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Many people are involved in making policy, but most books on public policy tend
to ignore the actual practice of policy work. They offer little guidance to policy
workers or students of policy. Policy work seems to be something you learn on the
job. Working for Policy directly addresses the nature of policy work. By blending 
academic and experiential knowledge, it describes, analyses and evaluates what
modern policy workers do in particular situations. This book explains how real-
life understandings of policy work clarify the policy process in complex policy
fields, and sketches the skills and knowledge required for policy work in modern
societies.
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7 Preface
There is a substantial body of literature on how policy elites engage in pol-
icy-making. Moreover, there are numerous textbooks that purport to teach 
students the proper methods and techniques of policy analysis. However, em-
pirical studies of the work of ‘ordinary,’ mid-level policy workers, inside or 
outside government, remain rare. This book is part of a small, but growing 
body of research that seeks to remedy this situation, which includes Page and 
Jenkins’ Policy Bureaucracy: Government with a Cast of Thousands (2005), and 
more particularly, Colebatch’s The Work of Policy: An International Survey 
(2006). This book builds on these earlier studies of policy work, adding new 
perspectives and findings.
First, we have tried to detect whether contemporary accounts of policy work 
deviate from traditional accounts of policy-making and policy analysis or not. 
We trace the potential influences of government reforms, such as the drive 
for New Public Management and the shift towards network governance. We 
looked at policy work in different countries (mostly the Netherlands, but also 
Canada and the United States) and in different settings where these trends 
occur. This includes policy work in the increasingly important setting of 
transnational regimes, particularly the European Union.
 Second, from a more analytical angle, the book explicitly focuses on pro-
cesses of account giving in the study of policy-making. It focuses on how we 
– both observers and participants – perceive, frame and actively construe the 
intrinsically ambiguous phenomenon known as ‘policy.’ It also shows that we 
are politically and professionally socialized to apply a few standardized and 
taken-for-granted accounts.
 Third, by focusing on the account giving of both observers (scholars and 
researchers) and participants (practitioners and policy workers), the book 
seeks to improve the troubled dialogue between the scientific study of public 
policy and practical policy work.
 Fourth, the book focuses primarily on individual policy workers, and on 
the day-to-day practices that make up policy. We are especially interested in 
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the potentially innovative capacity of policy work. Although policy workers 
have to act within the constraints of organizational routines and the struc-
tured interactions of politics and administration, they must be seen as essen-
tially  ‘agents’ that enact policy realities that structure and potentially innovate 
and change subsequent policy acts.
 Fifth, the book aims to be reflective and self-critical, avoiding the assump-
tion that policy can be understood simply as a product of the activities of 
policy workers. It takes into account the social, cultural, administrative and 
political phenomena within which policy is put together, reflecting upon in-
terpretive policy outlooks themselves, and in this way, showing that we may 
need to broaden our perception of how we understand ‘policy domains.’
 The book resulted from an intensive collaborative project that took shape 
at the margins of the Interpretative Policy Analysis (IPA) conference in Am-
sterdam, 2006. Several scholars and ‘reflexive’ practitioners came together in 
order to discuss papers on the nature of policy, and on how to represent and 
interpret policy work. In subsequent years, this group started to organize 
discussions and to produce more developed papers, which evolved into the 
chapters of this book. This means that most of the empirical material re-
ported here is drawn from Dutch policy experience but we make no apology 
for this: no account of policy work is context-free, but nothing in the research 
reported here suggested that this experience is idiosyncratic or irrelevant to 
policy work elsewhere.
 The realization of this book would, of course, not have been possible with-
out the authors’ inputs and contributions. We thank them for their high-qual-
ity cooperation. We also thank Laura Opraus, student at the Utrecht School 
of Governance, University of Utrecht, for her valuable editorial support.
Hal Colebatch, Robert Hoppe, Mirko Noordegraaf,
October 2009
AIntroduction
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1 Understanding Policy Work
Hal Colebatch, Robert Hoppe and Mirko Noordegraaf
 Policy as a handle on government
‘Policy’ has become one of the central ways in how we talk about government, 
presenting the process of government as a pattern of systematic action ori-
ented to particular collective concerns. It is a central concept in a narrative of 
governing in authoritative and instrumental terms: Governments recognize 
problems and make decisions to bring public authority and resources to bear 
upon these problems, with ‘policy’ as the expression of these decisions. As 
we will see, this perspective embodies questions and puzzles for both practi-
tioners and observers, but it occupies centre stage, constituting a framework 
within which policy concerns are discussed.
 In a way, the policy perspective is an alternative to the more traditional 
‘politics’ perspective on government that sees it as a competitive struggle for 
power and the capacity for allocation which goes along with it. Of course, 
the two cannot be totally separated, as the politics perspective considers one 
of the fruits of political success as the capacity to steer government through 
policy, and the policy perspective assumes that political leaders will want to 
shape the direction of government activity through policy choices. But the 
politics perspective tends to focus attention on the competitive struggle for 
the right to choose, while the policy perspective is more concerned with prob-
lem solving.
 In this narrative of ‘authoritative instrumentalism,’ a central place is given 
to ‘policymakers,’ although it is not always clear who is being referred to. It 
also envisages that the policymakers will have ‘policy advisers’ and may also 
draw on the work of ‘policy analysts.’ We find this unduly specific and limiting 
in its vision. There are many people whose work is oriented toward policy: 
political leaders, bureaucrats, professional experts, advocates, interest group 
representatives, and others. These are the people we call policy workers. They 
may be employed by the government, or one of a range of bodies concerned 
about how the authority of government can be brought to bear on problems: 
think tanks, interest groups, professional bodies, community associations, in-
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ternational organizations, etc. They may be activists, not employed in this 
sector at all, but committed to policy as a major part of their lives, though, in 
many cases, these people are drawn into paid employment, often because gov-
ernments offer grants to issue-focused groups so that they can employ staff 
and more easily bring their perspective to bear in official circumstances.
 Policy work is how these participants bring their diverse forms of knowl-
edge to bear on policy questions but how this work is done is something that 
is learned from practice rather than from study. ‘You learn on the job,’ as one 
policy worker put it (Howard 2005: 10). This may be related to differences 
in the sorts of knowledge we have of the policy process, particularly between 
the detached, codified knowledge of the academic observer and the involved 
and (possibly tacit) experiential knowledge of the practitioner. This book 
presents both forms of knowledge to illuminate the work of policy, both for 
the outsider who wants to understand it and the insider who has to make it 
happen.
 This introductory chapter first discusses the ways in which policy is un-
derstood and what these mean for the nature of policy work. It goes on to 
discuss the way policy work is institutionalized, and the collective nature of 
policy work, which can mean that policy workers find different sorts of ac-
counts of their practice are presented, and that different accounts may make 
sense in different contexts. It then identifies the questions that this book 
raises – about policy, policy work and policy workers – and shows how the 
chapters in the book contribute to our growing understanding of policy work.
  e policy narrative and policy work
The term ‘policy’ conveys a sense of clarity and stability, but its exact mean-
ing (and its implications for policy work) is not always clear. It is generally 
situated within a paradigm that we can call ‘authoritative instrumentalism,’ 
which sees government as a mechanism for official problem solving, centered 
around decisions made by authorized leaders, with official practice seen as the 
‘implementation’ of the decision (Friedrich 1963; Dye 1972; Hale 1988; Ander-
son 1997; Althaus, Bridgman and Davis 2008). Within this paradigm, policy 
is used to refer to:
– the goals or strategies of the leaders;
– specific acts such as decisions, announcements and statutes;
– an overriding logic of action (e.g., ‘our policy on the environment’);
– a structure of practice (e.g., ‘the school’s policy on late essays’).
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In some of these uses, policy refers to something specific and tangible, that is 
expressed in a document, but used in other ways, it is more diffuse and has to 
be inferred from practice, so we find people distinguishing between ‘formal,’ 
written policy, and tacitly-understood unwritten policy. Or they may play one 
usage against another – e.g., criticizing structures of practice because they op-
erate to undermine efforts to achieve stated goals. As a concept, policy would 
have to be considered what Levi-Strauss termed ‘a floating signifier’: its mean-
ing depends on the context and the people involved.
 So, to understand the work of policy, we have to look at the speciﬁ c context 
in which it is done. Th e narrative of authoritative instrumentalism focuses on 
the leaders, who ‘make policy’ by the exercise of their authority; policy is said 
to be made when leaders or groups of leaders approve a proposal. But the nar-
rative also recognizes that these proposals emerge from the work involved in 
governing, and are channeled through oﬃ  cials, whose function is to ‘advise’ 
political leaders. Th is means the recognition of a variety of ‘policy advisors.’ 
Th ere are the functional experts in the ﬁ eld under review – medical scientists, 
social workers, marine ecologists, etc. – some of whom may well have been the 
instigators of the policy moves. Th ere are also the people who can be called 
‘process experts,’ skilled at generating policy proposals, steering them through 
the complex world of procedure and stakeholder opinion, and responding ap-
propriately to the proposals of others. Th e policy movement in the US gave 
rise to a new cadre of ‘decision experts’ or ‘policy analysts,’ who were trained in 
graduate schools and claimed two linked forms of expertise. One was problem-
focused – what is the nature of the problem that needs to be resolved, what do 
we know about it, what are the possible responses – and policy analysts were 
trained to generate data, about the problem, the responses, and the impact 
they might have. Their second field of expertise involves decision-making 
technology, so that alternative courses of action could be compared in terms 
of the resources needed to put them into effect and their probable outcomes. 
The policy analyst was considered an expert adviser who clarifies the prob-
lem, identifies the alternative courses of action, and systematically determines 
the optimal response: he or she would be comparable to the scientist in the 
laboratory, and engaged in ‘speaking truth to power’ (Wildavsky 1979).
 The idea that systematic analysis should be incorporated into the govern-
mental process was well received in the US, and ‘policy analysis’ was soon a 
recognized term, and became institutionalized both as a body of knowledge 
and as a field of practice, so that by the turn of the 21st century, Beryl Radin 
was reporting that policy analysis had ‘come of age’ (Radin 2000). The in-
creased use of policy analysis by government induced non-government bodies 
to hire policy staff members who could ‘speak the language.’ The discourses 
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and norms of policy analysis became increasingly normalized through gradu-
ate programs subject to accreditation, through the homogenizing effect of 
conferences with attendees like the Association for Public Policy and Man-
agement, and through their incorporation into ‘normal practice’ (e.g., require-
ments that the federally funded activities of community groups be formally 
evaluated). Even academic writers who had reservations about this ‘normal 
practice’ sometimes felt obliged to instruct their readers in its use (e.g., Clem-
ons and McBeth 2001: chapter 8).
 At the same time, it was not clear that what these people were actually 
doing was policy analysis. Radin discovered that people employed as policy 
analysts were usually engaged in a wide range of tasks, ranging from doing 
non-partisan research for legislators to educating the general public to lobby-
ing for specific measures. This took them well beyond the realm of the formal 
methodology of choice in which they had been trained, which meant that 
(Radin 2000: 183):
Th ere seems to be a disconnect between the analyst’s perception of self-
worth (often drawn from the rational actor model) and the real contribu-
tion that the actor makes in the nooks and crannies of the policy process. 
... Th ey seem to need a language to describe what they do and to convince 
themselves – as well as others – that they contribute to the process.
Some have concluded that their textbooks were ‘really about theory rather 
than practice’ (Howard 2005: 10). This friction between teaching and experi-
ence finds it way back into the texts, where it is found in the argument about 
rigor and relevance, which wonder whether is it more important to conform 
to the canons of social science research or to have an impact on the process 
even if it means that the research is ‘quick and dirty.’ Should the policy analyst 
build support for the optimal course of action based on the analytical data? 
This became an important question because policy analysts and researchers 
noticed that carefully crafted policy analyses were seldom used by decision 
makers. This generated a demand for policy analysts to make their findings 
more accessible to busy decision makers (e.g., Edwards 2005), but also to dis-
cuss the various ways that research findings might have an impact (e.g., Weiss 
1982; 1991). Apparently, the demand for analysis was not simply meant to gen-
erate information on which to base decisions.
Information is gathered, policy alternatives are deﬁ ned, and cost-beneﬁ t 
analyses are pursued, but they seem more intended to reassure observ-
ers of the appropriateness of actions being taken than to inﬂ uence the 
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actions. ... choice in political institutions is orchestrated to assure its au-
dience ... that the choice has been made intelligently, that it reﬂ ects plan-
ning, thinking, analysis and the systematic use of information (March and 
Olsen 1989: 48, 50).
In any case, it was clear that government employees who work on policy had 
numerous tasks including formal analysis, writing texts, managing the de-
mands of the governmental process, and above all, interacting with other 
players involved in the issue. We will now turn to this dimension of policy 
work in the following section.
 Governing as collective activity
In the narrative of authoritative instrumentalism, governing happens when 
‘the government’ recognizes problems and decides to do something about 
them; what it decides to do is called ‘policy.’ The narrative constitutes an 
actor called ‘the government’ and attributes to it instrumental rationality: it 
acts as it does in order to achieve preferred outcomes. This is not necessarily 
the way that practitioners experience the policy world, however. One group 
reported: ‘We identified over 100 organizations involved in creating Austra-
lian illicit drugs policy. Some are national, some at the state/territory or 
local community level, and others are international organizations’ (McDon-
ald et al. 2005: 11). There are many players in the game, not all of them are 
involved in supporting a single political leader, or even a collective called ‘the 
government,’ and not all of them are trying to ‘make policy.’ They may come 
from other public agencies, community organizations, professional bodies or 
business groups. They may be near-permanent players or they may be only 
involved in a specific issue. They may be skilled policy operators or new to 
the game. But the game is not random, and over time, it has a tendency to sta-
bilize. The players develop relationships based on familiarity and trust, find 
common ground in the policy area, and recognize their mutual interdepen-
dence. Richardson and Jordan (1979) identified this process of clustering as 
‘the policy community.’ Others have described ‘issue networks’ (Heclo 1974), 
‘sub-governments’ (Coleman and Skogstad 1990), and ‘advocacy coalitions’ 
(Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993), in any case, policy is now widely recog-
nized as a multi-player game.
 This dimension of policy has become more widely recognized. People in 
positions of authority are more likely to accept the fact that other participants 
are also involved in policy development, considering them ‘stakeholders,’ and 
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valuing the accomplishment of collectively generated outcomes. Even policy 
professionals probably spend more of their time negotiating with their coun-
terparts in other agencies than they do in advising their bosses (Radin 2000). 
It is through these interactions with other participants that appropriate out-
comes are arrived at. There is a clear link here between the interaction and 
the discourse because shared discourse facilitates interaction, and interaction 
tends to generate shared discourse. Haas (1992) argued that the international 
policy accomplishments involving chlorofluorocarbons reflects the existence 
of an ‘epistemic community’ of scientists who share a common understanding 
of the problem.
 That is why this book is oriented toward ‘policy work’ as a broad field of 
practice, and to ‘policy workers,’ including the full range of those who find 
themselves engaged in the mobilization of public authorities involving issues 
of collective concern – that is, in the creation of policy. The focus is primarily 
on what they do rather than on the outcome – that is, on ‘doing policy work’ 
rather than ‘coming up with a policy on X.’
 Policy development as discursive construction
This last example points out the importance of policy development that 
involves a shared understanding of the problem. Policy work is about solv-
ing problems, but it is also about identifying areas of concern and applying 
known techniques of governing. This often has less to do with discovering 
phenomena than with re-evaluating already known phenomena. For instance, 
in a number of Western countries, policy on smoking has changed radically in 
recent decades, with restrictions on where smoking is permitted, massive in-
creases in taxation, and widespread curbs on advertising. But these changes in 
regulations were only possible because of changes in the shared understand-
ings about smoking; as smoking became less socially acceptable, it became 
increasingly possible to impose restrictions on it (and in turn, these made it 
even less acceptable). The changing attitude toward smoking reflected the ac-
tivities of health professionals (some of whom worked for government agen-
cies, many, however did not) and anti-smoking activists, but also complemen-
tary actions by insurance companies, trade unions and commercial landlords, 
many of whom do not commonly engage in policy development, but who con-
tributed to the changing perception of smoking and the eventual regulatory 
framework.
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 Multiple accounts of policy work
This book recognizes that there is no one simple ‘good account’ of policy work; 
it involves a broad range of activities that can be described as policy work, and 
a variety of ways to make sense of these activities. A helpful distinction can 
be made between accounts that explain outputs and those that seek to explain 
activity. To describe the action as ‘policy-making’ is to highlight the apparent 
output – ‘developing a policy on X’ – and to see the participants as contribu-
tors in this development. In an ‘authoritative instrumental’ account, the action 
may be considered a sequential progression toward a desired output: identify-
ing the issue, collecting data, framing options, evaluating, consulting, deciding 
and implementing. But an account focused on activity might reveal, that for 
many participants, participation is not about a policy on X, but on resisting 
it, or trying to use the interest in X to affect change in governmental practices 
in relation to p, q or r. The account would be framed in terms of interaction 
or conflict regarding the nature of the problem and the appropriate response, 
or resistance and distraction, or the search for a broadly acceptable outcome, 
or the ambiguity about the decisions made, and the potential for continuing 
the discussion.
 The interest is not so much in how the participants collaborated to achieve 
a known and desired result, but how the ongoing interaction between the 
participants – involved in various ways, to various extents, and for various 
reasons – was marked by points of apparent firmness (‘decisions’), which were 
then taken to come up with a ‘policy’ on a particular issue.
 Both of these accounts of policy work are valid; it just depends on the con-
text (‘locus’) and the perspective adopted (‘focus’). The output-based account 
makes sense of the result (‘the government has decided...’); the activity-based 
account makes sense of the experiences. The output-based account is told 
from a single point of view; the activity-based account is told from a number 
of different perspectives. The output-based account reflects a systematic and 
orderly understanding of governing, while the activity-based account reflects 
experiential knowledge. And it is clear that different types of accounts can be 
given of the same activity. Policy work on climate change, for instance, could 
be described as ‘advising the Minister,’ ‘negotiating an agreed course of action 
with key stakeholders,’ ‘shifting the parameters of public attention,’ or even 
‘tracing public perceptions’ or ‘spinning the effects of Al Gore’s An Inconve-
nient Truth.’ In any case, they can all be considered equally descriptions of the 
activity. This suggests three things:
1. that accounts of policy work are not neutral; they reflect contexts and 
perspectives;
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2. that giving accounts of policy practice are part of that practice and will 
involve experiential knowledge;
3. that analyzing policy work requires an understanding of the practices in-
volved in producing accounts, both by the participants and by outside 
observers.
That is why this book seeks to place policy work in the broader narratives 
of governing, present systemic and experiential insights into policy practices, 
and reflect upon the nature of accounts given.
 Our agenda for inquiry
This multiplicity of accounts points to the importance of empirical policy 
work studies, comparable to Mintzberg’s pioneering research on the nature 
of managerial work (Mintzberg 1973) and the work of writers like Forester 
(1993) and Healey (1992), who showed that town planning was less about 
making plans than about mediating between players with different concerns 
who discovered they were participants in a broad process of urban change. 
Noordegraaf (2000a; 2000b; 2007) tracked how policy managers dealt with 
the demands of the job. Hoppe and Jeliazkova (2006), drawing on interviews 
with middle-level policy workers, identified a number of quite distinct styles 
of policy work. A key question has been ‘why is the policy work being done?’ 
Tao (2006) showed that both elected members and permanent officials in 
American local government use policy analysis to support programs that they 
favor and resist programs that they oppose. As Radin (2000) noted, policy 
analysis has become the ‘dueling swords’ that policy workers use in negotia-
tions with other policy workers. In other words, they don’t use it to generate 
a clear solution but to facilitate discussion.
 This book focuses on policy as a continuing process, rather than as the 
production of completed outputs called ‘policies,’ and addresses a number of 
problematic aspects of policy and the processes that produced it. It highlights 
the tension between the perception of policy as consisting of episodes of 
instrumental choice (‘interventions’) as opposed to the continuing manage-
ment of problematic aspects of social practice (which may at times involve 
the mobilization of state authority). Accounts of policy shifts are commonly 
described in terms of government intention (‘the government has decided ...’), 
but policy workers often find that these ‘intentions’ involve the endorsement 
of painfully negotiated understandings among stakeholders. We can also see 
that while policy is considered an attribute and product of sovereign national 
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governments, the process of producing it reaches upwards (i.e., to inter- and 
supra-national bodies), downwards (to regional and local levels of govern-
ment), and outwards (to business and non-governmental bodies), involving 
a range of ‘non-state’ bodies in the business of exercising state authority. So, 
there may be a variety of policy accounts in circulation, and the account in use 
may differ from the practitioner’s experience of the process. This is because 
the accounts of policy practice are themselves part of the practice, and this has 
to be borne in mind in the analysis of policy practice.
 There are similar ambiguities and tensions in the study of policy work. In 
the narrative of authoritative instrumentalism, policymaking is very much 
considered to be an official preserve: outsiders may request or propose or 
advise, but it is for the authoritative leaders to decide and to ‘make policy.’ 
But there is a counter-narrative that focuses on the connections between the 
participants, and considers governing as the product of networks that cate-
gorizes participants in various governmental or non-governmental organiza-
tions and considers policy as something that emerges from this interaction, 
rather than something that is independently determined by the governmen-
tal members of these networks. This counter-narrative of ‘governance’ has 
come to dominate the analyses of government in the liberal democracies of 
Western Europe and many other countries (Rhodes 1997; Stoker 1998; Kjaer 
2004; Offe 2008), and raises many questions about the analysis of policy 
work, including:
– the relationships among governmental policy workers;
– relations between policy workers and non-governmental actors;
– the importance of non-governmental bodies in the construction of re-
gimes of rule;
– how the outcomes of these linkages are ‘enacted’ through the forms and 
practices of authoritative instrumentalism, which will be recognized as 
‘policy.’
It focuses attention on the dynamics of these interactions and on the struc-
tures through which these linkages operate, the practices by which they are 
maintained, and the shared meanings, which they give rise to, and which, in 
turn, sustain the ongoing collaboration.
 These tensions and ambiguities about policy and policy work are reflect-
ed in the self-awareness of policy workers who experience conflicting action 
cues. To what extent should they see their task as the application of expert 
knowledge, or knowledge of the field of action being governed (e.g., health 
or transport or migration) or of knowledge about methods for choosing (i.e., 
as taught in US-style policy analysis courses)? To what extent does one ne-
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gotiate with representatives of other stakeholders in order to get results that 
will at least be tacitly accepted by the stakeholders? To what extent is it con-
cerned with the management of the official structures and practices , which 
produce policy outcomes – advising leaders, and generating and process-
ing documents? The government-employed policy workers have questions 
about their relationship with their non-governmental counterparts, who are 
likely to share their professional background and whose cooperation they 
hope to secure; how will the need to maintain a cooperative relationship 
with non-governmental bodies affect the way they relate to the government’s 
agenda?
  e structure of the book
This shows us that we have to be attentive not only to what policy workers 
do, but also to how they (and others) make sense of this activity, in a variety 
of contexts. This book aims to track the nature of policy activity and the ac-
counts of it in different contexts. It asks what it is that policy workers do in 
particular situations and why is that the appropriate thing to do, what does it 
contribute to policy activity, what impact does it have and what can we learn 
from this about the skills and knowledge that policy work requires?
 As we have seen, the identification of policy as a dimension of govern-
ment, and of policy work as a field of practice that generates and sustains 
policy, is a particular account of government, which has to contend with 
other accounts, both in the shaping of practice and in the explanations of the 
practice. Therefore, our analysis begins with Colebatch’s investigation into 
how accounts of government are framed, how ‘policy’ is distinguished from 
other aspects of governing, and how these accounts are used in the shaping 
of practice. Noordegraaf presents a survey of academic research on policy 
work, identifying the different levels of data on which researchers draw, the 
concerns that they investigate, and the picture of policy work that they have 
thus far assembled.
 We then move to accounts of particular aspects of policy practice in par-
ticular contexts, and the questions that these accounts raise about policy 
work. Some of these are accounts of academic research (Geuijen, De Vries 
et al., Shore), some are accounts by policy workers of their own practices 
(Woeltjes, Metze), and some combine elements of both (Loeber, Sterren-
berg, Williams). These accounts highlight the multiple cues and pressures 
experienced in policy work, how policy work is concerned with continuity, 
but also with disruption, the range of meanings that policy activity can have 
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for the various participants, and how practitioners (particularly consultants 
and evaluators) locate themselves in relation to these different meanings and 
mediate between them. There are shared elements across these accounts, 
as well as distinct differences, which can be divided into three particular 
themes:
– Policy workers are involved in constructing shared meaning. Metze’s account 
of a redevelopment project shows how consultants acted to generate in-
novative and shared meaning among the various interested parties. In this 
case, the outcome was interesting to anyone outside of the circle of par-
ticipants, and a relatively open learning process was possible. By contrast, 
De Vries, Halffman and Hoppe found that the economic forecasts of the 
Netherlands Central Planning Bureau were held in great esteem because 
of its high level of expertise and autonomy; it was considered an offering 
of unbiased expertise in a contested policy field. The practitioners knew 
that there was considerable uncertainty about these forecasts, and there 
was some debate about them among bureau experts and ministry offi-
cials, but it was important to keep this private and that the bureau’s pre-
dictions be presented purely as the outcome of its own calculations. The 
most important element in the construction of meaning was the meaning 
attributed to the bureau’s predictions by political leaders and the ‘atten-
tive public.’
– Policy workers are involved in mediation between different participants 
and agendas, where institutional questions can be particularly important. 
Sterrenberg analyzes a case in which ‘insiders’ initiated a policy review of 
a long-established independent institute that regularly advises the Parlia-
ment. They encountered deep-seated cultural and institutional divisions 
among the participants and found that policy change required new rela-
tionships between the various actors. Their policy work involved look-
ing for windows of opportunity to foster these relationships. In Loeber’s 
case study a new public body was to develop policies for sustainable de-
velopment. It was generally accepted, but specific implications remained 
unclear. The policy developers mediated between the desire for change 
and the understanding and skills of the present practices. Meanwhile, the 
evaluators who were involved in the project from the outset, mediated 
between detachment and involvement. All of those involved in the project 
constructed relationships across different meanings as they discovered 
that they were engaged in both ‘collective puzzling’ and ‘powering’ (Heclo 
1974).
– Policy is seen as a state function, while policy actually operates beyond the 
nation-state. Political leaders preside over an apparatus of state officials, 
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but these officials often discover that they have to reach ‘upwards’ to the 
international level, ‘sideways’ to business groups and non-governmental 
organizations, and ‘downwards’ to local communities and social groups. 
Sterrenberg’s chapter reveals that policy activity reaches downwards, and 
Loeber’s chapter shows it reaching sideways. This has been particularly 
evident in Europe with the development of policy at a European level 
through the European Union, but it can be seen throughout the world, 
both as ad hoc incidents such as the outbreak of SARS, which initiated 
an expansion of the policy surveillance role of the World Health Orga-
nization, and more systematically, in the standardization of the regula-
tion of commercial practice through the World Trade Organization. 
When policy workers operate in these broader fields, they are subject 
to a wider range of cues for action, which have to be balanced against 
traditional norms of professional skills and the responsiveness to politi-
cal leadership. We present two case studies that investigate how national 
officials respond to the challenges of European-level policy work; one 
is a practitioner account, the other is comprised of academic research. 
Woeltjes’s study of the practitioner discovers that, in this trans-national 
context, policy work is rarely concerned with strategy, and much more 
with negotiations through complex institutional provisions that allow 
varying degrees of maneuverability. Policy workers are engaged in the 
maintenance of relationships among the various players, maintaining a 
flow of information and engaging in an ongoing conversation through 
which problems are ‘discovered’ and appropriate responses are negoti-
ated. This account is supported by the academic research of Geuijen and 
’t Hart, which stresses the importance of political preference in the do-
mestic policy dynamic and notes its relative absence at the European 
level, where policy workers receive multiple cues for action without an 
overriding political ‘steer.’ This means that, as Tenbensel (2008) would 
describe it, they are involved in a ‘no trumps’ game, in which a range 
of policy workers with multiple identities manage an ambiguous policy 
field on an ongoing basis – a process that the authors describe as ‘profes-
sional bricolage.’ They have to be credible in the European context with-
out finding themselves exposed at home.
Our analysis shows that policy work is traversed by multiple, overlapping 
and sometimes conflicting accounts of practice, which requires policy work-
ers to negotiate their reality within these different accounts. But differences 
arise between the various accounts that policy workers give of their own 
practice and the accounts that outside observers (i.e., academic researchers) 
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might give. We have already noted the distinction between output-based and 
activity-based accounts; we can also distinguish between accounts that are 
grounded in the logic of the system and those derived from the observation 
of activity, as well as those between ‘sacred’ accounts for public consumption 
and ‘profane’ accounts that are shared between trusted associates. Practitio-
ners and academics will probably pose different questions about policy work 
and address them in their own ways in different timeframes. The outcome 
is a widespread complaint from practitioners that academic research is not 
‘useful,’ to which the researchers respond by pointing out that their research 
is seldom used.
 The last two chapters address this conflict between academic and prac-
titioner knowledge. Williams (who is both an academic and a practitioner) 
argues that while academic and practitioner perspectives may differ signifi-
cantly, they are both valid and every effort should be made to encourage com-
munication across barriers. She reviews the criticisms that the two have of 
each other, and the barriers that they raise against learning from each other, 
and then outlines steps that could be taken to build ‘a culture of engaged com-
munication’ between academics and practitioners. Shore is an academic who 
mainly responds to the claim that academic research is not useful and that 
researchers should ‘learn to think and talk like policymakers.’ He points out 
the tension between the ‘authoritative instrumental’ framework that practi-
tioners are (at least publicly) committed to and the more critical views of the 
academic researcher. He argues that the value of academic research lies in its 
openness to alternative explanations which are tested against the evidence, 
which, in turn, yields a better understanding of the process that mobilizes the 
concept of policy in the management of practice.
Policy, as both a sphere of practice and as a field of knowledge, has under-
gone considerable changes over the last few decades, as has the type of work 
it is associated with. The areas that need to be analyzed are only just now 
being marked out, and there is currently no established body of knowledge. 
This book emerged from a gathering of academics and policy practitioners 
who wanted to combine the knowledge of the academic and the practitio-
ner to create policy work that is more informed, and policy research that 
is more practical. This book is only the beginning, but we hope that it will 
contribute to both the study and the practice of policy work. We hope this 
will foster further studies that will lead to a more critical and self-aware 
practice.
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 Introduction
In this book, scholars and (reflexive) practitioners will tell their ‘stories’ about 
their work in the field of policy, but first we need to consider the nature of the 
stories and ‘accounts’ of policy. Talking about ‘policymakers’ implies identifi-
able actors creating a clearly visible product: ‘policy.’ But when policy is seen 
in more ambiguous terms, it becomes more difficult to objectively define what 
the policy ‘is’ or the work that created it. Representing this ambiguous real-
ity as policy is an exercise in interpretation, which is accomplished by policy 
practices themselves, but also through the scholarly endeavors that analyze 
the policy-making processes. What is considered ‘policy work’ is part of this 
process of representation engaged in by both practitioners and observers. So 
neither ‘policy’ nor ‘policy work’ can be seen as neutral phenomena, instead, 
they are part of the process of learning how people attempt to understand 
and shape practice, and relate this to the broader attempts to ‘govern’ societies 
and channel political processes. This means that values and interests are at 
stake, and that the outcomes of policy processes will produce both winners 
and losers, which will no doubt affect the various interpretations. Critical 
forms of policy analysis, for example, aim not only to represent policies as 
openly as possible, but also to disclose the processes involved in the creation 
of policy, the voices heard (and not heard), and to inform and involve those 
left out of the process. Policy work is an exercise in the social construction of 
meaning, but the deconstruction of policy through analysis is also part of this 
policy process.
 This section thus focuses on meta-accounts, observations of how accounts 
of policy work are constructed and utilized. But first we must understand 
‘policy’ as a meta-account within our understanding of governing, and within 
this account, the sort of practices that are explained and validated. Hal Cole-
batch shows that there are distinct and overlapping accounts of policy that 
focus on different aspects of the process of governing. Policy can be seen as a 
process of authoritative choice that emphasizes the positions of leaders, deci-
sions and programs. It can be seen as structured interaction that focuses on the 
interplay between different participants with distinct agendas. Policy can also 
30 Introduction
be seen as social construction, which entails the ‘collective puzzling’ regarding 
problems and the appropriate responses. He shows how these accounts are 
constructed and how they are mobilized by both practitioners and observers 
to ‘make sense’ of policy activity. The policy process thus involves managing 
the interplay of distinct and potentially conflicting accounts, the fuzzy and 
contested outcomes, and the activity that generated these uncertain and un-
demarcated outcomes (i.e., ‘policy work’).
 Secondly, we must understand the processes involved in giving an account 
of policy work itself. Rather than presenting policy work in terms of its con-
tribution to a putative goal, we start with the actual work being performed 
and try to get as close as possible to policy workers. Mirko Noordegraaf 
shows how this can be accomplished, by first distinguishing three types of 
accounts: the personal accounts of participants (first-order accounts), observ-
ers’ analyses of participant behavior (second order accounts), and systemic ac-
counts of policy processes (third-order accounts). He emphasizes the impor-
tance of second-order accounts because they delicately steer a course between 
the Scylla of loose stories and the Charybdis of impersonal abstractions. He 
shows how policy workers and policy work are discussed in these second-
order accounts and distinguishes between the studies of dispositions of policy 
workers (including elite dispositions) that influence day-to-day behavior, the 
studies of contexts and how policy workers cope with circumstances, and the 
studies of the functions of policy workers, stressing the importance of infor-
mation and interpretation. Together, these insights add up to a well-rounded 
picture of the multifaceted nature of policy work.
 In this sense, the two types of meta-accounts are complementary. The 
fuzzy and contested nature of policy work as governing is reflected in differ-
ent accounts of policy workers and behavior. It also explains why real policy 
work looks and feels as it does – interactive, iterative and erratic. Developing 
policies is not just about analysis and making plans and decisions; it is also 
about understanding and realizing governing. This underscores the focus of 
this book, which is the importance of developing accounts and organizing 
dialogues between academic and practitioner accounts.
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2 Giving Accounts of Policy Work
Hal Colebatch
 Policy as an account of governing
This book focuses on how we account for the work of policy, recognizing 
that there is more than one type of account, and that different accounts may 
‘make sense’ in different contexts. In this perspective, we need to recognize 
that ‘policy’ is itself an account of government, a construct mobilized, both by 
academic observers and by practitioners, to make sense of the activity of gov-
erning. It presents government as a process of instrumental decision making, 
in which actors called governments address problems and identify goals; the 
practice of governing is then explained by referring back to these decisions, 
seeing it as the ‘implementation’ of the choices made by governments. Dye 
described public policy ‘whatever government decides to do or not to do’ (Dye 
1985). The basic assumptions underlying this description are seldom exam-
ined because it seems like ‘common sense,’ but this is precisely why we need 
to examine these (and other accounts): in how (and why) they ‘make sense’ of 
the process?
 This account of government as a pattern of official problem solving is not 
the only version available. A much older interpretation (e.g., from Hobbes to 
Oakeshott) believes that government is concerned with order or the mainte-
nance of stable relationships and practices as well as dealing with disturbances. 
The dominant paradigm in welfare economics considers government to be a 
mechanism that deals with market failure, while the processes of choice are 
simply devices that enforce calculated solutions to problems of collective ac-
tion. A third interpretation sees government as a struggle for partisan benefit: 
‘who gets what, when and how,’ as Lasswell (1936) described it. Linked to this, 
but also distinguished from it, is a perception of government as a competitive 
struggle for dominance among leaders, with statements about goals, choices or 
benefits being largely tokens in this continuing struggle. More recently, the 
term governance has been used to suggest that governing is the outcome of a 
complex interweaving of both official and non-official organizational forms, 
that often mobilizes different frameworks of meaning and rationales of ac-
32 Hal Colebatch
tion. All of these perspectives remain relevant, and they show that seeing gov-
ernment in terms of outcome-oriented instrumental choice is not the only 
available explanation.
 Having recognized ‘policy’ as a particular presentation of the process of 
government, we can then see that there are a number of different ways in 
which it is used to make sense, and we can identify three overlapping ac-
counts of policy: authoritative choice, structured interaction, and social con-
struction (see Colebatch 2006a; 2006b). Authoritative choice is the account 
that we identified at the beginning of the chapter. Policy is understood as the 
outcome of actors (governments) making choices about how to achieve their 
goals. This account is embedded in the field’s language because it focuses on 
‘decisions,’ and on the people who make them, the ‘decision-makers’ or ‘poli-
cymakers,’ and to some extent, on the ‘implementation’ of these decisions. A 
process described as ‘backward mapping,’ allows present practice to be seen as 
the consequence of previous decisions, and current problems as the result of 
incorrect decisions (or the absence of decisions) in the past. The policy pro-
cess is seen in terms of identifying problems, choosing appropriate responses, 
and ensuring that these are implemented.
 While this account of policy as the choices made by a government is 
universally accepted and is seen as the basis for public discussion, policy 
practitioners tend (perhaps in private) to provide an alternative account of 
the process, one that stresses the broad range of participants with diverse 
agendas and values, who are thrown together in various ways to produce 
ambiguous and provisional outcomes; in this account, policy is a process 
of structured interaction among ‘stakeholders.’ In this account, participants 
do not start by identifying a problem; rather, they find themselves in a con-
tinuous flow of action, much of it initiated by others. They find that the 
pursuit of their own projects will probably involve seeking the cooperation 
of other participants, and they, in turn, will become involved in the proj-
ects of others. They are not so much solving problems as managing areas 
of concern, seeking mutually acceptable outcomes, which can be seen as 
improvement. Lindblom (1959) called this process ‘partisan mutual adjust-
ment.’ Policy is seen as an ongoing process with numerous purposes that 
may overlap and conflict with each other, with outcomes that are provi-
sional and ambiguous.
 But the terrain on which these organized stakeholders conduct their ne-
gotiations – the matters that are the focus of attention, and the courses of 
action that may be appropriate – is neither self-defining, nor is it fixed and 
agreed upon. Governing is based on frameworks of understanding of what is 
problematic and worthy of attention, what bodies of knowledge are relevant, 
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what technologies of governing can be applied, and which actors are allowed 
to speak. ‘Environmental policy,’ for instance, cannot be reduced to the instru-
mental choices of governments or the deals reached between competing stake-
holders, but reflects broader shifts in understanding about what is normal and 
what is problematic, and whose opinions are considered ‘sensible speech,’ as 
Bourdieu described it (see Rose and Miller 1992; Dean 1999; Colebatch 2002). 
In these terms, policy is a process of social construction, marked by conflict 
and ambiguity regarding the problems to be addressed, which voices should 
be heard, and what activities may be appropriate. It can be argued that social 
construction is actually a meta-account, which makes the other accounts pos-
sible, but it is justifiable (and convenient) to use it to denote the dimension of 
policy which relates to shared understanding, norms and problematization. 
Are smoking, traffic jams, and traffic accidents considered policy problems? 
If so, whose problem is it and who can talk authoritatively about the issue? In 
this perspective, policy is less about making a decision than about discourse, 
which, in turn, is linked to the question of participation: the question of who 
participates in the policy process will shape the nature of the discourse, and 
the discourse will, in turn, identify the appropriate participants. In this ac-
count, policy is a process of ‘collective puzzling’ (Heclo 1974), driven by a de-
sire to identify and solve problems, and marked by uncertainty and disagree-
ments about the nature of the problems and the effectiveness of the responses 
to them.
We do not live in a governed world so much as a world traversed by the 
‘will to govern,’ fuelled by the constant registration of ‘failure,’ the discrep-
ancy between ambition and outcome, and the constant injunction to do 
better next time (Rose and Miller 1992: 191).
 Making sense with multiple accounts
Employing multiple accounts may be considered confusing, but, in fact, both 
practitioners and observers are accustomed to using more than one account 
of policy. In Allison’s groundbreaking study of the Cuban missile crisis (Al-
lison 1971), he argues that we need to draw on three models to make sense of 
an activity:
1. a ‘rational actor’ model, which defines the actors as ‘the US’ and ‘the 
USSR,’ each pursuing its own objectives;
2. a ‘governmental process’ model, which defines the actors as particular 
agencies (e.g., the Pentagon, the CIA, the State Department), working 
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independently of each other with their own perceptions and standard 
operating procedures;
3. a ‘bureaucratic politics’ model defines the participants as rivals in a con-
tinuing struggle for influence, resources, and the ability to define the 
problem.
Each of these models, Allison argues, helps explain some aspects of the pro-
cess, but none of them can sufficiently explain the entire process, which im-
plies that they should be used in various combinations.
 Policy practitioners also tend to recognize the various accounts, although 
they are less likely to articulate this experiential knowledge. Th ey recognize 
that the ‘authoritative choice’ account has a moral ascendancy because it involves 
a ‘sacred’ language and is appropriate for public use, where the discussion of 
structured interaction is ‘profane,’ and can be employed privately among trusted 
associates. Laboriously negotiated deals among mutually distrusting stakehold-
ers will thus be presented as ‘the government has decided...’; in other words, 
outcomes which have been accomplished through structured interaction will 
be presented as authoritative choice, a process of ‘enactment’ (Weick 1979). And 
the same action can be accounted for in diﬀ erent ways. Holding a public inquiry 
can be seen as calling for information to enable the government to make a de-
cision (authoritative choice), creating an arena in which key stakeholders can 
advance claims and negotiate an outcome (structured interaction), or constitut-
ing an opportunity for discourse, testing alternatives, and public learning (social 
construction) (see Degeling, Baume and Jones 1993; Holland 2006).
 There are thus multiple accounts in circulation, and the question is not 
‘which is the best account?’ but rather ‘How is each one utilized and what is 
their impact on policy practice?’
 Accounts and the framing of practice
Each of these accounts frames the policy process in a specific way, and makes 
some types of practice (and some practitioners) appropriate, and others less 
so. The authoritative choice account presents policy as the result of ‘policy-
makers’ choosing to ‘intervene’ by making ‘decisions,’ which will lead to some 
beneficial outcome, while focusing on the prospective outcomes and on the 
practices that give rise to these decisions. It sustains a public discourse of in-
strumental rationality, linking outcomes to the intentions of ‘the government,’ 
e.g., in advocacy (‘if the government seeks to reduce youth unemployment, it 
should make the school curriculum more work-oriented’) and critique (‘the 
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government has announced a lot of measures to reduce youth unemployment, 
but it continues to increase’).
 It specifically focuses on official practices, framing governmental activity 
in terms of decisions. Since these are presented as the prerogative of the le-
gitimate political leaders, the work of the state bureaucracy is described as 
‘advising’ the leaders before the decision, and of ‘implementing’ the decision 
after it has been made. Papers are prepared as ‘submissions’ for approval, and 
any suggestion that the bureaucracy has its own preferences is firmly rejected. 
When (some years ago) a senior Australian federal bureaucrat was asked to 
identify his department’s objectives, he responded angrily ‘I have never pre-
viously encountered the suggestion of objectives for a department of state’ 
(Hawker, G.N., pers. com.); the department was simply there to advise the 
minister and administer legislation.
 In this context, policy work is of an advisory nature, although this label is 
attached to a wide range of practices (see Radin 2000; Hoppe and Jeliazkova 
2006). So-called ‘classical’ policy analysis (as taught in US graduate schools) 
considers the tasks as defining the problem, generating a range of options for 
solving it, and subjecting these to rigorous comparisons grounded in welfare 
economics. This approach usually generates a recommendation regarding the 
optimal course of action. More austere versions insist that the analyst should 
do no more than table the comparison. Radin (2000) concluded that, while 
policy workers had been trained in this sort of analysis, they were more likely 
to be engaged in tasks other than analysis, ranging from negotiations with 
other agencies to public education functions.
 By contrast, the structured-interaction account is reflected less in official 
titles and public discourses than in the experiential knowledge of policy prac-
titioners. These practitioners have found that the policy world is a constant 
flow of activity, much of it initiated by other people, and regardless of whether 
they pursue their own projects or respond to those proposed by others, they 
end up negotiating with fellow policy practitioners. They also realize that the 
development of policy on any topic usually concerns a few specialists – some 
governmental, some non-governmental – that relationships of familiarity and 
trust tended to grow between these specialists over time. They also notice 
that the policy process seemed to work better when expectations of these spe-
cialists to get a seat at the policy table were met. Richardson and Jordan (1979) 
called this coalition of the interested ‘the policy community,’ which has been 
readily adopted, as was the term ‘stakeholder’ (adopted from the management 
literature – Mitroff 1983), which recognizes the relationships involving shared 
interests and mutual dependence in policy fields. In the official discourse, 
terms like ‘consultation’ and ‘coordination’ are used to describe the interaction 
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that takes place during attempts to achieve a favorable outcome, but these 
terms attempt to express the interaction in a language of authoritative choice; 
as one practitioner observed:
Th ese words are so neutral. It’s not about consultation. It’s really about 
stakeholder engagement (Howard 2005: 10).
In this account, the focus of policy work is less on the prior preferences of the 
actor (‘the government’) and more on the generation of an outcome considered 
acceptable to a sufficiently broad range of stakeholders to win endorsement 
by the relevant political leaders. Policy work is concerned with identifying 
players and their institutional support, the stances they have taken and the 
discourses used. Policy work also engages in the sort of interaction that may 
lead to a successful outcome (which may be why so many want ads for policy 
staff insist on ‘superior communication skills’). Documents are produced to 
facilitate and express the mutual understanding that is created in this process. 
Noordegraaf (2000) found that policy managers led lives of ‘meetings and pa-
pers.’ Expert analysis may play a role in this interaction, but less as conclusive 
proof than as a vehicle for continuing the discussion. Tao (2006) observed 
that local elected and appointed government officials in Florida were more 
likely to use policy analysis against each other – as Lindblom had already 
noted in 1968, when he pointed out that policy analysis is not a substitute for 
political struggle but a means of pursuing it (Lindblom 1968: 34).
 In the social-construction account of policy, attention is focused on how 
situations become policy concerns, the recognition of authoritative knowl-
edge, and the identification of appropriate responses. One variant of this ac-
count links it to authoritative choice, where governments play a role in articu-
lating ‘the big picture’ of the public purposes – a meta-narrative, as Roe (1994) 
puts it. This forms the basis for the writing of large-scale plans (e.g., a ‘Na-
tional Language Policy’), and occasionally, has led to the creation of high-level 
policy advisory bodies, such as the Central Policy Review Staff, established 
in the UK in the 1970s (although like many of these bodies, it was relatively 
short-lived). At a more mundane level, it was interesting to note that during 
Tony Blair’s term as British Prime Minister, the Press Office at 10 Downing 
Street included a Head of Story Development, who focused on managing the 
meta-narrative that the government presented to the public.
 Another variant of the social-construction account looks at policy develop-
ment in terms of the change in the shared understandings on which it rests. 
When Professor Ross Garnaut was commissioned by the Australian govern-
ment to prepare a report on climate change policy in 2007, he presented his re-
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port to the Prime Minister, but also immediately began a series of public meet-
ings to stimulate public debate on the issue. In the US, former Vice-President 
Al Gore’s impact on the climate change debate through his ﬁ lm An Inconvenient 
Truth led to calls for his to return to the political arena as the Democratic presi-
dential candidate, which he resisted. One commentator observed that:
[Gore has] also come to believe that even a US president is powerless to 
act on climate change unless public opinion has moved, that acting as a 
teacher and advocate can have a greater political impact. And in a way the 
Nobel jury has just proved him right (Freedland 2007).
But the social-construction account of policy is not simply about govern-
ments marketing already-formed policy positions: it focuses attention on 
how issues are problematized, how they are understood, and who can speak 
authoritatively about them. Officials either play a leading role or they don’t. 
As Ian Marsh (1995) has pointed out, some of the most important policy 
shifts in Australia in recent years (including those connected with gender and 
the environment) originated in various social movements, not government or 
political party initiatives. Ballard’s study (2004) of the development of smok-
ing policy in Australia reveals a long trajectory of agitation by activists and 
medical authorities, which was accompanied by public opinion shifts, and 
over time, the anti-smoking lobby secured various forms of action on vari-
ous levels of government, which, in turn, contributed to (but did not directly 
cause) a decline in smoking (Chapman 1993). In this context, an activist with 
a spray can defacing a Marlboro billboard is clearly contributing to the social 
construction of smoking, and hence, to policy development. This is reflected 
in the emerging school of ‘interpretive policy analysis’ (see Fischer and For-
ester 1993; Hajer and Wagenaar 2003; Colebatch 2004), which focuses on 
how policy subject matter is ‘framed’ (Rein and Schön 1994).
 The implications this has for policy work are that much of the work of 
policy development happens over time, in the consciousness and attitudes of 
both the immediate participants and of the broader public. In the last quarter 
of the 20th century, agricultural policy in Australia changed from protecting 
farmers from both domestic and international competition, to a policy that 
promoted efficiency through more competitive markets at home and abroad, 
but this cannot be traced to any one governmental decision. Instead it in-
volved a slow process that evolved over several decades of discussion, which 
eventually led to a shift in the shared understandings and values of the main 
players. This stimulated a series of incremental changes at various levels 
of government in the way that public authority was deployed in relation to 
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 agriculture. The formal structures of government may play only a very small 
part in this process of social construction. Metze (in this volume) shows how 
the redevelopment of industrial sites in Amsterdam was facilitated by the 
relevant ministries agreeing to commission consultants to work with the vari-
ous stakeholders to develop plans for new uses. The consultants used various 
strategies to generate visions of an alternative future to which the stakehold-
ers could relate. The policy task in this instance was not to secure an agree-
ment on the plan but to generate a vision amenable to the stakeholders. Policy 
workers are not technical analysts who compare programs, or even, as Majone 
(1989) suggested, skilled rhetoricians, who come up with good reasons for do-
ing things, but facilitators of long-term social processes that are beyond their 
control. As Hoppe (1999) noted, policy analysis has evolved from ‘speaking 
truth to power’ to ‘making sense together.’
 Accounts of policy and the experience of policy
It is widely noted (particularly among policy practitioners) that the system-
atic accounts of the policy process found in textbooks and reflected in official 
presentations often diverge from actual experiences involving the policy pro-
cess. Adams, reviewing one of these texts, reflects that after having hired new 
people to fill various policy positions (Adams 2005: 103):
I often ask them after a few years if their views of the policy process have 
changed. Th e invariable response is that the reality diﬀ ers from the texts. 
People describe to me policy processes constituted not by order and ra-
tionality but by uncertainty, interpretation, contested meanings, power, 
volatility, compressed views of time and space and partial information. ... 
practitioners are confronted with constant paradoxes.
Similarly, Radin reports that policy analysts in the US are often uncomfort-
able with the ‘disconnect’ between the self-image derived from their training 
and the nature of their practice. ‘They seem to need a language to describe 
what they do and to convince themselves – as well as others – that they con-
tribute to the process’ (Radin 2000: 183).
 One reason for this ‘disconnect’ is that the aim of a structural separation 
between analysis and the processes of government – such as the idea of creat-
ing a small top-down policy group that would ‘advise the Prince’ – was never 
achieved in practice. Top level ‘all-encompassing government’ policy units, like 
Lord Rothschild’s Central Policy Review Staff in the UK, were sometimes 
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established but rarely survived as permanent features of the system of govern-
ment. The dynamics of organization also had its impact: when a CEO used 
policy analysts to evaluate proposals, the heads of subordinate units hired 
their own policy analysts so that they could meet the boss’s expectations and 
compete with rival claims from other units and organizations. Policy analysts 
found that they were being used not so much to evaluate proposals as to ad-
vocate and defend the preferred course of action against the alternatives and 
that policy analysis had become, as Radin (2000) described it, the ‘dueling 
swords’ that are employed during these encounters.
 For policy workers, this raises the question of whether one should be an 
outside expert or an inside participant, particularly when this is seen in terms 
of being technically correct or having a practical impact, in other words, ‘getting 
your hands dirty.’ Patton and Sawicki (1991) argue that the policy worker should 
be prepared to sacriﬁ ce the methodological precision of the social sciences in 
order to produce immediately useful advice – to do ‘quick and dirty’ analyses. 
Bardach, in his A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis, goes further by tentatively 
raising questions about whether policy analysts should become participants in 
the process and then suggesting that policy analysts should ‘sometimes’ try to 
recruit support for their work and thus neutralize potential opponents, and 
‘where appropriate,’ they might in this way ‘become more of a partner in the 
process than an outside observer and diagnostician’ (Bardach 2005: 14-15).
 In any case, this interplay between participants becomes a recognized part 
of the policy process. We have already noted that Noordegraaf ’s policy man-
agers live a life of ‘meetings and papers,’ trying to negotiate a mutually accept-
able outcome. Recognition of the interplay is often institutionalized in the 
processes of government – for instance, when considering policy proposals, 
political leaders are likely to demand evidence that the stakeholders in this 
policy area have been consulted as well as ask how they are likely to react to 
the proposal. The exercise of authoritative choice is best done when it follows 
the norms of structured interaction.
 What can policy workers learn from this?
Perhaps the first lesson for the policy worker is that the apparent disorder 
and the widely felt frustration that occurs in the policy process are not the re-
sult of poor institutional design or human failings, but of structural tensions 
that are inherent to the process of governing. Policy workers have to confront 
these tensions but they do not all respond the same way, leading to a broad 
range of practices, as well as uncertainty about the appropriate practices and 
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the management of conflict, and a certain amount of ambiguity about the 
outcomes of policy practice.
 While the dominant account of policy (authoritative choice) describes 
policy in terms of clear choices made to accomplish known outcomes, the ex-
perience is of the diversity of meanings in use. This explains these structural 
tensions. Not only does the authoritative choice account have to contend with 
the structured interaction and social construction accounts in framing the 
policy process but there are also competing framings of the nature of the prob-
lem and the appropriate responses. Should policy on child care, for instance, 
be seen in terms of the reconstruction of gender roles, increasing workforce 
participation, the provision of opportunities for socialization, early childhood 
education, or as an opportunity for re-shaping the nature of work? All of these 
views may be voiced, although none of them will simply disappear if a decision 
ultimately excludes it from further consideration. Th us, the policy workers 
have to deal with a continuous diversity of meanings.
 Policy workers have to manage this diversity in the face of tensions be-
tween perception and practices from the account of authoritative choice and 
those from structured interaction. In recent years, the dominant theme in the 
public discussion about the process of governing has been ‘governance,’ which 
argues that governing by authoritative choice is no longer effective or appro-
priate, and that it has already been or is in the process of being replaced by 
‘governance,’ which relies on negotiation among interested parties both inside 
and outside of the realm of government (see, e.g., Rhodes 1997; Stoker 1998). 
This is associated with the mobilization of non-official voices both in the dis-
cussion of the problem and the framing and execution of the response. At the 
same time, there are strong pressures for the demonstration of authoritative 
choice. Political leaders want to be seen as decisive and as capable of achieving 
goals, particularly since the media presents the process of government as an 
ongoing struggle between various factions (see Anderson 2006). Bureaucrats 
have increasingly become subject to the same pressures, discovering that their 
work is increasingly defined by ‘performance indicators,’ and need to show-
case their responsibility for various desired outcomes. Boxelaar et al. (2006) 
explored efforts by agricultural extension workers to mobilize farmers to col-
lectively reshape their harvesting practices to reduce fire risks. They showed 
how this was frustrated by the rhetoric by the agency’s management, which 
essentially focused on official outputs. The extension workers were well aware 
that only the farmers could actually alter their own harvesting practices, and 
that the task of policy was to encourage them to take greater responsibility for 
their practices; the agency’s management, however, wanted to be able to point 
to ‘deliverables’ that the agency had rendered to its ‘customers.’
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 These tensions and ambiguities are a source of stress among policy work-
ers who have been taught to define the problem and then find appropriate 
responses. They may find that competing responses are being advocated well 
in advance of any agreement regarding the problem, and that an appropriate 
response remains unclear and context dependent. Tenbensel (2006), drawing 
on Flyvbjerg and Aristotle, argues that we can distinguish three distinct sorts 
of policy-relevant knowledge: episteme (derived from study), techne (derived 
from practical experience) and phronesis (practical-ethical decisions), and 
cites cases in the area of health policy to show that policy workers need to be 
able to deploy the right sort of knowledge at the appropriate time.
 This means that policy work is probably going to be iterative and interac-
tive. It may involve the creation of a document that establishes a case for a 
certain course of action, but the influence of this document depends on the 
extent to which it reflects the understanding and commitments of the various 
parties whose collaboration is necessary to make it work. Policy workers are 
involved in both creating this framework of shared understanding and com-
mitment, and in securing the ‘enactment’ of the outcome via the appropriate 
forms of authorization – a Cabinet-level decision, a statute, an inter-govern-
mental agreement, etc. It is an exercise in making sense, which generates an 
outcome that ‘makes sense’ to all of the parties involved, both the immedi-
ate participants and the political leaders and commentators. Policy work is 
hindered by the conviction that policy workers have the right answer. The 
greatest policy assets are a capacity for creating shared understanding and a 
tolerance for ambiguity.
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3 Academic Accounts of Policy Experience
Mirko Noordegraaf
 Introduction
There is no shortage of texts on policy making, policy analysis, policy pro-
cesses and policy implementation (e.g., Dunn 1994; Parsons 1995; John 1998; 
Radin 2000). They show us how policy decisions emerge from policy-making 
institutions – such as policy bureaucracies – and how circumstances influ-
ence the policies that are made. They focus on the policy networks, circles, 
triangles and rings that constitute policy domains, and determine participants 
and positions. They describe the policy steps, phases, cycles, and rounds that 
are necessary to go from initial ideas to policy measures, and they trace how 
decisions are adapted when plans are implemented by executive agencies. 
They explore how policies affect citizens and companies. Although these texts 
are important for providing perspectives on policy, and for getting ‘the bigger 
picture,’ they tell us little about what happens inside policy bureaucracies, 
how policy plans emerge, what negotiations take place, which relations are 
formed, how policy categories are formed, how policymakers think and act.
 Texts on ‘real’ policy work and on day-to-day policy experiences are scarce. 
This may be understandable, but it is far from satisfactory. Of course, the 
phenomenon of ‘policy’ does not equal individual policy acts, and policy is 
larger than the life of individual policymakers, so merely looking at what poli-
cymakers do and feel will not be enough to fully capture policy dynamics. 
However, policy comes from real people and human action, so it makes no 
sense to separate policy dynamics from acts and experiences. Therefore, this 
chapter will start the other way around – it will analyze how policy work 
is done, what acts and experiences contribute to what we see as policy, how 
bundles of acts and experiences make up policy dynamics, and how this might 
affect society. It will draw from available academic texts in order to reveal the 
‘smaller pictures’ that can be sketched when it comes to public policy.
 This is not an easy task because academic accounts of policy work are not 
merely or directly about policy work. People appointed to make policy can be 
observed and studied, but understanding who the relevant players are, what 
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they do and how they do it, calls for conceptual constructs that do not emerge 
directly from daily behavior. Even the simplest of meetings, for example, can be 
interpreted in diﬀ erent ways, depending on the perspectives applied and con-
cepts used (e.g., Alvesson 1996). Academic accounts of policy work, in other 
words, are also accounts (see chapter 2) or textual artifacts that can ‘get close to,’ 
but never mirror policy realities exactly. In order to understand policy work, 
we need to understand how scholars produce representations and which rep-
resentations are meaningful for understanding and improving policy practices.
 Understanding policy work
This chapter distinguishes between first-, second- and third-order accounts of 
policy (see table 1) and focuses on second-order accounts. First-order accounts 
start from individual policy experiences: individuals who are involved in pol-
icy describe what policy looks like. Third-order accounts, on the other hand, 
might focus on policy workers, but see them as policy ‘actors’ who are involved 
in bigger policy processes. Second-order accounts see policy people as agents 
– individuals with institutional positions and powers – and try to analyze 
how these agents are involved in policy practices that generate (meaningful) 
policy results. This chapter focuses on second-order accounts of policy work: 
interpretations by academics who stay close to real work, but use systematic 
methods to study policy practices and use more or less abstract terms, models 
and schemes in order to understand how policy occurs. This can be separated 
from first-order experiences, that is, direct, anecdotal accounts by the people 
who ‘do policy’ (see other chapters in this volume), as well as more abstract, 
third-order accounts by academics who offer perspectives on policy-making 
and bigger policy pictures (see chapters 1-2). Our focus is on policy work, pro-
duced by policy agents in observable policy practices.
Box 1 Multiple accounts of policy
Level Focus Example
First order Policy workers as individuals (Autobiographical) accounts of 
policy making by policy people
Second order Policy work by policy agents Academic understandings of policy 
practices
! ird order Policy processes through structures 
and actors
Perspectives on the nature of 
policy and policy processes
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Of course, second-order interpretations cannot be neatly separated from first 
order policy experiences and third-order perspectives on policy processes. 
Second-order accounts that present more or less detached understandings 
of real policy people and day-to-day policy acts are fed by actual policy ex-
periences, but also deal with policy perspectives, especially in the finding of 
alternatives for ‘rational’ or ‘functional’ perspectives on policy processes (e.g., 
Colebatch 2006a). This in itself highlights the added value of second-order 
accounts. Policy administrators often feel there is a lack of rationality and that 
it is difficult to relate their policy behavior to problem solving. When policy 
administrators try to make sense of their work by applying (third-order) ra-
tional policy perspectives, second-order accounts enable us to analyze how 
this happens, and how the search for policy solutions is played out. When 
alternative perspectives are developed in order to get away from rational per-
spectives, such as ‘institutional’ or ‘bureaucratic politics’ perspectives (cf. Al-
lison 1971), or ‘deliberative’ perspectives (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; 
Hajer and Wagenaar 2003), second-order analyses enable us to understand 
how such abstract perspectives relate to the real work that is done on a day-
to-day basis, by real people who occupy positions in regulated or routinized 
policy games.
 We can see this interplay between accounts in the academic analyses of iron 
triangles, policy subsystems, policy networks, etc. (e.g., Marsh and Rhodes 
1992; Jordan 1990; Kickert et al. 1997). Although these academic accounts de-
viate from those by policy people, and also from rational accounts that por-
tray policy-making as sequential and instrumental, they sketch bigger policy 
pictures that privilege systemic features. They try to conceptualize the struc-
tures and arenas that constitute policy processes, as well as institutionalized 
connections between policy actors that determine policy outcomes. They lack 
any experiential sensitivity, however, which enables us to understand those 
people with positions who are subjected to bigger forces, but also (actively) 
shape policy processes.
 Getting this experiential sensitivity is not just a matter of combining per-
spectives with first-order experiences, of being ‘in between’ first- and third-
order accounts; it is also a matter of the distinctive scholarly stances that are 
considered when policy work is studied. Instead of focusing on individuals 
who are engaged in policy processes, and the policy ‘structures’ or roles that 
are played by ‘policy actors,’ second-order accounts focus on policy ‘agents’ 
who are part of day-to-day policy practices, producing what is generally seen 
or experienced as ‘policy.’ Heclo’s treatment of ‘issue networks’ is illustrative 
(1978: 88):
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Based largely on early studies of agricultural, water, and public works poli-
cies, the iron triangle concept is not so much wrong as it is disastrously 
incomplete. ... Preoccupied with trying to ﬁ nd the few truly powerful ac-
tors, observers tend to overlook the power and inﬂ uence that arise out of 
the conﬁ gurations through which the leading policymakers move and do 
business with each other.
A similar approach can be found in the empirical work that tries to show 
how things really work by starting with the agents that ‘do policy’ in order 
to show how policy outcomes are molded and manufactured. Scholars who 
focus on real work and practices may come from political science or sociology, 
but often have behavioral (Rose 1989), psychological (Hammond 1996; Tet-
lock 1985; 2005), psychoanalytic (Mitroff 1983) and ethnographic or anthro-
pological ‘biases’ (e.g., Hammersley 1994; Shore and Wright 1997; Colebatch 
2006b). They stress constructivist epistemologies (Estes and Edmonds 1981; 
Edelman 1988), strongly favor relational and argumentative outlooks (e.g., 
Fischer and Forester 1993) and prefer qualitative methods such as observation 
(see Rhodes et al. 2007). As a consequence, they focus on distinctive compo-
nents of the policy phenomenon, such as ‘thoughts, experiences and emotions’ 
(Heclo 1977), ‘coping mechanisms’ (Lipsky 1980) or ‘language, objects, and 
acts’ (Yanow 1996) that are seldom used in systemic texts that focus on policy 
arenas and policy outcomes.
  ree types of second order accounts
These second-order representations, however, also imply that the understand-
ings of policy work take different shapes. When scholars get close to policy 
practices, there is no one clear account of policy work and policy experiences. 
In the first place, scholars study different sorts of policy agents, which, in 
addition to policy analysts, include policy contributions by political execu-
tives, policy administrators, policy managers, and policy advisers. Secondly, 
scholars rely on different methodologies; policy practices are studied by using 
surveys, interviews, documentary analysis and observation. Thirdly, different 
disciplinary backgrounds and vocabularies produce distinct understandings, 
each portraying policy work in its own distinct ways. We can identify three 
different approaches to the understanding of the experiential basis of policy 
work, each combining a certain academic stance and terminology.
 Firstly, some scholars try to personalize policy processes by studying the 
agents who are expected to form and implement policies. They explore per-
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sonalities, longings and the experiences of policy people, to better understand 
the human side of public policy. This is less about individuals than human 
dispositions that are formed through education and socialization.
 Secondly, some scholars try to contextualize policy work, by analyzing how 
policy agents deal with circumstances. They show how certain policy con-
ditions influence the work of policy officials, and how officials seek coping 
mechanisms to survive. The reciprocal relations between contexts and coping 
mechanisms are emphasized.
 Thirdly, other scholars try to functionalize policy acts by seeing policy pro-
cesses as webs of information and streams of interpretation, through which 
meaningful policy realities are enacted. They show how policy agents con-
tinuously exchange information, rework interpretations, and manufacture 
meaning in the face of ambiguous objectives. The informational functions of 
policy workers are stressed.
Box 2  ree types of second order accounts
Account Focus Example
$. Dispositions Policy work as thought and 
behavior
Empirical analysis of traits, the 
attitudes and behavior of policy 
agents
%. Contexts Policy work as coping with 
conditions
Empirical analysis of the 
impossibilities of policy work, and 
how agents cope
'. Functions Policy work as making issues 
meaningful
Analysis of how policymakers 
interact, exchange information, and 
enact policies
 Dispositions
Th e job of the Prime Minister’s Parliamentary Private Secretary is to 
‘nobble’ an MP: ‘Th e Prime Minister would like you to ask this question.’ 
Nonetheless, the Prime Minister can conﬁ dently expect two-thirds to 
three-quarters of questions to be hostile. And the most awkward ques-
tions of all frequently came from the government side – from disappoint-
ed, disaﬀ ected and sour senior backbenchers who have either been over-
looked or sacked from oﬃ  ce (Lynn and Jay 1990: 405).
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Th e ﬁ rst type of academic account of policy work tells us a lot about who en-
gages in policy acts, and what these policy oﬃ  cials think, feel and experience 
when they make or do policy, and how this aﬀ ects policy. Although these ac-
counts start with individuals, and their values and behaviors ( just like ﬁ rst-
order accounts), these accounts represent more than individual features – they 
might reveal how individual thought and action are part of the social action.
 In some cases, the social dimension of individual administrative action is 
accentuated by an emphasis on the moral stature of real policy administra-
tors, e.g., in studies of administrators who are ‘exemplary’ (Cooper and Wright 
1992). These administrators have certain traits, attitudes and behavior pat-
terns that enable them to be remembered as exceptional policy people. In 
other cases, it is accentuated by an emphasis on the political sides of policy ac-
tion, such as the importance of institutional craftsmanship (e.g., Terry 1996). 
These studies may also reveal a lot about the ‘typical’ civil servant and the ‘ca-
reer service’ and bureaucratic ‘elites’ to which these civil servants belong. Many 
elite studies show how ‘elite’ features differ from country to country – not 
in the least because of differences in education, training and selection. They 
also explore important aspects of policy processes that are affected. Particular 
emphasis is placed upon politico-administrative relations – upon interactions 
between policy officials (as members of career services and elites) and politi-
cal executives.
 The well-known study by Aberbach et al. (1980), for example, provides 
an extensive cross-national overview of bureaucrats and their features, not 
least of all to clarify how politico-administrative interactions are structured. 
Aberbach et al. distinguish between various models, varying from the tradi-
tional hierarchical model, with clear distinctions between policy administra-
tors who administer policy, and politicians who make policy, to a ‘pure hybrid’ 
in which clear dividing lines are absent. The other models are located between 
these extremes, and show how administrators and politicians contribute dif-
ferent things to policy making. In the ‘facts/interests’ model, administrators 
contribute facts and knowledge, while politicians contribute interests and 
values. In the ‘energy/equilibrium’ model, politicians ‘articulate broad, diffuse 
interests,’ whereas administrators ‘mediate narrow, focused interests.’ Other 
cross- national overviews of bureaucrats have been presented by e.g., Van 
Braam 1957; Dogan 1975; Van der Meer and Roborgh 1993; Page 1992. Pe-
ters’ typology of politico-administrative interaction (Peters 1987) shows how 
politicians and administrators can be part of ‘village lives.’ These studies often 
compare countries like the US (least Weberian, most hybrid) with countries 
like the UK (career service), Germany and France (professional ‘corps’), and 
the Netherlands and Denmark (village lives).
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 In other studies, empirical explorations are limited to certain groups of 
policy officials. These may involve lower-level officials who are engaged in 
‘everyday politics,’ as opposed to ‘high politics’ (Page 2001), or central policy 
functionaries who have a certain ‘professional self-image’ that influences how 
they work (Hoppe and Jeliazkova 2006). More often, they concern top of-
ficials (Page and Wright 1999; 2007; Rhodes and Weller 2001), who might 
be seen as an ‘elite’ (cf. Page and Wright 1999) with a certain position vis-à-
vis elected politicians. Rhodes and Weller (2001) wonder whether these top 
officials must be seen as ‘mandarins or valets.’ Page and Wright (1999) focus 
on ‘political control,’ wondering ‘How can one ensure that bureaucracies are 
responsive to the governing party or parties?’ (p. 270). The well-known BBC 
comedy series ‘Yes, Minister’, about life at the top of a British government 
ministry (Lynn and Jay 1990), popularized this perspective. The attempts of 
the Minister of Administrative Affairs (and later, Prime Minister) Hacker 
to really determine policy courses and steer the ministry, and the subtle and 
covert attempts of his Permanent Secretary, Sir Humphrey Appleby, to align 
policy preferences with administrative considerations, routines, and long-
ings have come to symbolize the tensions between conflicting policy worlds: 
the world of elected officials who are the innocent bystanders and victims 
of smooth-running policy systems, and the world of appointed officials who 
run these systems, backed by ‘old boys networks’ and certain socio-cultural 
antecedents. These stories show the conflicting accounts of policy worlds, 
while different views on policy processes are consciously mobilized by the 
participants. Explicit attempts by Sir Humphrey to preserve the integrity of 
mandarin behavior are backed by publicly stated accounts of ‘proper’ policy-
making. This is especially visible when the minister’s principal private sec-
retary, Bernard Woolley – a civil servant – has ‘explained’ to him how things 
work.
 No wonder then that most of the studies mentioned not only focus on pol-
icy behavior or administrative values, but also on these antecedents of policy 
activity. How policy officials are educated, for example, may have significant 
influence on policy dynamics. In the Yes, Minister series: the ‘old boys net-
work’ that connected British top officials was reinforced by their Oxford and 
Cambridge educations (which the ministers did not necessarily share). Thus, 
the forming or reforming of individual policy behavior and values can not be 
detached from structural factors, such as how policy officials are selected, 
appointed and trained. Some studies, especially those of the UK, France and 
Germany (Drewry and Butcher 1991) primarily focus on these factors because 
these countries traditionally have distinctive, rather ‘narrow’ routes to policy 
apexes. UK class distinctions and ‘Oxbridge’ schooling, French elite education 
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(especially at the Ecole Nationale d’Administration – ENA), and German le-
galistic training mean that policy officials have distinctive characteristics that 
affect the way they perform policy.
 Reforms and dispositions
Management reform (e.g., Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004) has started to change 
these policy landscapes. Consequently, many scholars explore policy behav-
ior in light of changing (organizational) parameters. They investigate, for ex-
ample, how ‘public service motivation’ is affected by management change and 
the ‘contractualization’ of managerial work (e.g., Perry, Perry and Hondeghem 
2008), how (policy) managers ‘pursue significance’ (Denhardt 1995), or which 
‘competencies’ are developed by civil service systems in order to improve pol-
icy behavior (Lodge and Hood 2005). In many countries, policy elites have 
turned into Senior Executive Services (SES), which may be subjected to im-
provement programs like the so-called British ‘Professional Skills Program.’ 
Although this does not automatically change bureaucratic antecedents and 
policy acts, it influences selection, appointment and development process-
es, which – in the longer run – may influence how policy occurs. From an 
academic point of view, this may reinforce the emphasis on policy experi-
ence – namely, on how the so-called managerialization of policy processes and 
its consequences are experienced. Managerialization constitutes the means 
through which the structure and culture of public services are being recast. In 
doing so, it seeks to introduce new orientations, remodels existing relations 
of power and affects how and where policy choices are made (Clarke et al. 
1994: 4).
Th ese new paths have not, by and large, been of the civil service’s own 
choosing, and it may not like some of the prospects that can be seen on the 
horizon (Drewry and Butcher 1991).
The extent to which this has actually happened that new managers with new 
dispositions and orientations have started to overtake, recast or reinvent pol-
icy formation, has hardly been studied, however. Rhodes and Weller (2001) 
conclude that ‘Change is uneven. Not every country rushed to embrace the 
new public management and, of those that did, there are big differences in 
their aims, measures and outcomes ... the impact of change on senior officials 
over the last 20 years is overstated’ (p. 230). Having studied departmental 
secretaries in various countries, they concluded that contemporary secretaries 
look a lot like their predecessors, but their roles have changed significantly. 
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Their monopoly of advice, for example, has ended. ‘Policy contestability is 
the order of the day’, Rhodes and Weller conclude (p. 238). Moreover, de-
partmental secretaries have become ‘managers,’ although the exact meaning 
of management differs from country to country, and, more specifically, they 
have to ‘manage networks’ (pp. 240-241). Country differences are explained by 
governmental traditions. Page and Wright (1999), also stressing variation and 
national traditions, conclude that relations between bureaucratic and politi-
cal elites show signs of a ‘deinstitutionalization or personalization of politi-
cal trust’ (p. 277). To be able to trust that appointees as well as personal ties 
become more important, also in countries that have experienced substantial 
managerial reforms.
 Contexts
Public service workers occupy a critical position in American society. Al-
though they are normally regarded as low-level employees, the actions of 
most public service workers actually constituted the services ‘delivered’ by 
government. Moreover, when taken together, the individual decisions of 
these workers become, or add up to, agency policy (Lipsky 1980: 3).
As well as focusing on how personal attributes affect policy work, scholars 
also focus on the nature of the work itself – on the conditions that policy 
workers face, and on how they cope. The most famous example is Lipsky’s 
Street-level Bureaucracy (1980), which focuses on street-level bureaucrats, and 
reveals that policy is often made at the street-level, especially involving deci-
sions about individual cases. Lipsky showed how service workers find them-
selves amidst complex and contradictory demands and how they develop cer-
tain coping mechanisms. They may categorize or actually ‘stereotype’ clients in 
order to speed up the decision-making process. The bosses of certain street-
level bureaucracies have also been studied. Hargrove and Glidewell (1990), 
for example, showed how public managers like welfare managers or police 
commissioners deal with so-called ‘impossible’ circumstances.
 Links between context and coping behavior can also be found in stud-
ies that involve national policy-making arenas; this includes, for instance, 
Heclo’s exploration of bureaucratic and political behavior in Washington 
(Heclo 1977), Allison’s identification of ‘governmental processes’ and ‘bu-
reaucratic politics’ (e.g., Allison 1971), the ‘messiness’ of certain policy set-
tings (Dryzek 1982), and the ‘symbols, rituals and power’ of crisis manage-
ment (’t Hart 1993). Heclo (1977) portrays policy bureaucrats as ‘people in 
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the machine,’ with certain preferences and dispositions – for gradualism, 
indirection, independence, political caution, and relations – and contrasting 
job orientations – program bureaucrats, staff bureaucrats, reformers, and 
institutionalists. He then explores the working relations between various 
bureaucrats and political executives. He approaches these relations in terms 
of ‘conditionally cooperative behavior’ (p. 193), which ‘rejects any final choice 
between suspicion and trust, between trying to force obedience and passively 
hoping for compliance.’ Certain strategic resources, such as political clout, 
setting goals and building support, are used to ‘create commitments to mu-
tual performance’ (p. 194). From a more general point of view, Dryzek (1982) 
stresses the importance of appropriate policy analysis, i.e., modes of analy-
sis that match policy circumstances. He highlights what he calls a ‘mode 
VI’ analysis, or ‘hermeneutic’ analysis, appropriate for a ‘residual category 
of circumstances ..., defined by a pluralistic decision process made up of a 
multiplicity of actors and interests which is not producing manifestly good 
outcomes’ (p. 321).
 How policy people cope
The emphasis on coping mechanisms that originated in studies of street-level 
bureaucrats but could also be applied to public (policy) managers, and politi-
cal executives can further also be applied to specialist policy staff – policy ad-
visors, policy analysts and policy administrators. Here, the analysis can focus 
on roles and behavior as well as cognition and judgment, in order to highlight 
processes of generating policy results. Meltsner (1972), who was one of the 
first to study the behavior of policy workers, how they experience ‘politics,’ and 
how they are able to cope with the politics of framing and selecting policy 
alternatives, stressed the importance of ‘political feasibility’ and how analysts 
might strengthen their ‘political expertise.’ Maley (2000) has studied the work 
and behavior of policy advisers, and came up with five policy roles: agenda-
setting; linking ideas, interests and opportunities; mobilizing; bargaining; 
and ‘delivering’ (pp. 455-468). Edwards (2001), a former policy advisor, has 
shown how policy advisors can enhance their effectiveness. During various 
policy phases or ‘stages,’ different challenges had to be tackled to ‘break up the 
policy process into clear steps in order to manage the complexities of develop-
ing policy’ (p. 4).
 With respect to the process of coping with policy challenges, such as ill-
structured or dreadful problems, others have studied behavioral mechanisms 
(e.g., Hisschemöller and Hoppe 1995). Policy analysts have attempted to 
structure problems as much as possible, which runs the risk of over-simplify-
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ing the problem. Against this background, Hisschemöller and Hoppe show 
the importance of ‘problem structuring,’ of organizing ‘political participation 
of actors with different views on the problem, and argued problem choice’ (p. 
40). A comparable emphasis on ‘problem definition’ can be found in studies 
such as Rochefort and Cobb (1994), which shows how defining problems is 
‘intertwined with the political process throughout the activities of issue initi-
ation, program design, and legislative enactment’ (p. 56). Dealing with policy 
problems can also be approached from (socio)psychological angles. Adelman 
et al. (1975), for example, introduced their ‘social judgment theory’ in order to 
understand policy quarrels and conflicts. ‘The basic thesis is that such quar-
rels often occur because policymakers possess different cognitive representa-
tions of the relations between variables in the environment’ (Adelman et al. 
1975: 138). Tetlock has studied the ‘integrative complexity’ of policy commu-
nication and rhetoric in order to understand the relation between complex 
contexts – such as international relations or crises – and the perceptions of 
government leaders. Communications may consist of ‘simple responses, gross 
distinctions, rigidity, and restricted information usage, and at the other by 
complexity, fine distinctions, flexibility, and restricted information search and 
usage’ (Suedfeld and Tetlock 1977: 169).
 International contexts
Geuijen et al. (2008) approached it from a different angle; they studied how 
national (Dutch) administrators operate in international arenas, most spe-
cifically in EU policy-making (see also Geuijen and ’t Hart’s chapter 9). They 
call these administrators ‘new Eurocrats,’ and they traced their complicated 
working conditions and how they cope. Complications mainly follow from 
their distinctive roles in transnational networks. They possess specific ex-
pertise that is not easily accessible, their hierarchical superiors seldom pay 
attention to them, and they have to reach an ‘international consensus’ when 
engaged in multilateral negotiations. Geuijen et al. show how different role 
orientations produce different behavior at different loci. So-called back-office 
coordinators are involved in national departmental interactions, in order to 
establish departmental and national positions. Bureaucrat-diplomats are active 
in EU-policy processes – i.e., committees – trying to defend national interests 
and minimize costs in the field of veterinary policy, for example. Street-level 
entrepreneurs are problem solvers who exploit situations in order to get things 
done, often in issue-based networks that transgress national borders, in situa-
tions like when there is a need for improved police cooperation across nations. 
Policy workers establish links between policy options and implementation, 
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which has also been highlighted by others (McLaughlin 1987). The emphasis 
on Eurocrats nevertheless adds something to the more traditional emphases 
on ambiguous circumstances, namely the internationalization of policy work. 
Increasingly, policy happens in transnational policy networks.
 Functions
Brieﬂ y, I claim that the analysts who produce the information would like 
to produce clear and straightforward analyses or interpretations that 
could be used to make decisions or solve problems. By contrast, the way 
that the process works results in a type of information that is much less 
decisive than that (Feldman 1989: 2).
Feldman focused on the bureaucrat analysts who are engaged in ‘problem 
solving and issue interpretation’ and whose analyses are sometimes directly 
used in policy-making, in order to better understand how policy agents grap-
ple with ambiguous circumstances. Although there are common perceptions 
regarding certain issues such as AIDS, national security, medical care, these 
perceptions may be poorly defined, and new information does not necessarily 
resolve the technical and ethical questions. Policy-making, then, is a process 
of interpretation through which agreement about how to view and define is-
sues is negotiated. Mere content in this situation is not enough, which means 
that analysts and policymakers will have to rely on organizational routines 
in order to produce the necessary information, which includes concurrence 
processes, paper-writing routines, and the organization of expertise (Feldman 
1989). Bureaucratic analysts are less problem solvers, than ‘negotiators’ (ibid.: 
118-124) or ‘boundary spanners’ (ibid.: 125). When they contribute to policy 
formation, they ‘negotiate agreements on a given issue,’ which means they not 
only need to know a lot about the substance of issues, but also about posi-
tions and organizational contexts. Moreover, they also act as ‘liaisons between 
interdependent organizations.’
 These findings are echoed by other empirical studies of policy processes 
which show that it is not so much individuals or their coping behavior that 
are at stake, but how policy agents operate within webs of information and 
processes of interpretation. Following the interpretative turn in policy analy-
sis, Tenbensel (2006) shows how policy workers deal with different types of 
knowledge. Earlier he showed how policy workers can never use clear ‘evi-
dence’ to ground specific policies (2004). Weiss (1989) described problem 
definitions as ‘packages of ideas’ that include ‘at least implicitly an account of 
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the causes and consequences of some circumstances that are deemed undesir-
able, and a theory about how a problem might be alleviated’ (p. 97).
 This emphasis on informational or interpretative processes parallels the 
empirical interests in organizational and managerial behavior (Mintzberg 
1973; 1975), including the day-to-day behavior of policy managers such as fed-
eral bureau chiefs (Kaufman 1980) or high-ranking policy directors (Noorde-
graaf 2000; 2007). These studies show us the high-paced, lively and erratic 
nature of organizational environments, as well as how managerial work con-
sists of a steady stream of contacts, interactions and information exchanges 
that follow a variety of institutional norms and procedures in order to pro-
duce outcomes. Mintzberg showed how managers face a continuous stream 
of people, texts and acts, and perform certain institutionalized, interpersonal, 
informational and decision-making ‘roles’ to make things happen. Kaufman 
noted that bureau chiefs engage in informational activities, inside and outside 
their own organizations, which are constrained by fixed rules, regulations and 
cycles. Becoming a federal bureau chief in American public administration is, 
according to Kaufman, like ‘stepping in[to] a fast flowing river.’
 Interpretation and institutions
All of this means that Feldman’s emphasis on policy analysts – also visible 
in related policy and managerial observations – has two sides: an interpreta-
tive emphasis on policy issues as texts and conversations, and an institutional 
emphasis on routines and procedures, formed in order to enact ‘appropriate’ 
policy behavior (cf. March and Olsen 1989). These sides have also been ob-
served in other works as well, although here either the interpretative or the 
institutional outlooks may have been emphasized. Lynn (1987), for example, 
shows how policy work – particularly policy management – is a matter of in-
stitutionalized ‘games,’ played out in order to fabricate shared understandings 
of policy issues. ‘Managing public policy is the deliberate effort of a public 
official with executive responsibilities to create favorable interpretations of 
governmental actions by influencing (a) the nature of the actions, (b) the con-
sequences of those actions, and (c) the perceptions of those actions and their 
consequences by important constituencies’ (p. 43). The ‘daily lives of public 
executives,’ as Lynn calls it, should not be judged by their substantive rational-
ity, which entails ‘sequentially choosing goals and subsequently designing ac-
tions to fulfill those goals’ (p. 29) – but by their procedural rationality, which 
means ‘their success in changing the character of governmental actions and 
in bringing about more favorable interpretations of governmental actions’ (p. 
31). This calls for the appropriate use of goals, resources such as time, atten-
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tion and influence, and constraints. Likewise, Hall and McGinty (1997) show 
how policy can be seen as ‘the transformation of intentions,’ as a ‘flexible pro-
cess whereby many actors with different intentions, interests and interpre-
tations enter into the process at different points along its course’ (p. 441). 
Difficulties that arise during the process can be very mundane, involving 
such things as how to categorize responsibilities, for example, when career 
ladders for teachers are being devised? Certain conventions, like committees 
with chairs, make cooperation and coordination simpler, as they establish 
linkages, which enable participants to ‘create their own practical arrange-
ments for the furtherance of their intentions’ (p. 462). ‘Through attempting 
to see their intentions reflected in the policy process, policy actors create 
conditions that can become consequential at linked future sites and phases 
of policy activity’ (p. 463).
 Tenbensel (2002) also privileges institutions: ‘The chief concern of poli-
cymakers ... should be to concentrate on the structures and institutions 
through which information is interpreted’ (p. 192). By studying the role of 
mediating bodies in setting priorities in health care, he shows how these bod-
ies ‘interpret the public voice’ (p. 174), which is essential for enhancing the 
rationality and legitimacy of setting priorities. Such findings are utilized in 
critical-interpretative research views, which – like Tenbensel – extend their 
analyses to spheres beyond the formal policy circles, but also alter our under-
standing of interpretative processes (see also Shore’s ch. 11). Yanow (1996), 
for instance, did not analyze ‘what’ a policy means, or ‘why’ policy officials 
act as they do (cf. Lynn), but how a policy means, how acts and objects, such 
as buildings, enact policy realities. Policies are not made in a vacuum simply 
to accomplish set goals, but in environments where policy actions are read 
as ‘expressive statements’ or ‘texts’ by various stakeholder groups. Policy is 
not just about information exchanges in policy circles. It is primarily about 
‘meaning making,’ outside of the usual policy circles. This is also highlighted 
in the dramaturgical approaches to policy processes in which political pro-
cesses are seen as ‘sequences of staged performances of conflict and conflict 
resolution’ (Hajer 2005: 624). Settings and their design affect ‘what is said, 
what can be said, and what can be said with influence’ (p. 624). Hajer ap-
plies this perspective to participatory policy-making, which – like Yanow’s 
observations – not only changes our understanding of how policy meanings 
are produced, but also where meaning is generated. Policy-making cannot 
be isolated from the public, although ‘the public becomes what the setting 
makes it’ (p. 642).
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 Contours of policy work
These various clusters of insights add up to a distinctive understanding of 
‘real life’ policy practices, although they offer multiple understandings of pol-
icy people and their work. We started with exemplary administrators who 
bring moral integrity to policy processes, and we ended up with policy work 
that generates meaningful texts and acts outside policy work. Academic ac-
counts of policy work are diverse and heterogeneous. Nevertheless, there are 
also overlaps and most accounts have much in common. Before we highlight 
the important differences, we will sketch the contours of a second-order un-
derstanding of policy work.
 Policy is ‘real’ but does not really ‘exist’
Second-order studies of policy work show that it is difficult to define and 
grasp policy accurately. We can study policy practices using conversations, 
meetings and texts, produced by policy functionaries – advisers, executives, 
managers, analysts, administrators – but real people and their encounters do 
not automatically generate policy or policy outcomes. The shapes and dynam-
ics of policy work depend on where these people come from, how they (are 
forced to) think, how they deal with contingencies, and how and where mean-
ingful outcomes are generated. Even an emphasis on individual policy agents 
and how they think is not an ‘actual’ affair, as these individuals have positions, 
backgrounds and forms of expertise that enable them to participate in policy 
processes, or even prevent them from participating, e.g., when policy analysts 
lack the proper political expertise.
 Second-order accounts enable us to focus on ‘real’ things like meetings and 
texts, but also force us to ‘see through’ these real things in order to understand 
why they are there, how they evolve, and how collections of meetings and 
texts constitute policy patterns over time. This clarifies the added value that 
was hinted at before: day-to-day policy experiences (first order) are insuffi-
cient for truly understanding what is going on, especially over time, but big-
ger pictures of arenas and structures (third order) miss the actual day-to-day 
encounters that constitute policy practices.
 Policy work is connective and transformative
In order to contribute to or ‘make’ policy, raw policy material such as concerns, 
information and proposals must be transformed into something that is recog-
nized or perceived as ‘policy.’ Policy practices consist of people, texts, acts, and 
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objects, and how they are configured determines what new texts, acts and ob-
jects are produced. How politico-administrative relations are structured, for 
instance, influences how policy-making happens. Basically, this means that 
policy workers must enter into relations with other policy actors, which ex-
plains why policy ‘sites’ like meetings and texts are so important. They are sites 
at which some sort of ‘input’ is transformed into something else. Intentions, 
for example, are transformed into options, problems are transformed into 
problem definitions, and alternatives must be transformed into transferable 
categories. This means that relations or connections as such are insufficient. 
Signals, events and ideas must be translated, in order to generate some sort 
of policy ‘outcome.’ Policy cues must be picked up, (political) conditions must 
be taken into account, options must be negotiated, and interpretations of ac-
tions (by relevant others) should be influenced. Policy analysts, for instance, 
will have to present ‘correct’ policy options, but also move options ahead by 
keeping an eye on political feasibility.
 How policy work happens, is ‘malleable,’ but constrained
Policy agents have a certain amount of leeway to act, but all of the accounts 
also stress the limits of policy action. Policy work is highly routinized: many 
parameters determine the course of interactive and interpretative processes 
such as the social and educational backgrounds of officials, the organizational 
routines of agencies, and the recognized points for discussion and choice. 
Various work-related mechanisms and organizational routines constrain pol-
icy work; while they enable policy agents to act in the face of complexity and 
ambiguity, they reduce behavioral options. Policy administrators cannot sud-
denly negotiate with members of Parliament, or contact outsiders, they can-
not by-pass their superiors or come up with creative changes in paper flows. 
Work-related mechanisms also ‘protect’ administrators – e.g., street-level bu-
reaucrats alleviating work pressures by stereotyping clients.
 In short, policy work is a highly institutionalized phenomenon and for 
good reason: the structuring of policy processes mitigates ambiguity and 
facilitates the production of shared understandings. Certain rules for using 
resources help policy officials to change the course of governmental action. 
At the same time, institutional insecurities may increase. Managerial reform 
affects traditional working methods, the rise of transnational networks con-
fuses policy mandates, and the normality of participatory processes accelerate 
policy exchanges with people outside policy circles. Flexibility and networks 
affect why policy is formed, what officials do, where actions occur, and how 
policy happens.
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 Diff erences
Despite these commonalities and ‘overall’ results of studying policy practices, 
there is no one definitive second-order view of policy work. The accounts 
differ because they are backed by different theoretical notions (and by dif-
ferent academic positions that legitimate such notions). This means that the 
notion of ‘everyday processes’ differs for different scholars. For some scholars, 
the ‘everydayness’ of policy formation is a matter of individual features such 
as values, opinions and interactions. For some, it is a matter of behavioral 
mechanisms that relate contexts and consequences: of coping mechanisms 
and roles. For others, it is a matter of interpretative acts, which enact and 
reproduce the policy realities of ambiguities and conventions. This implies 
that different scholars take different stances and find distinctive ways to show 
what ‘really’ happens when people do policy.
 This does not mean that all three accounts offer well-rounded pictures of 
policy work. Different scholars find different things, even if they share stances 
and conceptual outlooks and ‘belong’ to a certain account. This is partly a 
matter of contingency, which depends on times and places (such as countries) 
so that studies may end up producing distinctive images of policy processes. 
In contemporary public administration, relations between politicians and ad-
ministrators have changed over time because contacts between policymakers 
in different countries have increased and citizens often play more prominent 
roles in policy-making. But it is also a matter of how scholars frame and pres-
ent research. Accounts that favor dispositions, for example, might emphasize 
individual traits, like moral integrity, but also the social formation of indi-
vidual behavior, e.g., through education. Researchers might frame politico-
administrative relations in terms of distinctions like energy/equilibrium, or 
in terms of metaphors like ‘village life.’ Accounts that focus on contexts and 
coping behaviors may highlight the roles of policy agents or the processes 
aimed at taming the general messiness and structuring problems. Accounts 
that stress the interpretative functions of policymakers may reveal how texts 
are made meaningful or how institutions generate meaning.
 More generally, these various accounts may highlight episodic outputs 
(policy behavior and activities) or the continuing process by which they are 
produced and made meaningful. But even then, scholars often differ in terms 
of their critical inclinations. Some open up the black boxes of policy forma-
tion in order to show how things are working when policy is ‘made.’ They may 
end up showing how politico-administrative interactions work or how policy 
analysts get a grip on messy circumstances. Other researchers open black 
boxes in order to improve our understanding of policy-making and perhaps 
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to improve policy outcomes. In-depth analysis of the problem-defining policy 
behavior may, for example, help analysts to find improved problem defini-
tions. Some researchers may attempt to alter our understanding of where rel-
evant black boxes are. Instead of focusing on policy making and asking ‘what’ 
policymakers and others do in order to generate meaningful policy options, 
they may alter our understanding of where policy occurs and how it happens. 
This may be motivated by a search for ‘just’ policies.
 Conclusion
Despite the differences between second-order accounts of policy work, we 
can see the relevance of studying policy work through outlooks that stay close 
to day-to-day policy practices. Although second-order accounts are situated 
between real, day-to-day experiences and more abstract scholarly perspectives 
on policy processes, they do more than combine experiences and perspectives. 
They focus on the nature of policy and the evolution of policy processes, also 
over time, by showing how policy becomes ‘real’ through ‘real’ texts, acts and 
objects that make up normal working days. The things that structure the pol-
icy worker’s perceptions – earlier encounters, experiences and events, certain 
configurations of people, established ideas, routines and sites – such as cer-
tain scheduled meetings or paper flows – reproduce routines and procedures, 
but also enable policy agents to come up with new ideas, respond to new cues, 
and generate new outcomes. On the one hand, these structures enable the 
predictable interactions, which generate shared meaning, transforming ideas 
into commitments and proposals into authoritative policy texts. On the other 
hand, while structure frames action as appropriate, it does not determine it, 
and policy workers have to plot their own course in a contingent, contested 
and ambiguous world.
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Introduction
Policy is a way of giving meaning to how we are governed; it is an account of 
governing that focuses on collective concerns, the specialized knowledge of 
problem areas, and the application of public authority. This account emerges 
not only in the statements of political leaders and senior bureaucrats (loosely 
labeled ‘policymakers’), but also from how community and sectional activ-
ists make claims, experts are recognized and listened to, officials define and 
apply categories, and journalists construct stories about the public drama of 
governing. The questions to be addressed include ‘What is this “all about,” 
whose responsibility is it, and what can, or should, be done about it?’ Those 
who are working in policy, whether inside or outside of government, find that 
their work is concerned with the construction, negotiation and propagation 
of meaning, which includes discussing problems, identifying and debating ap-
propriate responses to these problems, framing plans, and relating the specific 
practices of governing to these broader frameworks of meaning in which they 
are located. Majone (1989) argues that the work of a policy analyst is less 
like that of a laboratory scientist and more like that of a courtroom lawyer 
who must table ideas, explore their application, test the utility of competing 
frameworks, probe their persuasive power to different audiences – in short, 
he or she must find good arguments for doing things.
 Th is ‘sense-making’ takes place in a variety of ways, not all of them explicitly 
focused on ‘making policy,’ but policy workers are particularly concerned with 
two of these ways: writing documents and negotiating with interested parties 
(‘stakeholders’). Th e two are closely related because writing documents relates 
the claims of stakeholders to one another and to existing practice, and stake-
holders assert their claims to consideration by producing documents of their 
own and contesting or endorsing the documents produced by others. So, a 
large part of policy work is concerned with interaction around the production 
of authoritative documents. As Noordegraaf (2000) noted, policy managers 
lead lives dominated by ‘meetings and papers,’ with meetings being held to dis-
cuss papers and papers being prepared for meetings. Indeed, some would argue 
that policy requires an authoritative paper, which is ‘the policy.’
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 Two of our case studies focus on this process of meaning making, but in 
quite different contexts. In Tamara Metze’s study of the redevelopment of 
former industrial sites in Amsterdam, the various participants had very differ-
ent views of what the story was ‘all about,’ and the policy process was focused 
on the construction of shared meaning. In this case, specialist policy workers 
were recruited with the explicit task of developing among the interested par-
ties shared (or at least mutually compatible) understandings of the redevel-
opment, and they went about this by explicitly presenting it as an exercise 
in collective learning. In this process, documents were produced as part of 
the meaning-making, but not only texts: at particular points, graphic artists 
were engaged to visually express the shared vision that was being generated 
by these discussions. Collaborative project teams were constituted and their 
working procedures were framed to encourage innovative thinking and collec-
tive responsibility for the outcome. It was perhaps unusual in that it was so 
explicit about the intent, but we can see the commissioning of public inquiries 
or the establishment of consultative bodies as technologies for the generation 
of shared understandings and collective commitment – a process which, over 
time, leads to the emergence in specific fields of concern of ‘policy communi-
ties,’ characterized by shared understandings and mutual recognition.
 In the case presented by Annick de Vries et al., the context of the meaning-
making was quite diﬀ erent but it was equally important in the construction 
of policy. Th is study focuses on the economic forecasts produced by an au-
tonomous research institute, which carry particular weight in policy discourse 
in the Netherlands because the institute is considered to have the technical 
expertise while remaining completely free of bias, while its policy workers are 
anxious to protect this reputation. Other policy workers respect this concern, 
recognizing the importance of this reputation in the validation of policy out-
comes. But economic forecasting is not an exact science and experts will readily 
concede that their predictions depend on assumptions that may turn out to be 
unwarranted, and that nominating a range of likely outcomes would be more 
accurate than picking a single ﬁ gure, but a clear ﬁ gure carries more weight in 
policy discourse than a range of possibilities, so there is a tension between 
technical precision and political utility. A single-ﬁ gure prediction is open to 
challenge technically but remains useful in policy development. At the same 
time, policy workers in other institutional locations might produce diﬀ erent 
forecasts but they may also want to avoid the appearance of public disputation 
over something that is presented as the product of technical expertise.
 The result is a delicate process of deliberation between experts from the 
institute and interested policy workers from other institutional locations. 
This is marked by an openness among the ‘policy community’ to the possibil-
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ity of alternative and equally-defensible predictions. It is also marked by a 
shared commitment to the production of a single, expert prediction. Annick 
et al. show that participants employ different discourses in different contexts, 
producing a ‘sacred,’ ‘front office’ discourse that stresses expertise and impar-
tiality, and a ‘profane,’ ‘back office’ discourse that admits to a divergence of 
predictions and the importance of keeping the public stances of different par-
ticipants in alignment.
 The two cases are set in rather different contexts, and display different 
characteristics. Metze’s case shows a more variegated construction of mean-
ing, in which the validity of the distinct perspectives of the various partici-
pants was recognizable, and the process of weaving a shared meaning could 
take place in public. De Vries et al., by contrast, analyze a situation in which 
particular value was attached to a single, authoritative statement, so that the 
process of negotiation among the participants about the terms of this state-
ment had to be done in private, and the outcome explained differently in of-
ficial, ‘front office’ settings and more private ‘back office’ ones. But, in both 
cases, we can see the construction of a shared and public account of governing 
as an important part of the work of policy.
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4 New Life for Old Buildings: 
 Mediating Between Diﬀ erent Meanings
Tamara Metze
 Introduction
Policy work begins with problems and with the way people perceive and re-
spond to these problems. This is a story about a flour mill, a cookie factory, a 
gasworks, and a shipyard; all old industrial sites in the Netherlands that over 
the years have lost their function as more and more industrial production 
has moved to low-wage countries. In a modern capitalist economy the usual 
response of landowners, financiers, developers and government agencies is to 
demolish these old deteriorated buildings and replace them with shopping 
malls, condominiums and offices. This development strategy has long been 
considered the most lucrative, the quickest, the most market-responsive, and 
the easiest to regulate. But sometimes, artists, filmmakers, musicians, graphic 
designers and so on, find innovative new functions for these sites before any 
development plans have been made. These innovative functions may inspire 
the relevant actors – government officials, planners, architects, but also proj-
ect developers, financers, and housing corporations – to maintain these sites. 
This can open the eyes of project developers and governments to the fact that 
these artists and their cultural activities not only add cultural value but also 
financial and economical value. The artists and small businesses can attract 
new audiences and new potential users and buyers from the ‘creative class’ to 
the location but also the surrounding areas (Florida 2002). In these cases, the 
owners and financers may propose reconstructing rather than demolishing 
the characteristic buildings with their high ceilings, big windows, and strange 
silos. They may want to form a coalition with the artists and small creative 
businesses to cooperate in the renovation.
 However, coalition formation is often difficult due to the rules and regula-
tions that guide formal planning in the Netherlands; the dominant ideas of 
making quick profits in the world of project development; and the squatters’ 
and artists’ distrust of the government and project developers. This poses a 
challenge to policy workers inside and outside government: How to overcome 
the barriers of routines and procedures to enable traditionally adversarial ac-
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tors to work out an innovative solution? At this point, governmental actors 
may hire external consultants to work out an alternative approach. This was 
the case for seven of these Dutch industrial sites. A coalition of national and 
local governmental actors together with project developers and housing cor-
porations hired external consultants to create an alternative route for policy-
making in a learning network. These external consultants are policy work-
ers (see chapter 1 and Gill and Colebatch 2006), specialized in mediation, 
consensus-building and coalition-formation. They know how to facilitate the 
creation of shared meaning, a process that includes a reframing of the prob-
lem at hand (Rein and Schön 1993: 164). This enables cooperation amongst 
otherwise adversarial actors. Shared meaning can facilitate the fruitful media-
tion of conflict between the different interests and creates an alternative route 
for redevelopment.
 In the redevelopment of the old industrial sites, the consultants created a 
learning network based on Wenger’s idea of a community of practice (CoP). 
They facilitated the formation of coalitions across boundaries between actors. 
Rather than a negotiation with winners and losers, the interested parties en-
tered a process with a goal of creating outcomes that benefited everyone and 
were acceptable to all. In other words, the specialized policy workers induced 
participating actors to move from a ‘political view’ to a ‘cooperative view’ (Rein 
and Schön 1993: 160) with the aid of the ‘staging of learning settings’ (Hajer 
2005: 626).
 This chapter offers an account of how these specialized policy workers cre-
ated and maintained this learning network across the seven sites. Moreover, it 
describes in detail how external policy workers induced participants to move 
from a political view in which their interests are conflicting and need to be 
negotiated, to a cooperative view in which the mediation of different mean-
ings and a communal learning effort about these meanings was developed as 
an alternative policy approach.
 Specialized policy workers: creation of a learning network
In 2004, some consultants in mediation and consensus building brought to-
gether several local government agencies, housing corporations, financers, 
and project developers that were all involved in the development of an old 
industrial site in the Netherlands. While working on other projects, these 
consultants had seen that these actors shared ambitions and ran into similar 
problems in their attempts to redevelop these old industrial sites. The consul-
tants launched the idea of starting a ‘Community of Practice: Pilot Cases for 
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the Creative Economy.’ The consultants persuaded this group to learn from 
similar ongoing projects across the Netherlands that had all experimented 
with this new type of redevelopment.
 In total, seven projects were included in the learning network: the Haze-
meijer factory for electronic appliances in the east; a flour mill factory in 
Leiden; an old school in Rotterdam; a chemical factory in Amersfoort; and 
two projects that were related to the strategies of governments and private 
partners for attracting the creative industry in specific neighborhoods in 
Arnhem and Amsterdam. Hence, the group of project developers, housing 
corporations, governmental actors and financers formed a core team that 
consisted of at least seven practitioners, each representing one project. The 
members of the core team were all people with some financial investment in 
one of the seven projects; no artists or creative entrepreneurs were included 
in this group. The individual core team members had decision-making pow-
ers over their own projects, but the core team had no power as a collective 
body. The team members financed the learning network with resources from 
their organizations and with additional resources from Habiforum,1 a na-
tional program.
 Habiforum is a collaboration of the Ministry of Transport and Traffic, the 
Ministry of Housing, and the Ministry of Agriculture, whose objectives are to 
stimulate sustainable and innovative land use (Habiforum 2007). It is a pro-
gram that fosters the formation of learning networks amongst practitioners 
and scientists to obtain these objectives. In the late 1990s, Habiforum was 
inspired by Etienne Wenger’s concept of a community of practice. Wenger de-
veloped this concept to better understand learning processes in networks. As 
Wenger argued, these communities learn through equal apprenticeship and 
they create their own visions based on their practical experiences. According 
to Wenger, a Community of Practice is a group of people who share a com-
mon concern or passion and want to learn how to do it better. They are part 
of a community; they share a domain and a practice (Wenger 1998). What 
started out as an attempt to understand learning as situated practice (Lave 
and Wenger 1991), evolved into a tool for knowledge management that could 
be further cultivated (Wenger et al. 2002).
 The consultant was inspired by this idea of the community of practice and 
designed a structure to guide the learning process called de opwerkingsfabriek 
(the enrichment factory). As is the case in communities of practice, learning 
in the enrichment factory was closely linked to problems encountered and les-
sons learned in the practice of redevelopment. The consultants designed the 
enrichment factory to facilitate the iteration between learning and practice 
without undo interference by external experts. The members of the network 
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were to advise each other. The goal of this design was twofold: to guide the 
improvement of the overall concept of the project development of old indus-
trial sites for the creative economy and to stimulate the improvement of local 
projects (see figure 1).2
Figure 1  e Enrichment Factory
Source: De Stad bv (%--/)
In this design, two learning groups were created consisting of the core team 
and the experiential experts including the artists and creative entrepreneurs 
involved in the projects. The core team met four or five times a year and 
monitored the general learning process. The second learning group consisted 
of experiential experts (Kolb 1984) from each of the seven projects who had 
learned valuable lessons from practice, which they combined with a more 
general knowledge of project development. They all had a stake in one of 
the seven projects. This group included the investors but also artists, musi-
cians, filmmakers, etc. The latter were included because they represented the 
Practice (7 projects)
C
or
et
ea
m
Interests of
experiential
experts
Knowledge of
experiential
experts
Next practices
Expertmeetings
79New Life for Old Buildings
present and future end users of these locations. The project developers were 
convinced that these users would add cultural value to these old industrial 
sites. The experiential experts met twice at on-site expert meetings, fostering 
learning exchanges amongst the participants. The experiential experts even-
tually suggested general lessons that the core team could draw from these 
cases.
 Moving from the political to the cooperative: staging the learning settings
The policy workers created a learning environment, which they saw as consist-
ing of equal apprenticeship among the partners. They supplied various tools 
as part of the core team and during the expert meetings to induce participants 
to learn and not to bicker. The specialized policy workers had the expertise 
to create a setting that could ‘construct people as collaborators’ (Hajer 2005: 
625). As such, they ‘staged’ a learning setting to influence how the participants 
behaved (Hajer 2005: 626). The policy workers encouraged participants to 
interact in ways that were different from their normal routines. For example, 
the consultants organized the meetings on site and not in offices. At most of 
the meetings a meal was served while the participants created scenarios and 
artists came up with their impressions of the deliberations. These tools and 
strategies were to ensure that everyone worked together indirectly, to avoid 
sitting at a table and negotiating face to face. John Forester calls them ‘strate-
gies for indirection’ (Forester 2000; 2009), which also include ‘making time 
and space for the rituals of sharing food and storytelling, the time and spaces 
enabling parties to acknowledge and learn new things about one another at 
the same time’ (Forester 2009: 249).
 The aim of these preparations was to encourage participants to shift 
away from a political view on policy-making procedures and redevelopment, 
which is based on an adversarial relationship between rivals with conflicting 
interests where negotiation is necessary, toward a more cooperative view in 
which the action involves multiple-conflicting frames, each of which is per-
ceived as legitimate (Rein and Schön 1993: 163). Rein and Schön argue that 
the tension between cooperation and conflict is inherent in political action, 
but when the involved parties take a more cooperative view, it becomes easier 
to generate a mutually acceptable outcome. Rein and Schön see conflicts be-
tween frames as reducible through the reflection of the participants on these 
various frames (Rein and Schön 1993: 164), by creating a shared understand-
ing and reframing of the problem, or in our case, constructing a shared value 
of a location.
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 Rein and Schön argue that these two views have different implications for 
the role of policy analysis in policy controversies because in the political view, 
policy analysis has to provide rational knowledge to resolve a conflict, while 
in the cooperative view, policy analysis can facilitate inquiries into a common 
problem and also stimulate frame reflection and reframing. In the political 
view, the participants and policy analysts believe that ‘being rational’ will solve 
the problem (Rein and Schön 1993: 162); any policy analysis that aims to con-
tribute to conflict resolution needs to provide rational information. However, 
in the cooperative view, being rational is not enough. To understand the dif-
ferent frames of interpretation, it is necessary to reframe the problem and to 
generate outcomes that are more than acceptable to all participants. In this 
kind of reframing process, the function of policy analysis is to ‘facilitate the 
inquiry into the common problem’ (Rein and Schön 1993: 160). But the case of 
the Community of Practice for the Creative Economy demonstrates that Rein 
and Schön’s distinction between ‘political’ and ‘cooperative’ is not simply an 
analytical distinction but can also be seen as part of policy practice. The par-
ticipants can interpret a situation as political or cooperative, which influences 
their willingness to cooperate and learn. It is not just their understanding of 
the problem, or in our case, their understanding of the value of the old indus-
trial site, that shapes the outcomes; it is also their idea of being involved in 
a political conflict or in a cooperative situation. In her study of storylines on 
participation in deliberative settings, Carolyn Hendriks showed that story-
lines about who should participate and how and when, affected the quality of 
the deliberations (Hendriks 2005). In our case, the specialized policy workers 
attempted to stage settings in which participants were induced to move from 
a political view to a cooperative one, and at the same time this meant a refram-
ing of their normal frames.
 Two learning settings and four strategies to induce a cooperative view
As we have already seen, the policy workers created at least two different 
types of meetings to facilitate a shift from a political to a cooperative view: 
the expert meetings and the core team meetings. They also applied at least 
three different strategies of staging to induce participants to remain in or 
move towards a more cooperative view where they can learn from each other: 
indirection, co-creation of a learning-and-knowledge document, and the co-
creation of learning stories.
 The consultants introduced the strategy of indirection (Forester 2000; 
2009) at both the expert and core team meetings. These included: meeting 
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outside of normal office hours, meeting at informal locations, sharing a meal, 
and having a drink together. These rituals were evaluated by the core team 
participants, who found them valuable and helpful.3
 Second, a learning-and-knowledge document was co-created in which the 
core team tracked and traced the general lessons. Rather than have an aca-
demic researcher document the lessons, the core team members deliberated 
several times about the lessons learned, and adapted it and the conclusions. 
This document served as both an agenda and as documentation so that new 
questions and problems periodically appeared on the agenda while answers 
to earlier questions were being formulated. This document facilitated knowl-
edge gathering as well as collectively exploring and diagnosing problems. This 
agenda and the midterm review successfully traced the learning process of the 
community of practice. It helped redefine the problem – converting old, ugly 
and useless buildings into great new locations for the creative economy. It also 
contained practical information for the practitioners and it generated general 
lessons on how to conduct project developments in the creative industry for 
future projects.
 A third strategy that fostered the learning environment involved encour-
aging the core team practitioners to not only gather knowledge but also to 
reflect on their own practices, which led the consultants to introduce the no-
tion of ‘learning stories.’ Learning stories are the minutes of meetings plus 
additional observations and reflections, which may provide an agenda for 
sense making, and stimulate new questions and decisions (Kleiner and Roth 
1996; Metze and Ermers 2002). The learning stories strategy was less suc-
cessful than the learning and knowledge document, however. The consultants 
only succeeded once in organizing a discussion of this nature.4 The core team 
preferred to deliberate on the learning-and-knowledge agenda, considering it 
more important to develop knowledge and competences that might be helpful 
in the negotiations with people from outside of the community of practice, 
than spending time on a learning process inquiry within the community.
 Fourth and last, the consultants came up with different mediation and 
communication tools for each meeting, especially the expert meetings. For 
example, they would apply scenario thinking to stimulate creativity; they cre-
ated a fish bowl setting in which the local stakeholders sat in an inner circle 
where they could be questioned by the experiential experts from other proj-
ects in an outer circle; they hired actors to visualize the future; they hired 
cartoonists to visualize participants’ views.
To illustrate how the consultants utilized these strategies to stage learning 
environments, I will use one of the projects, the NDSM-wharf East, as an 
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example to explore how consultants applied various tools and strategies to 
encourage participants to rely on the learning model to negotiate between 
conflicting meanings and interests.
 Cooperating and learning at the NDSM-Wharf East
At the NDSM-wharf in Amsterdam Noord (North Amsterdam), located on 
the banks of the river IJ, young independent artists had organized events: 
exhibitions, concerts, and theatre-festivals for over ten years. These events 
attracted large audiences but also interested investors to the area. Because 
this old shipyard and its surroundings were used informally and sometimes 
illegally, the city could transform this area into something more attractive. 
The city, together with a consortium of project developers (Red Concepts), 
started investing in this wharf area and helped facilitate cultural programs. 
For example, MTV Networks Northern Europe moved its headquarters to 
the old carpenters workshop there, and other entertainment industries have 
also moved their offices to this up and coming area.
 At the first expert meeting at the NDSM site, the consultants hired two 
actors to perform and present various future scenarios. The first scenario 
envisioned the commercial development of the site. In this scenario, MTV 
figured as a main player. This private company would determine which 
events would be held here. The area would only be accessible to invitees. 
The independent artists who are the current residents cooperated with 
MTV in developing this vision. The second scenario envisioned something 
at the other end of the spectrum: a theatre festival would receive grants from 
a philanthropic organization, which would make them the major player and 
the independent artists would be invited to cooperate with this organiza-
tion.
 These two scenarios provided an opportunity to discuss the various (fu-
ture) values of this site to the different users and developers. The reactions of 
the participants at the meeting ranged from: ‘the shipyard is more than just a 
décor’ and ‘the public space belongs to the local government and should thus 
remain public,’ ‘the area has an urban dynamic that should be maintained and 
stimulated.’5 This discussion allowed the consultants to identify the common 
values that the participants attributed to the site:
– All of the involved parties wanted to foster the bottom-up dynamics (ac-
tivities) of this area.
– The public-ness of the area should be maximized.
– Many things are possible, but all of the involved parties need to have ac-
cess to the area.
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– There is enough space at this site to host many different cultural events at 
the same time.
– The cultural agenda, including all of the organized events, need to be 
subsidized by more than one sponsor.
– A shared identity needs to be developed to ensure that the site does not 
become some plaything for various trend-mongers.6
The chief value of this site appears to be its public-ness, the great variety of 
activities and users. The consultants came up with a list of the values that the 
participants all agreed on.
 At the same time, this exercise made it clear what the differences were. For 
example, some wondered whether it was necessary for this site to be world-
famous and attractive to everyone. Perhaps a somewhat more exclusive ur-
ban site would be attractive as well?7 The consultants chose not to emphasize 
these differences in the minutes, preferring to focus on the similarities and to 
stage a learning situation. They feared that emphasizing the differences would 
lead away from a learning environment.
 At the second meeting, the consultants used the conclusions arrived at the 
previous meeting, which meant a general consensus regarding developing the 
significance of the area. The consultants deliberated with the city and the 
project developer and decided to continue the mediation process of different 
values and to construct an ‘identity.’8 This had become more important as the 
area became increasingly popular among more commercial enterprises, such 
as the Dutch retailer, HEMA. This made the need to establish the kinds of 
activities and businesses that would contribute the most creative value and 
identity to this site all the more urgent in order to prevent it from being trans-
formed into an ordinary business site.9
 The consultants facilitated learning at the second expert meeting by stag-
ing a discussion of how the site might look in 15 years. Each of the three 
groups addressed a specific question: (1) what types of activities will take 
place here? (2) What will the public areas look like? (3) How will the different 
users of this shipyard interact?10 Each group had its own ‘beeldkunstenaar,’ a 
draughtsman. Two preferred a more cartoonist style, while the third opted for 
a more futuristic architectural style. The drawings distilled the major images 
that each of the participants envisioned for the site. The draughtsmen pro-
duced an estimated ten images per interest group.
After this first round, experiential experts from other projects were asked to 
select the drawings they believed best expressed the core value of the NDSM 
shipyard and it surroundings. They selected, among others, a drawing of ‘raw 
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meat’, a workshop that included an auto mechanic atmosphere and a bar; and 
a ‘mobile hotel’ (see images). The selection process provoked a stimulating 
sense-making conversation (Weick 1995) in which the images that best ex-
pressed the values and identities were discussed.
Figure 2 Raw-ness
Figure 3 Industrial Romance (for everyone)
Source: De Beeldleveranciers (Image Suppliers)
The consultants synthesized and combined the different values and elements 
of identity in the minutes of this second expert meeting. They constructed 
an identity for the area based on the drawings and discussions, which includ-
ed an inter-connected island of ‘rawness’ that would combine the industrial 
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character, a sense of incompleteness and imperfection, with the ‘character of a 
well-connected island in the city.’11 Again, the consultants withheld the values 
that stakeholders disagreed on, again, fearing that drawing attention to them 
would change the nature of the interaction from one of learning to one of 
negotiation and possible conflict, and transform the cooperative process into 
a more political one.
 It is still uncertain how the cooperative view that was constructed in the 
learning setting will be used in the redevelopment of this site. One option 
would be to make it part of a formal covenant between public and private 
partners, including agreements on the development and maintenance of the 
private and public buildings and areas: what creative industries will be per-
mitted to establish or expand, and under what conditions? For example, the 
public use of the canteens of these private companies could be one condi-
tion, or permission to exceed a certain decibel level during certain organized 
events. Another option would be to include this constructed identity in local 
government policy on area development.
 We can conclude that the consultants’ tools to stage the learning setting 
in the two expert meetings at the NDSM-Wharf East were successfully em-
ployed. Th ere was collaboration among the potential rival participants; they 
stopped negotiating and began a collaborative process to resolve the issues at 
hand regarding the diﬀ ering values that the various end users and owners at-
tached to the area. Th e consultants played an important role in facilitating this 
learning process as they mediated the diﬀ erent values and applied diﬀ erent 
strategies to stage learning settings and construct a shared meaning of the area.
 Understanding the consultants job: Balancing learning and relevance
We have seen how policy workers created a learning network to bridge dif-
ferences in meanings and interests amongst actors who all wanted to develop 
various old industrial sites, but for different reasons and perhaps in different 
ways. The policy workers had a threefold task:
1. to induce participants to move from a political view to a cooperative view;
2. to mediate between different frames, the various kinds of meaning, that 
the participants attached to these old industrial sites;
3. to remain relevant to the policy making and planning processes regarding 
these industrial sites.
To achieve these tasks, the policy workers created an alternative approach to 
policy making and planning with regard to these old industrial sites. They 
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created a learning network and staged two learning settings, ‘safe havens’ in 
which actors could refrain from negotiating and where they could share their 
experiences and ask ‘what are we doing’ (Rein and Schön 1993: 160). The two 
learning settings were, for the most part, successful; although in different 
ways. First, the core team focused on the generation of more general lessons 
and knowledge, while at the expert meetings, a mediation of the different 
meanings took place. This difference can be explained by mentioning a third 
challenge and how the policy workers resolved it.
 The third challenge to the policy workers was to keep the lessons from 
these learning settings relevant to the practice regarding the specific projects. 
The focus on real-time projects where something is at stake for participants, 
made it impossible to deny the conflicting interests. The expert meetings were 
directly linked to negotiations in the seven projects. It was at these meet-
ings that consultants had to introduce more advanced strategies and tools to 
foster the cooperative view of actors. The consultants made an effort to di-
rect the communal learning process, emphasizing what the practitioners had 
in common by employing a strategy of indirection, which entailed cartoon-
ists distilling the shared core values of the practitioners and then visualizing 
them. They also chose to suppress the differences in core values, emphasizing 
the shared meanings instead. The consultants encouraged a process from a 
cooperative point of view among the participants. The core team members 
were further away from the negotiations. As they drew more general lessons 
which did not have to be applied to these specific projects, they did not need 
a strategy to bridge differences between frames. They preferred to co-create 
knowledge on how to redevelop old industrial sites and express it in a learn-
ing-and-knowledge document.
 The aim of the learning network was to stimulate cooperation through 
shared meaning to an agreed-upon outcome. All of the actors agreed to par-
ticipate and were aware that the cooperative outcomes were the aim. More-
over, they were free to leave the learning network at any time. In one of the 
projects, a group of artists, in fact, did so. They successfully turned to normal 
decision-making procedures to regain their position within the learning net-
work. But overall, the consultants and the more powerful participants – the 
investors, governmental actors and project developers – all made an effort to 
include all of the interested parties, even those with no significant financial 
stake in the projects. They agreed that the inclusion of these otherwise less 
powerful actors in real-time project development and in the learning pro-
cesses was a condition to not only encourage collaborative learning but also 
to improve the quality of urban redevelopment of these particular industrial 
sites.
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 In this sense, the learning network also had a politically more strategic, and 
even democratic goal because the core team members and rest of the partici-
pants wanted to partake of this new type of redevelopment of old industrial 
sites which would include minority frames consisting of artists, filmmakers, 
musicians, and other creative entrepreneurs. They wanted to demonstrate 
that this new type of redevelopment could be financially, culturally and so-
cially successful. Although some of the parties may have played a dominant 
role because they were ultimately the ones who could decide whether the less 
powerful parties should or should not be included – the artists and creative 
entrepreneurs were still taken seriously in the redevelopment process of the 
seven sites. Artists and other creative entrepreneurs also had a stake in par-
ticipating in the learning network; their participation made the ‘creative iden-
tity’ of the seven sites stronger. This enabled the investors, project developers 
and governmental actors, with the support of the artists and other creative 
entrepreneurs, to maintain this identity in the negotiations with other pos-
sible occupants of the sites. These potential newcomers would then need to 
meet the conditions set by the artists and creative entrepreneurs as well as by 
the developers. Moreover, the core team members and other actors used the 
lessons they learned in how to convince other participants to participate in a 
broader debate on urban redevelopment in the Netherlands to convince oth-
ers that this type of redevelopment is indeed credible.
There are plenty of other questions that need to be answered about the 
democratic legitimacy of this learning network such as: was it transparent, 
did the participants represent all of the interests concerned with this type of 
redevelopment, did people have equal amounts of time to make their point, 
did the artists have real decision-making powers or were they sometimes 
overruled by the commercial investors? Unfortunately, I cannot answer all 
of these questions in this chapter. I merely wanted to demonstrate that pol-
icy work can be about managing processes in the face of power (Forester 
1989), which, in this case, means in the face of ongoing tensions during 
negotiations. Policy work is always political and the aforementioned con-
sultants were exercising their power by suppressing contrary views, but, in 
this case, it was less about engineering a victory for any one actor, than 
about constructing a shared meaning amongst potentially rival actors to en-
able them to create a stronger coalition in the negotiation process. The role 
of consultants as specialized policy workers was here defined as managing 
practices, meanings, relationships, and staging settings to induce actors to 
cooperate and learn.
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 Notes
 Habiforum (). Website Habiforum. Retrieved October , , from http://
www.habiforum.nl.
 Published with permission from Critical Policy Analysis. The first place this figure 
was published: Critical Policy Analysis (). 
 Stad bv, d. (b). Vragen aan kernteamleden voor telefonisch interview inclusief resul-
taten --/-- [Questions to core team members for telephone interview 
including results -- / --]. Amsterdam.
 Stad bv, d. (). Noties Kernteam -- [Notions Core team --]. Am-
sterdam.
 Stad bv, d. (a). Proeftuinen Creatieve Economie – Verslag Expertmeeting I NDSM-
Oost Amsterdam [Pilot projects Creative Economy – Report Expert Meeting I 
NDSM-East Amsterdam]. Amsterdam.
 Stad bv, d. (a). Proeftuinen Creatieve Economie – Verslag Expertmeeting I NDSM-
Oost Amsterdam [Pilot projects Creative Economy – Report Expert Meeting I 
NDSM-East Amsterdam]. Amsterdam.
 Stad bv, d. (a). Proeftuinen Creatieve Economie – Verslag Expertmeeting I NDSM-
Oost Amsterdam [Pilot projects Creative Economy – Report Expert Meeting I 
NDSM-East Amsterdam]. Amsterdam.
 Stad bv, d. (a). Proeftuinen Creatieve Economie – NDSM Werf Oost: Programma 
expertmeeting II [Pilot projects Creative Economy – NDSM Dock East: Program 
Expert Meeting II]. Amsterdam
 Stad bv, d. (a). Proeftuinen Creatieve Economie – NDSM Werf Oost: Programma 
expertmeeting II [Pilot projects Creative Economy – NDSM Dock East: Program 
Expert Meeting II]. Amsterdam
 Stad bv, d. (a). Proeftuinen Creatieve Economie – NDSM Werf Oost: Programma 
expertmeeting II [Pilot projects Creative Economy – NDSM Dock East: Program 
Expert Meeting II]. Amsterdam
 Stad bv, d. (b). Verslag Expertmeeting II NDSM-Oost [Report Expert Meeting II 
NDSM-East]. Amsterdam.
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5 Policy Workers Tinkering with Uncertainty:
 Dutch Econometric Policy Advice in Action
Annick de Vries, Willem Halﬀ man and Rob Hoppe
 Experts and civil servants at work, together
Every year, on the third Tuesday of September, the Dutch cabinet presents 
its plans to Parliament for the coming year. There is much pomp and circum-
stance, which is unusual for a political culture that is otherwise proud of its 
modesty and restraint. The Queen is transported to the Parliament build-
ings in a golden carriage, cheered on by the masses and accompanied by an 
extensive corps of mounted guards. The horses are brought in from all over 
the country for the event, because the state no longer owns enough horses. 
The Queen’s state of the nation speech then kicks off weeks of Parliamentary 
bickering over the budget, which assesses the work of the government in great 
detail. MPs of the various parties in Dutch politics bicker over each and every 
detail in the budget, but one feature of the budget is beyond debate: the as-
sessment of future economic growth by the nation’s official econometricians 
is considered not only the very best estimate but the only one that really mat-
ters. In spite of obvious and acknowledged uncertainties that could make or 
break the nation’s wealth – such as wars, bank crises, or simply bad weather 
– the assessments made by these experts keeps the level of disagreement to a 
minimum: everyone ends up agreeing on the state of the economy, both cur-
rently and in the near future.
 This situation is pervasive in Dutch politics and is all the more remark-
able because the relationship between specialized experts and policymakers is 
generally a difficult one. Civil servants and politicians typically complain that 
experts do not provide ‘useful’ knowledge or do not appreciate the context 
in which knowledge will be put to work. Conversely, experts complain that 
policymakers abuse their findings or fail to understand the qualifications and 
uncertainties of the advice. In order to maintain cooperation, both parties 
need to adjust mutual expectations and negotiate their roles.
 This chapter analyzes how this ‘boundary work,’ as we call it, occurs at 
one particular body that provides economic expert knowledge to the Dutch 
government, the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis. This 
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government institute has a key role in Dutch public policy in that it pro-
vides knowledge that is considered highly reliable and is invariably de-
ployed as such in public debate. We will try to understand how experts and 
policymakers together manage to produce economic assessments that are 
widely accepted as correct for all practical purposes, in spite of the consid-
erable uncertainties involved. In spite of these uncertainties, acknowledged 
by both experts and policymakers alike, these actors manage to produce 
what are considered solid cognitive foundations for economic policy. They 
channel political energy into what needs to be done rather than into the 
current state of affairs. The focus of this chapter is on how this cooperation 
is structured.
 Advisory relationships are productive when experts and policymakers 
work together. Empirical studies of expertise for public policy have shown 
that expertise that is unceremoniously dropped at the doorstep of the policy-
maker rarely leads to any kind of policy learning (Cash, Borck and Patt 2006; 
Huberman 1987; Landry 2003; Weiss and Bucavalas 1977). However sensitive 
experts may be to immediate policy needs, effective use of new information 
relies on actual interaction, on working together.
 Work implies meaningful and purposeful activity, directed at the creation 
of a collective product. Experts do not work on policy reports by blindly and 
thoughtlessly following recipes, but through an understanding of the problem 
at hand; a meaningful comprehension of the knowledge available; the context 
in which this knowledge is to be used; as well as what kinds of statements are 
justifiable, given professional standards and values. In other words, experts 
operate in a social world, not as computing actors in a Euclidean void (Strauss 
1988; Wenger 1998).
 Working together means policymakers and experts have to negotiate ten-
sions and disjunctions between their respective social worlds. Their respec-
tive ongoing concerns and projects never quite coincide, no matter how poli-
cy-oriented the expert or how knowledge-sensitive the policymaker. Working 
together implies the negotiation of work across boundaries between social 
worlds, mutual adjustment, and tinkering with new problems as they occur. 
Advising policy is complex, professional work, where all of the eventualities 
have not yet been resolved and all of the role conflicts have not yet been set-
tled. Civil servants negotiate complex streams of thinking and powering, in 
which expert advice is but one parameter in a fuzzy set of undefined equa-
tions. Because this work occurs across the boundaries of policy and expert 
worlds, we call it boundary work. Boundary work can more formally be un-
derstood as the attempts of actors to define practices in contrast to each other 
through demarcation; as well as the attempts of actors to find productive 
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cooperation across these boundaries through a division of labor that is more 
or less accepted by the actors involved (Gieryn 1995; Halffman 2003; Hoppe 
2005; Star and Griesemer 1989).
 This chapter describes the tinkering involved in boundary work for econo-
metric advice to government departments in the Netherlands. Through ex-
tensive participatory observation and interviews during the production of two 
policy reports, one of us (AdV) has observed what occurs in these practices 
when new issues arise that require alignment work between social worlds (De 
Vries 2008). We wanted to know how economic experts tinker with their 
tools, tailoring advice to policy needs, while carefully maintaining the stan-
dards of their trade. From the perspective of civil servants, we wanted to know 
how they formulate their need for econometric knowledge and integrate that 
knowledge into policy projects.
 Our analysis focuses on what happens when the advisory work is con-
fronted with uncertainties. Policy may wish for accurate numbers predicting 
annual GNP growth rates for purposes of budgeting, for example, but econo-
mies suffer from unexpected crises, experience sudden windfalls, and even 
surreptitiously resist precise measurement. A skirmish on a Middle Eastern 
border, the fall of an unstable dictator, or the unmasking of a corrupt mega-
corporation, can send shudders through the world’s economies, play havoc 
with the oil price, or send currencies into a spin. The consequences for a small 
and open economy such as the Dutch one can be enormous.
 Both experts and civil servants involved in the advisory process are well 
aware of the uncertainty that underlies their predictions and they have found 
ways to accommodate it in their work. Uncertainties are particularly chal-
lenging to the division of labor between experts and policymakers, as this 
division often relies on the argument that experts provide certain knowledge, 
leaving policymakers to make value-based choices in the remaining areas 
where experts cannot provide hard knowledge. At the same time, although 
uncertainties about the economic future are obvious and undeniable, deci-
sion makers want to convey certainty, if only to legitimate choices or provide 
public assurance. Unpredictable fluctuations in the oil price, the mood swings 
of economic conjuncture, or even the fickle mind of the national consumer 
are issues that cannot easily be divided between the remit of the expert and 
the policymaker. Sociologically, uncertainty is a monster, as it challenges the 
social ontologies of public expertise.
 In this chapter, we want to describe how civil servants and experts together 
deal with this monster. They have found ways to tame uncertainties in an ad-
visory relationship that otherwise stresses the certainty of expert knowledge. 
In the next section, we will describe the role of the Dutch planning bureaus 
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to show how important certainty is for their contribution to national policy 
making. In the next two sections, we will analyze the production process of 
two reports and show how uncertainties were addressed. In the final section, 
we draw conclusions about how uncertainty is managed in this dense interac-
tion between experts and policy workers.
 Our research sites: Economists and their clients
Economists of the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis provide 
the national executive with authoritative analyses of the Dutch economy and 
how it is expected to develop in the future. Its staff of 200 produces about 
100 reports per year, with the Departments of Economic Affairs and Finance 
as its main patrons. The Bureau operates at some distance from the Minis-
try, where it carefully guards its reputation as an independent institute for 
the analysis of policy outcomes ex ante and ex post, based on the calculative 
reason of econometric models. For example, the bureau will assess the ex-
pected effects of tax changes on income distribution, the economic benefits 
of infrastructure projects, or the state of the government’s budget in light of 
European monetary agreements.
 The Bureau has a remarkable role of authority in the Dutch policy world. 
Its regular economic growth predictions are featured prominently in the me-
dia and form crucial interventions in the periodic adjustment of national poli-
cies. Political parties submit election manifestoes to the Bureau to assess the 
likely effects of their political plans on the Dutch economy. Its econometric 
analyses also form an input to negotiations between the social partners and 
at several points in policy cycles for major issues such as the national budget, 
government is legally required to submit its plans to these experts. The Bu-
reau has so far been able to maintain its role as a neutral arbiter of economic 
realism, even against criticism of technocracy or against challengers among 
Dutch economists (Halffman and Hoppe 2005).
 The economists of the Bureau trace back their role definition to their 
founding father, the Dutch economist Jan Tinbergen, the first director of the 
Bureau in 1947. Tinbergen defended the role of economics in policy making 
by invoking the typical sacred narrative: policymakers formulate the desired 
policy outcomes, while economists can advise on what policy instruments can 
provide these outcomes. For example, in the traditional Keynesian economics 
of the era, economists could suggest how to achieve a desired balance between 
unemployment and inflation, but it was up to the politicians, not the econo-
mists, to identify the desired outcome (Don 2004).
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 Although the establishment of the principles for policy analysis by the 
planning bureau is presented as a historical discontinuity by a stroke of ge-
nius, the debate over the role of a planning bureau already started in the 1930s, 
when ‘economic planning’ was seen as a way to tackle the profound economic 
crisis after the stock market collapse of 1929. By the time the Bureau was 
established, centralist planning had already lost many of its credentials, but 
differences of opinion on the role of economics in policy continued to exist. 
When the Bureau produced its first reports, the notion of ‘planning’ in its 
name was already being frowned upon, but its Dutch name, which literally 
translates as ‘Central Planning Bureau’ was anchored in law and has remained 
unchanged since (Van den Bogaard 1998).
 The economists at the Bureau guard their role carefully and are quick to 
distance themselves from any notion of ‘planning,’ seen as technocratic and 
‘not of this time.’ For this reason, the English name of the Bureau refers to 
‘Economic Policy Analysis’ rather than the ‘Central Planning’ of the Dutch 
name. Senior members of the bureau will also vehemently object to terms 
such as ‘assessment’ or ‘policy advice’ to describe their work, as these imply 
normativity, telling politicians what to do, or taking sides in political disagree-
ments. They see their role purely as one of analysis: a neutral study of the 
likely outcomes of policies (Hoppe 2008).
 However, in the practice of policy debates and shifting governance struc-
tures, these principles require further elaboration. In 1996, a protocol for 
planning bureaus was published, formalizing some of the principles about the 
kinds of tasks that experts can and cannot perform for policymakers. There 
have also been some recent skirmishes at the sister institute for the environ-
ment about how preliminary, but not yet accepted policy should be assessed 
in the analysis of expected policy outcomes. Experts in planning bureaus are 
not expected to question the political acceptability of policy intentions. They 
may have doubts about civil servants trying to exaggerate future policy effects 
by including intended policy rather than established policy, but if the experts 
were to question the political acceptability of these policies, this could poten-
tially undermine the position of the responsible minister in Parliament.
 Conversely, there are also limitations to what civil servants are allowed to do 
in this respect. Th e expert economists insist that civil servants can ask questions 
or suggest alternative scenarios for the future, but that the outcome of their cal-
culations will not be changed. In this sense, even the large econometric models 
of the Dutch economy that form the linchpin of their toolkit serve to organize 
the science-policy boundary. Civil servants can have a say on the input side of 
the models, or even request the construction of expansions of the model, but 
what happens in the models is considered the domain of the economists.
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 Here too, the general principle requires negotiation in concrete cases. For 
example, policy proposals that are going to be ‘analyzed’ by the planning bu-
reaus may not always fit into the models, or may not even be sufficiently ar-
ticulated to allow for a calculation of the results. In such cases, the economists 
tend to accommodate policymakers with suggestions on how to further ar-
ticulate policy or advise on policy instruments that will produce the desired 
effects. Huitema has described the careful maintenance of neutrality when 
planning bureaus provide this kind of advice to political parties in the analysis 
of election manifestoes (Huitema 2004).
 Thus, the role of the Dutch planning bureaus, and that of the Central 
Planning Bureau in particular, can be understood as being a linesman of poli-
tics: by predicting the likely outcomes of policies that are being considered, 
the planning bureaus define what is at stake in policy making (Halffman and 
Hoppe 2005: 140). The exceptional level of cognitive authority of the Bureau 
is partly a matter of convention: senior policymakers are aware that these 
analyses are best guesses that are not always as precise and certain as pre-
sented in the media. Nevertheless, there is a broad-ranging consensus among 
policy practitioners that it is best to accept these assessments, in order to 
enable the complex negotiations that have long characterized Dutch politics, 
from coalition formation to negotiations with socio-economic partners. Chal-
lenges to these assessments do occur, but these are often seen as politically 
weak, as a way to hide weaknesses in policy proposals by attacking the ex-
pert messenger. The cognitive certainty the planning bureaus provide seems 
to simplify the political negotiation, that can focus on bargaining rather than 
bickering over what is the state of affairs (Halffman 2009).
 In light of the importance of neutrality and certainty, the accommodation 
of uncertainty in this advisory practice is a fascinating puzzle. If the key ele-
ment in the role of econometric ‘policy analysis’ is to provide stable ground for 
budgeting, coalition formation, or wage negotiations, then too much obses-
sion with uncertainties in predicting the economic future would paralyze the 
endeavor. However, ignoring uncertainties would undermine the epistemo-
logical legitimacy of the advisory project, as there are obvious inaccuracies 
in any predictions. The Bureau’s economists, at the insistence of an inter-
national expert evaluation committee, have acknowledged these inaccuracies. 
Assessments of past one-year predictions of GNP shown an average accuracy 
of about 1.5 in the period 1971-2002 (Kranendonk and Verbruggen 2003).1
 For purposes of government budgeting, even fluctuations of a few percent-
age points can affect departmental budgets by millions of euros. So, how do 
these economists contain uncertainties, acknowledging their relevance with-
out letting them run rampant?
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 Uncertainty threatens the advisory relationship in a more profound way 
as well. If the experts are responsible for the creation of certainty and the 
policymakers for choice in light of political and value-based preferences, then 
uncertainties constitute an uncomfortable grey zone. More explicit attention 
to uncertainties requires new accommodations in the division of labor be-
tween experts and policymakers. In this sense, uncertainty is also a footloose 
mongrel that ignores the carefully nurtured enclosures in the maze of power/
knowledge. How do civil servants discipline this mongrel by boundary work?
 Economists and the budget cycle: the Central Economic Plan
One of the most important reports the Bureau produces is the Central Eco-
nomic Plan (CEP), which is a statutory annual report for the government that 
provides a national economic forecast for the current and subsequent year. 
The CEP contains crucial figures on important economic variables, such as 
the expected inflation rate and the gross domestic product (GDP). Above all, 
it is crucial in the construction of the national budget because it provides the 
data that support budgetary negotiations within the administration. Because 
of its key importance in economic and financial policy, the Bureau is keenly 
aware that it needs to provide econometric projections that are both accurate 
and policy relevant. We observed and analyzed the production of the CEP 
edition of 2005.
 In order to guarantee coordination of the report with policy needs, there 
is intensive interaction between the Bureau experts and civil servants over its 
content. This interaction starts in so-called ‘scoping meetings’ during the early 
stages of planning the report, where the main topics are established. From the 
very beginning, uncertainty has been on the agenda of these meetings. The 
CEP team and the policy staff involved cooperated to manage uncertainties 
in such a way that the demand and supply of uncertain information were in 
agreement.
 The issues addressed involved textual matters, technical questions about 
the quality of data, but also more substantial concerns. Especially the creation 
of uncertainty variants shows how uncertainty fine-tuning between the CPB 
and the ministries was realized. The CEP team asked civil servants which 
uncertainties for the coming year required closer attention. Both experts and 
civil servants considered selective uncertainty variants to be a useful tool for 
analyzing and communicating uncertainty.
 Two particular moments in which these suggestions could be made were 
the technical meeting (with the financial-economic policymakers) and the 
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contact persons meeting (with more ministries and a broader approach). The 
writing of the CEP is a relatively open process (Borstlap et al. 2007) and the 
(draft) uncertainty variants were presented to the policy workers involved in 
advance, giving them an opportunity to react and to ask for additional vari-
ants or for alterations in the variant subjects.
 In the technical meeting, a discussion arose about the adequacy of econo-
metric projections due to large fluctuations of the oil price. The draft version 
assumed a decrease in the oil price, which was questioned by many partici-
pants. After sending out this draft version, the oil price had already risen con-
siderably. Furthermore, civil servants argued that the negative and the positive 
risks or uncertainties had to be in balance to avoid a view of the economy 
that would be considered too optimistic. This reflected the concerns for bud-
get austerity of the civil servants from the Ministry of Finance involved in 
the meetings. Since the ministries’ representatives thought the CEP created 
a carefree atmosphere while the risks were enormous, their suggestion was to 
nuance this positive tone by paying more attention to ‘downward risks’ and, in 
particular, to the price of oil. This led to the following request with regard to 
uncertainty information:
CPB1:  ‘Th e certainty concerning the oil price in 2006 is lower than in 
2005.’
FIN:  ‘Are you willing to make uncertainty variants on that?’
CPB2:  ‘Yes. We don’t know the precise interpretation yet, but we will 
work on that.’
Similarly, the desire for another uncertainty variant was also expressed in a 
meeting with civil servants at other ministries a few weeks later. Amongst oth-
ers, the representative of the Ministry of Economic Aﬀ airs explicitly suggested 
highlighting the uncertainty surrounding the oil price. Th e majority of min-
istry representatives agreed that the uncertainty regarding the oil price was 
too important to not create a variant for. Th e CEP team leader replied that 
they were fully aware of the uncertainties and risks, and that they were ‘... busy 
creating an additional uncertainty variant regarding the oil price.’ Although 
originally raised as an issue related to budget concerns by civil servants at the 
Ministry of Finance, the oil price variant became a project that was supported 
by other civil servants as well as the Bureau’s economists because there was 
general agreement that the oil price was an important issue for the forecasts.
 Th is mutual consultation is not created from scratch for every individual 
report. In fact, the production of the CEP and similar periodic reports has 
become a well-structured process, with a well-rehearsed protocol which, al-
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though unspoken, is generally known by the civil servants and experts in-
volved. Th is standard mode of operation allows, the policy workers to be well 
informed about their roles and they have time to prepare for the CPB gather-
ings. Th e protocol routinizes meeting plans and the production process of a re-
port, which clariﬁ es what both parties in this cooperative situation can expect.
 Similarly, both civil servants and experts share an understanding of what 
variants are and how they can be used to address uncertainties. Since making 
uncertainty variants was a routine way of dealing with uncertainties that ap-
pear in short-term reports and because of the close contacts with the Minis-
try of Economic Affairs and the Ministry of Finance in particular, the policy 
workers involved knew beforehand that they would have the option to suggest 
topics for the uncertainty variants. They prepared uncertainty variant sug-
gestions by consulting specialized colleagues in order to get a clear picture of 
the important developments that were affecting the economic situation at the 
time. The ministry representatives gathered the variant suggestions internally. 
At both the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, the topics suggested 
by the CEP matched specialisms and interests of the policymakers. The min-
istries had a specialist for each ‘standard’ CEP topic, which could foster the 
development of suitable uncertainty variants. This knowledge made it possi-
ble to thoroughly prepare these suggestions prior to the CPB meetings. Policy 
workers could anticipate how the bureau was going to address uncertainties 
in the CEP and hence formulate their questions and concerns in ways that the 
experts could handle.
 This shared knowledge came about through the well-honed cooperation 
and personal networks that were available. Civil servants and the Bureau 
experts have historically had close contacts with one another. Personnel ex-
changes are also common and it is not unusual for social networks to link 
back to a handful of university departments that train these economists and 
financial experts. These close contacts create a shared discourse and under-
standing of the world, which enable interaction during the writing process of 
the CEP, allowing for the systematic transformation of wild uncertainties into 
uncertainties that may be useful for policy.
 An ageing population: A non-routine policy report
Apart from standard reports, the Bureau also produces a large number of 
non-routine reports, ranging from brief ad hoc papers that respond to spe-
cific policy questions, to extensive dossiers on major policy issues. One such 
issue that deals with public finance that has been high on the policy agenda 
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in recent years is the ageing of the Dutch population. The report Ageing and 
the Sustainability of Dutch Public Finances (AS) is a long-term CPB study 
that looks ahead to 2040. Population ageing means that the number of pen-
sioners will continue to increase, creating increasing financial burdens. Rising 
financial burdens are the result of a gap between government expenditures 
and revenues (‘sustainability gap’), which requires budgetary adjustments. 
The study assesses the sustainability of public finances as a consequence of 
ageing and explores several policy options that address the restoration of fis-
cal sustainability.
 As in the CEP case, frequent interactions with policy workers were fa-
cilitated by the use of a shared understanding of how uncertainty can be 
addressed. However, the task at hand was much more complex in this case. 
The issue required a projection of several decades, rather than just one year. 
Moreover, there was no standard protocol available, the range of ministries 
and expertise was larger and some aspects required the development of a new 
computer model. This level of complexity created a certain amount of stress 
on the cooperative nature of the situation, but, at the same time, it gave a more 
accurate picture of how civil servants and the experts might be able to manage 
uncertainties more productively.
 We found that an important heuristic underlying successful uncertainty 
management is the use of a shared classification scheme for uncertainties and 
uncertainty tools. This involves a general division of types of uncertainty that 
helps civil servants to thematize uncertainties. This translates into a clear 
set of instruments that the experts use, reducing uncertainties to a manage-
able set, while, at the same time, resolving potential conflicts regarding the 
science-policy boundary. Thus, the classification scheme facilitates coopera-
tion by aligning policy uncertainties with cognitive resources and capacities 
of experts, while organizing the division of labor between policy-makers and 
experts.
 Th e main classiﬁ cation principle focuses on the distinction between sources 
that can affect projections. Policy intentions are a source of change that can al-
ter econometric projections, which have to be treated as a given, however. For 
purposes of policy analysis, alternative measures can be ‘calculated through.’ 
A second source consists of changes in the world that are considered unpre-
dictable, such as changes in lifestyles or wars. These are dealt with via vari-
ants, as we saw in the CEP case. The last source originates in the inaccurate 
nature of knowledge and data, which raises concerns about the sensitivity of 
any policy analysis. Even though this classification is shared and seems rela-
tively straightforward, the practice of writing reports still requires significant 
adjustments and tinkering so that the monster fits into these boxes. The AS 
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team’s struggles with the uncertainty of interest rates in the future shows that 
there is a limit to these kinds of adjustments. Deviations from the basic clas-
sification scheme create confusion and undermine cooperation.
 When the writing of the AS report began, the most likely interest rate was 
3. However, the Bureau experts faced important issues like the justifica-
tion of the level and future changes in the interest rates. Discussions emerged 
about the uncertainties involved, the sensitivity of the outcomes, and how 
these issues could be resolved.
 One serious option was to create an extra baseline projection of 3.5, in ad-
dition to the 3 figure. The reason they chose 3.5 was that the team wanted 
to remain attuned to the European Commission’s interest rates. Meanwhile, 
the assessments of other policy experts were considered other frames of refer-
ence (e.g., Tetlock 2005). The team considered this a good solution because 
they expected policy workers to only look at the baseline projections and not 
at the sensitivity analyses. They argued that the two baseline projections were 
more important in illustrating uncertainties than the sensitivity analyses. The 
main drawback was that policy workers would only be focusing on one base-
line projection. This is reflected in the following discussion:
CPB 1: ‘Th us, you are showing us that [the baseline] is uncertain.’
CPB 2:  ‘But policymakers will then just take the average, which would be 
3.25, which would make the presentation of two baseline projec-
tions worthless.’
CPB 3: ‘But 3.25 is actually a very good ﬁ gure.’
Another team member with regard to the two figures 3 and 3.5 wanted to 
know:
CPB 4:  ‘Does this bandwidth represent reality or is it just politically de-
sirable?’
CPB 5:  ‘If you use 2.75 to 3.75 you are no longer in line with Brussels. If 
you use the more cautious 3 to 3.5, you make it politically more 
viable. Otherwise, the study group will end up facing even more 
pressure. So, just accept the 3 to 3.5.’
By the end of the meeting, the Bureau’s experts had come to an agreement. 
Rather than present just one discount rate and one variant, the team chose 
two baseline projections with different discount rates. It is obvious that the 
AS team took the interest rate calculations of the Economic Policy Commit-
tee in Brussels into account, despite the fact that the authorities used different 
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ways to calculate the interest rate. A senior official at the Ministry of Finance 
was able to convey (without actually saying it) that this was a good decision 
because the interest rate figures of the two authorities were still comparable 
with each of the two calculations coming up with an interest rate of 3.
 Thus the AS team tried to reduce interest rate uncertainty by effectively 
creating two different scenarios for the future. Concerns about the perception 
of this policy approach was part and parcel of the decisions made because this 
included not only the creation of a realistic projection, but also prevented the 
inclusion of an easy way out for policymakers by refusing to revert to overly 
optimistic scenarios. The experts were effectively attempting to force the civil 
servants into what they saw as good policy making. The relationship that the 
experts had with the civil servants may be productive and geared toward the 
communication of useful uncertainty, but this does not mean there are no at-
tempts at mutual disciplining.
 Nevertheless, usefulness remained a dominant concern. One specific audi-
ence for this report was an interdepartmental study group of civil servants, 
consisting of specialists on issues related to aging. The AS team was aware 
that its report would serve as input to the study group and the team was 
constantly aware that their analysis had to be useful to these civil servants. 
A larger range between the two baseline projections was considered more 
problematic for the study group to deal with because it would create a much 
wider range of future predictions. This implies that the AS team intention-
ally provided the study group with (supposedly) ‘manageable’ information and 
clear figures, narrowing down options and uncertainties.
 These pragmatic interventions in the packaging of uncertainty also had to 
be justified to their peers. Beside the discussion within the project team, the 
authors also consulted other CPB experts on the interest rate problem. One 
expert criticized the (relatively) small range between the two interest rates 
and noted that the two baseline projections should deviate more significantly. 
Another expert argued that the smaller the difference between the figures, the 
higher the probability will be that ‘you will have to take full responsibility for 
it in autumn,’ implying that, in this case, there was a greater chance of coming 
up with inaccurate [faulty?] calculations, which might require recalculations 
later that same year. A presentation of a baseline with little attention to un-
certainty increases the probability that one will end up having to recalculate 
it periodically, for example, through updates. This is already the case for the 
periodic CPB reports such as the CEP, but the updates for long-term studies 
such as AS, would be more complex and time-consuming.
 One team member, who was also on the CPB’s management board, and a 
CPB expert (not on the AS team) discussed the uncertainty range and wheth-
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er the message would be properly understood by the end-users. The CPB 
analysts in this situation had to consider how much room to leave for the 
politicians. In other words, the interpretation option for politicians increases 
when extensive uncertainty information is provided instead of just one base-
line projection.
1:  ‘OK, we have to accept 3 in any case, because of Brussels, and then, 
well, let’s also include a rate of one percentage point higher. But then 
the average is not 3.25 any more [CPB’s best estimate]. If you accept 
3 and 4, then the politicians will use 3.5 and that will not be the 
most likely rate.’
2:  ‘You wouldn’t want to reduce the uncertainty regarding the interest 
rate just in favor of the output, would you? You should focus on the 
uncertainty in the input, not on the uncertainty in the output!’
Another team member agreed that by accepting the smaller bandwidth (of 3 
to 3.5) ‘you leave the choice to the politicians’. The issue continued to haunt 
the team. It was difficult to keep politicians informed, and to stay in line with 
peers, as well as Brussels projections. Practical concerns of how to present 
information also clearly played a role. During a subsequent meeting, the team 
eventually decided to accept the 3 and 4 interest rate figures for the two 
baseline projections:
1:  ‘In order to resolve these discussions about the current rate, we’ll take 
3 to 4.’
2:  ‘Wouldn’t it be easier, for the sake of communication, to accept just 
the 3?’
3:  ‘For the graphics, it doesn’t make any diﬀ erence whether you use one or 
two ﬁ gures.’
1:  ‘And, if we use [only] the 3 ﬁ gure, we are leaving ourselves vulnerable; 
we have to be able to explain [the large ﬂ uctuations in interest rates].’ 
‘And, actually, I don’t want to stimulate too many technical discussions 
about the interest rates.’
A few weeks later, the AS team had to present its proposal for the two base-
line projections to get the opinion of the ministries’ representatives. Finally, 
there was going to be a decision made in this discussion. The main ques-
tions were how the civil servants were supposed to interpret the two baseline 
projections and the status of the baseline projections in relation to variants 
that had already been proposed. For example, a Ministry of Economic Affairs 
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representative, because of the political significance of this matter, wanted to 
know whether these projections and the variants could be considered equiva-
lent. The team leader replied explicitly that the projections were more impor-
tant than the variants. The ‘basic’ baseline projection (based on the ‘original’ 
discount rate of 3) was slightly more important than the ‘alternative’ baseline 
projection (based on a discount rate of 4). Another team member also un-
ambiguously emphasized that the two projections were not equivalent. This 
meant that, despite the acknowledgement of large uncertainties, the team ob-
viously prioritized the outcomes of the ‘basic’ baseline projection while the 
‘alternative’ projection was ‘only’ calculated to illustrate uncertainty.
 By coming up with alternative baseline projections, the team had trans-
gressed the shared acknowledgement of uncertainties. Policy workers did not 
understand the status of this new category and were also clearly concerned 
about how this would aﬀ ect their own work. Eventually, directors from both 
sides (i.e., the department directors at the Ministries of Finance, Economic 
Aﬀ airs and Social Aﬀ airs and Employment, and the director of the CPB) met 
to discuss the interest rate and how the information was going to be presented. 
Th e Economic Aﬀ airs representatives advocated the presentation of two in-
terest rate projections, but the other ministries had their own opinions. For 
example, a senior Ministry of Finance oﬃ  cial explained that they did not favor 
the presentation of two projections. Th ey felt that two projections would be 
ineﬀ ective since the base projection (or CPB’s ‘best estimate’) would remain 
unclear if presented in this way. An oﬃ  cial at the Ministry of Economic Aﬀ airs 
explained that the AS team then tried to ﬁ nd a balance between the various 
opinions of the policymakers and their own views. Th e ﬁ nal AS report pre-
sented only one baseline rate but, after serious consideration, the AS team 
stuck to its ‘initial’ classiﬁ cation scheme (which consisted of the tripartite dis-
tinction between baseline projection, sensitivity analyses, and policy analyses).
  e profane work of taming uncertainty
Producing uncertainty information in policy analyses that is actually use-
ful for policy workers and politically accountable decision makers is not a 
precisely defined, deductive system. In spite of attempts to formulate un-
certainty analysis by experts and uncertainty assessment and management by 
policy workers in the more sacred fact/value language of protocols, guide-
lines, detailed taxonomies, or analytic structures, taming uncertainty uneasi-
ly straddles the fact/value divide. Hence, it requires careful negotiation, not 
only of the treacherous terrain of (future) economic processes, but also of the 
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boundary work concerning policy, and the practical aspect of writing readable 
reports that are finished by the deadline.
 We have shown how this complexity is managed through frequent interac-
tion between policy workers and experts; a well-designed writing process that 
helps to establish mutual expectations; a shared world of personal contacts 
and knowledge; and, crucially, a shared framework for organizing uncertain-
ties. The latter could be found here in the form of a relatively robust, shared 
classification of uncertainties. In the boundary work between economic ex-
perts and policymakers, we see these elements as crucial heuristics that en-
hance the alignment between the planning agency and the ministries. The 
following section describes how this works.
Box 1 Taming uncertainty through boundary work between experts and policy makers
In the research into discourses of boundary work among Dutch experts and 
policy workers, Hoppe (2008) replicated the findings of Bal et al. (Bal, Bijker 
and Hendriks 2002), which discovered that experts and policy workers use 
two kinds of accounts of their daily activities. They activate a sacred, front-
office account for ‘outsiders’ – i.e., parliamentarians or journalists – who 
expect explanations about what, how, and why they do the things they do. 
Among colleague ‘insiders’ and in the boundary work between experts and 
policy workers, they use a more profane, back-office language.
 In public, the experts at the Netherlands Bureau of Economic Policy Analy-
sis usually stress their autonomy in their activities. For example, they clearly 
reject the idea that their clients co-define the relevance of the knowledge; 
Sacred account,
front oﬃce
Profane account,
back oﬃce
srekamyciloPstrepxE
Sound science,
uncertainty analysis
Decision support, 
available and usable
knowlegde
Mix of guidelines
and tacit knowledge, 
contextually used
in practice
Interrogatory heuristics
of uncertainty assessment
and management
Boundary
work
Divergence:
“independent
assessment”
Convergence:
shared heuristics, 
interaction
106 Annick de Vries, Willem Halffman and Rob Hoppe
similarly, they claim uncertainty analysis as their exclusive domain, which is 
uninfluenced by the views of clients or stakeholders. However, in the shel-
tered environments of their communities of practice, they acknowledge that 
in their long-standing pragmatic relations with their clients, and guided by 
the rules of the advisory game that emerged over a long period of time from 
their practical experiences, they serve politics and are willing to qualify ‘sound 
science’ using terms like ‘available and usable’ knowledge.
 Similarly, policy workers at the Departments of Finance and Economic Af-
fairs publicly portray themselves as the exclusive advisors providing decision 
support to their political superiors: ‘We span the boundary between analysts 
and politicians’ (Hoppe 2008). They do not deny that science plays an impor-
tant role in uncertainty reduction. However, while formally tasked with the 
responsibility of uncertainty assessment and management, they claim that, 
if necessary, ‘we keep our expert centre on course’ (Hoppe 2008). But, infor-
mally they also describe their practices as using the interrogatory heuristics of 
expert reports and they translate expert views into politically acceptable and 
administratively feasible policy proposals.
 Conclusion
As shown in the previous accounts of dealing with uncertainties in the short 
and long run, in both standard reports on the future of the Dutch economy 
and a non-routine study of the issue of an ageing population, both experts 
and policy workers appear to practise boundary work on the basis of their 
respective profane self-understandings. This appears to be a necessary con-
dition for productive boundary work at the science-policy interface. The 
well-known, oft-repeated list of complaints about science-policy misunder-
standings in the ‘two communities metaphor’ of knowledge utilization (see 
Williams’ chapter 10) accurately describes what happens when scientists and 
policy workers steadfastly cling to their sacred narratives; and are unable to 
admit that behind the incompatible front-office images there are more easily 
alignable back-office practices.
 What this alignment facilitates is a working relationship that provides pol-
icy workers with information that can be used as the relatively stable basis for 
making decisions and for negotiations, while continuing to explore a limited 
set of uncertainties. We have tried to describe this process without passing 
judgment. However, as is usually the case in pragmatic approaches, there is 
a certain grey area where pragmatism becomes transgression. In all honesty, 
we should signal that this advisory practice has been criticized, for example 
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for overly restricting political choice through a particular take on economics 
(Van den Berg, Both and Basset 1993) or for a tendency to discipline politi-
cians (Pesch, Hisschemöller and Huitema 2006). Inversely, criticizing these 
practices from the perspective of sacred accounts (Morgan and Henrion 1992) 
or utopian rationalities (Ezrahi 1980; 1990) runs the risk of sacrificing effec-
tive contributions of knowledge to policy making – what Jasanoff has called 
‘serviceable truths’ ( Jasanoff 1990). By documenting pragmatic approaches to 
the taming of uncertainty, we hope to encourage debate over the development 
of practical and communicable but not overly restrictive forms to frame un-
certainty.
 Notes
 This means that the absolute mean predicted error amounts to ., which means 
only the amount of error is taken into account. This implies that the CPB forecasts 
about economic growth deviate . on average from the realized growth. Further-
more, the assessments concluded that the CPB forecasts slightly outperform a naive 
projection of the (estimated) national income growth for the previous year. A naive 
forecast implies that the estimated GDP growth for the year concerned equals the 
growth of the previous year (Kranendonk and Verbruggen ; Kranendonk and 
Verbruggen ).
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Introduction
The previous part, ‘Constructing Meaning through Policy Work,’ emphasized 
the ambiguities of policy-making, but the enactment of policy realities re-
mained rather ‘local.’ Chapter 4 mainly focused on the construction of mean-
ing in concrete ‘learning networks’ that were formed in order to redevelop 
buildings. Chapter 5 focused on working relations between economic experts 
and policymakers within (and around) one organization, the Dutch Bureau 
for Economic Policy Analysis. Although the next two chapters also empha-
size policy enactment, they deviate in a few major ways. First of all, they are 
less ‘local’ in the sense that they describe policy practices that cut across many 
institutes, agencies and organizations. Although the perspectives are clear – 
the roles of two ‘hybrid’ science and policy institutes are highlighted (the Ra-
thenau Institute, and the National Initiative for Sustainable Development) – 
these institutes have had to work with many other actors and parties in order 
to accomplish certain goals.
 Secondly, the chapters are less ‘local’ in the sense that it was difficult to 
localize the issues that were being addressed. In the two chapters, the hybrid 
institutes encountered difficulties in finding and fixing the issues. In both 
cases, the issues were only clear in a very general sense: the Rathenau Insti-
tute had to advise members of the Dutch Parliament about future ‘sustain-
able water management’ in the Netherlands, while the National Initiative for 
Sustainable Development was called upon to improve the Netherlands as a 
‘sustainable society.’ These grand, vague goals not only produced major am-
biguities – what does it mean? It also produced tensions between finding the 
right technical expertise and the appropriate political rationales, or, in Heclo’s 
terms, between ‘puzzling’ and ‘powering,’ and between changing ideas about 
the future, as well as stable and institutionalized ideas and interests on the 
part of the parties involved. Their accounts are much more institutional than 
the ones we have thus far looked at.
 Lydia Sterrenberg and Anne Loeber, who were themselves very involved 
in shaping the policy practices mentioned, both show and analyze what hap-
pened and what was done to arrive at certain goals, as well as the mistakes 
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that were made. In fact, they mainly show how policy work involves institu-
tional management, in the sense of attracting attention, influencing agendas 
and concerns, involving the right parties, and finding channels for securing 
a follow up. They show that sustainable water management and a sustain-
able society require sustainable channels and procedures for new and durable 
interactions. The thread that runs through both of their accounts, however, 
is the continuous ‘in between-ness’ of their acts. They were forced to continu-
ously mediate between insights, ideas and interests.
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6 Managing the Problematic in Policy Work
Lydia Sterrenberg
 Introduction
This is an account of policy work that aims to put new things on the politi-
cal agenda and disrupt institutions. It was an exercise in constructing policy 
advice about sustainable water management in the Netherlands, undertaken 
between 1999 and 2002 by the Rathenau Institute, an independent institu-
tion for technology assessment, which gives policy advice to the Dutch Par-
liament.
  e origins of the project
In early 1998, some people involved in the field of water management con-
tacted the Rathenau Institute, which is a small, independent think tank 
funded by the Dutch government to advise Parliament, and is traditionally 
involved in technology assessment and sustainability studies (Van Eijnd-
hoven 2000). They were involved in innovative spatial projects for more 
sustainable regional water management, but had problems getting the vari-
ous levels of government to cooperate, found that the local residents reject-
ed their plans, and they were also unable to convince the various national 
policymakers that new policies were necessary. They were hoping that the 
Rathenau Institute would be able to influence policymakers and the Dutch 
Parliament.
 Water management in the Netherlands, a delta area of which about two-
thirds is below sea level, had reached a turning point. It had aimed to adapt 
the water system for the needs of building, shipping, agriculture, recreation 
and nature development and relied on technical measures. But climate change 
confronted the Dutch water management with increasing flood risks due to 
rising sea levels, and more local excesses and shortages of water, because of 
increased periods of intense rain and drought. It challenged the technical ‘wa-
ter follows function’ approach. For example, wherever the Dutch had depended 
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on their dikes along the main rivers for their safety, raising them in response 
to increasing river discharges due to climate change would only increase the 
effects of flooding, if they ever broke. Meanwhile, the problem of land subsid-
ence and the salinity of peat areas in the western part of the Netherlands, due 
to permanent drainage requirements for agriculture, made them more prone 
to flooding especially with rising sea levels.
Box 1 Key actors in modern Dutch water management
Key actors in Dutch water management by %--- were (Van Rooy and Sterrenberg %---b; 
Van der Ven et al. %--'; Sterrenberg %--0): ! e Water Boards (‘Waterschappen’), which 
bore the responsibility of maintaining local water systems, and, by %---, they were also 
responsible for water quantity and water quality issues and the ‘everyday’ maintenance of 
local dikes. ! e ﬁ rst Water Boards were established about 1-- years ago and their number 
grew over time to over $---, but in a series of mergers this number was reduced = to 
23. ! e Boards are considered to be a fourth level of government and one of the ﬁ rst 
examples of Dutch democracy; they also collect their own taxes.
 ! e Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management deﬁ nes overall water 
management policies and takes primary responsibility for water safety management. 
Meanwhile, the Dutch national government has ‘systemic responsibility’ for local 
water quantity issues and water quality aﬀ airs, which became an issue in Dutch water 
management in the $01-’s.
  e Public Works Agency (‘Rijkswaterstaat’), the executive organization of the Ministry 
of Transport, Public Works and Water Management, is responsible for river and coastal 
management (especially management of ﬂ ood prevention). Until %--$, when a stringent 
division was made between policy-making by the Ministry and the execution of the Public 
Works Agency, it was also involved in policy-making.
 ! e provinces ($% in total) are formally supervisors to the Water Boards and responsible 
for regional spatial policies.
 ! e municipalities (ca. 2-- by the year %---) are responsible for local spatial plans and 
water sewerage systems.
 Finally, two other departments should also be mentioned because of their role in 
(spatial) water management: the Ministry of Public Housing, Spatial Planning and the 
Environment, which is responsible for spatial planning policies and policies involving 
chemical pollution and the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries, 
which is responsible for wetlands policies.
This is why, in 1995, the Public Works Agency (‘Rijkswaterstaat’), one of the 
central actors in water management (see also box 1), concluded that the task 
of water management would have to become more variable. It had suggested 
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new strategies of spatial solutions to deal with local excesses and water short-
ages and river spates (Public Works Agency 1995). These ideas were included 
in the national Policy Memorandum on Water Management of 1998 (Ministry 
of Transport, Public Work and Water Management 1998), which had already 
been issued by the time the innovators contacted the Rathenau Institute. 
However, they felt that the report neglected to address the issue of imple-
mentation.
 The issue raised by the innovators fit into the Institute’s goals of perform-
ing politically relevant work and operating within the water management do-
main – new for the Institute – could be defended because it was concerned 
with (changes in the use of ) technology. Since the Board could freely decide 
the Institute’s program, no additional authorization was necessary for a re-
quest for policy advice that explored the question of why sustainable water 
management had not been pursued earlier.
 Designing the right project?
I was appointed the project leader. Lacking both a network in the field and 
expertise in water management, I only had the hypotheses that were gener-
ated by earlier Rathenau projects on sustainable development: that cultural 
and institutional issues mattered and that sustainability implied new actor 
relations and new rules. I started attending symposia and interviewing re-
searchers, on the one hand, to check my hypothesis, and, on the other, to find 
someone who was acquainted with water issues, had a network in the field, 
and could do research work for the Institute. I found an innovative researcher-
advisor and accomplished networker who was enthusiastic about the project 
and whose experience confirmed the Rathenau perspective. He became the 
external project leader and main researcher in relation to policy advice while 
I was responsible for the management of the project, including its quality and 
political orientation.
 Together we began to define a project. We could see that we would need 
factual information and assessments of practitioners to better understand 
why practice was stalling despite many good intentions, and we envisaged 
analyzing policy plans, as well as holding interviews and three workshops. 
We decided to focus the case study on a functional water management area 
rather than an administrative area of one of the Water Boards. The sub-basin 
area chosen was in the centre of the Netherlands and partly below and partly 
above sea level. All relevant stakeholders were present here and a wide variety 
of Dutch water management situations and problems could possibly occur. 
That would provide us with an excellent starting point for understanding 
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problems of unsustainable water management, and for exploring improve-
ment options. A practical reason for choosing this specific area was that the 
external project leader had many contacts there, and the Water Board people 
agreed to cooperate.
 The next step entailed checking whether the proposal was robust enough 
to serve as the basis for policy advice. From the interviews with parliamentar-
ians we learned that starting with an analysis of local practices was a good 
approach. The members of the parliamentary Standing Committee on Water 
Management were convinced by the Fourth Policy Memorandum that gov-
ernment and Water Boards had adequately adapted their policies for sustain-
able water management. However, comments issued by the Ministry were 
negative. The head of the Water Management Division of the Ministry of 
Transport, Public Works and Water Management reacted by noting that ‘Ev-
erything has already been examined for the Fourth Memorandum on Water 
Management,’ and that ‘A problem was suggested that does not exist’ (Van 
Rooy and Sterrenberg 2003: 5). But others we spoke to did not agree, or at 
least not fully. Who were we supposed to believe then?
 To explore whether the Ministry’s negative reaction was primarily a 
show of resistance to interference by the Rathenau Institute, we organized 
a meeting to discuss the feedback. The Ministry representatives respon-
sible for the feedback were invited to this meeting as well as some of the 
innovators that had been in contact with the Rathenau Institute. The dis-
cussion convinced the project leaders and the Director that the Institute 
should continue, although with some small adaptations to the project. The 
Rathenau Board agreed, but stressed that more people from spatial plan-
ning needed to be involved in the project to more satisfactorily address the 
issue of more ’space for water.’ Knowing that the Water Boards were de-
fensive about their autonomy and unwilling to publicly discuss any of the 
problems, the Rathenau Board also demanded a guarantee that the Water 
Boards in the basin area would cooperate. This could be arranged due to 
the excellent contacts that the external project leader had and, by the end 
of 1998, the Board had given us a formal ‘go-ahead.’ However, some Board 
members had lingering doubts about whether the project would succeed or 
not. Neither the Parliament nor the government were formally obligated to 
react to policy advice from the Rathenau Institute, and there was skepti-
cism about whether Rathenau’s advice regarding local practices would be 
sufficient to convince the ministry and the Parliament when the innovators 
ultimately failed in their aims.
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 Working on a problematic
Research commenced at the beginning of 1999. Data on regional water man-
agement and spatial planning were collected and analyzed and the policies of 
the relevant organizations were screened. Interviews dealing with both the 
problems and opportunities in the area of sustainable water management in 
the basin area were held with representatives of the Water Boards, the prov-
inces, municipalities, and environmental and farmers’ organizations. These 
were followed by three workshops consisting of 10-15 participants each. The 
first workshop consisted mainly of water managers and it was here that we 
checked our assessments regarding the water management situation in the 
basin area and we further discussed the both the positive and negative aspects 
of pursuing sustainable water management in the area. The second work-
shop explored these questions with spatial planners. In the third workshop, 
which consisted of a variety of participants, the visions of the two groups 
were presented and we began exploring policy options. By the end of 1999, 
a problematic had been arrived at (Box 2). Overall, several non-sustainable 
situations had been found in the area and we realized there were a number of 
Box 2 Problems of unsustainable water management in the catchment area
–  Several unsustainable water management situations (short-term solutions, buck-
passing, etc.) were found.
–  Innovation with respect to water management was limited.
–  Available information on the state of the water system was incomplete.
–  An abundance of plans existed, sometimes in conﬂ ict with one another. For instance, 
there were two provincial water balance plans in the area, two water boards’ 
maintenance plans, one maintenance plan by the Rijkswaterstaat Utrecht for the 
Amsterdam-Rijn canal in the area, two plans presented by water pipeline ﬁ rms, %0 
municipal water and/or sewage plans and one integral, multi-stakeholder plan for the 
Vecht River and its borders.
–  Diﬃ  culties involving cooperation between the various actors were found, due to 
established task divisions and (separate) funding streams.
–  Participants conﬁ rmed that contacts that water management experts had with physical 
planning actors were limited; and proactive actions by the ‘water people’ regarding 
spatial planning were missing.
–  Cultural diﬀ erences between the ‘engineer-like,’ ‘fact-focused’ water sector and the 
‘creative design’-oriented physical planning sector were evident and hampered fruitful 
interaction.
Source: Clewits et al. (%---)
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factors that impeded innovation for more sustainable water management. A 
key factor was that water management was divided between various organiza-
tions, each with their own plans and interests. There was a lack of interaction 
between the spatial planners and water managers, particularly in the early 
phases of spatial planning, which was further exacerbated by the cultural dif-
ferences between the two groups.
 Dealing with a lack of openness
We had several closed-door interviews with water managers. This was due to 
the reigning morality among the interviewees in the sector, which included 
not speaking publicly about internal problems. This meant that it was not 
self-evident that our problematic would be discussed by the sector in an open 
way. We decided on an offensive strategy and used our external project leader 
who was a member of the organizing committee of the annual congress of the 
Society of Water Managers. He persuaded his colleague organizers that he 
should give a keynote speech on the case study results. Aware of the risk of 
collective denial and de-legitimization of the Institute’s work (and for the ex-
ternal project leader, whose job and livelihood depended on the sector, there 
was also a financial risk) we carefully designed the presentation, being extra 
sensitive to its tone. We even checked this aspect with some supportive water 
managers. We were relieved to learn that, although some of the congress par-
ticipants disagreed with our results, the majority did not.
 Enhancing the project’s political relevance and robustness
An advisory committee was formed at the start of the project. Members were 
principals or people involved in innovation for sustainable development and 
with a stake in water management or spatial planning. Two of the members 
were former parliamentarians and thus were well aware of how Parliament 
functioned. By January 2000, the advisory committee had discussed the inter-
im results and first thoughts on policy options. It did not consider the results 
and recommendations as convincing enough for politicians and governments 
and thus suggested performing more case studies on how water issues were 
dealt with in spatial planning. This was considered an important focus be-
cause Parliament was about to consider the national Spatial Planning Memo-
randum, and this would provide an opportunity for Parliament to assess the 
advice offered by the Rathenau Institute. The committee also suggested dis-
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cussions with leading figures in spatial planning and water management, both 
to test the results and to make them more politically robust.
 But the extra money and time that the Rathenau Board made available 
was limited. We had to make do with five smaller studies on local water pol-
icy-making and spatial planning, based on a limited number of interviews. 
Moreover, four smaller regional meetings were held with some eight key 
figures (local politicians, water firm directors, and representatives of water 
boards, provincial governments, NGOs and farmer organizations) at which 
time the problems of unsustainable water management in the basin area were 
presented and the policy options were discussed. The options linked to the 
more general policy discussions were developed by the project leaders from 
the workshops and had been pre-tested in the project leader’s network.
 Balancing between criticism and adaptation
We were planning to produce a journalistic report on the case studies, which 
we felt would be the best way to communicate the findings to parliamentar-
ians. But a draft, which had a critical tone and was based on limited research, 
antagonized our interviewees, who were offended by the critical tone and 
what they saw as a failure to acknowledge the initiatives that had been taken 
for sustainable water management. We were accused of ‘gossip journalism’ and 
we were compelled not to disseminate the report. The core conclusion from 
the case studies, however, that water interests were only marginally consid-
ered in spatial planning decisions was not refuted (Box 3).
Box 3 Results of the mini-case studies
! e additional case studies conﬁ rmed that sustainable water management was 
not a major issue in spatial planning decisions. ! e continuous drainage of the 
Horstermeerpolder, for example, was causing deterioration of the soil, salt water problems 
and was disturbing the Naardermeer lake ecosystem, a nearby protected nature preserve. 
! ere were discussions on the creation of wetlands in the polder, but none focused on 
a sustainable water management alternative that involved a small body of water. Even 
the nation’s major conservation organization, which managed the Naardermeer area, had 
avoided discussion of this option because they feared the reactions from local residents. 
! e case of extending IJburg in Amsterdam further into the IJmeer lake, in the north of 
the catchment area, water managers had been keen to intervene because of algae risks, 
but had not advised spatial planners to seek alternative locations due to increases in
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water levels and an increased need for water storage facilities because of climate change. 
! e national Public Works Agency interfered at a late stage and managed to ensure that 
IJburg was constructed half a meter higher. ! e IJmeer’s reduced water storage capacity 
due to the IJburg extension only became a political issue in %--1-%--/ after most of 
IJburg had already been completed. In the case involving the extension of the city of 
Utrecht, the location that was chosen was relatively appropriate from the viewpoint 
of sustainable water management, but a planned extension near the city of Nijmegen 
would have led to a bottleneck in the river, which only became an issue long after the 
plans had been formally agreed to. ! e last mini-case showed how the fragmentation of 
tasks among diﬀ erent organizations weakened the response to problems involving water 
quality and water quantity near the city of Hilversum.
 Dealing with conﬂ icting frames and delegitimation
In one of our meetings with stakeholders the chairman of one Water Board 
criticized us for having packed our observations ‘in a lot of rhetoric and some-
times even nonsense,’ and being ‘wrong in making it an institutional debate in 
advance.’ What was really at stake, according to him was that water interests had 
not suﬃ  ciently been taken into consideration and should now be highlighted. 
A local alderman supported his criticism, which made it diﬃ  cult to continue 
our discussion; participants ultimately did agree that research problems were 
not speciﬁ c to this area, although the hostile atmosphere in this case did not 
disappear. Later conversations with the chairman, which were possible only 
after completion of the project, made it clear that his main fear was that Water 
Board taxes would be abolished and he wanted to protect the Water Boards’ 
ﬁ nancial autonomy, to make them immune to what he saw as the whimsical 
policy priorities of the government. He also claimed that he was concerned that 
institutional debates would delay necessary responses to climate change. Th is 
shows the complex and partly conﬂ icting agendas and institutional interests 
through which this policy issue was being addressed. We feared that a negative 
assessment of our project was going to be disseminated by the participants 
and after the meeting we decided to approach some supportive and inﬂ uential 
people involved in the water sector to explain our project.
 Searching for political windows of opportunity
In early 2000, we began thinking about how and at what moment we were 
going to address Parliament, which, without any major comments, had 
agreed with the Fourth Memorandum. New parliamentary debates on water 
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management involving the Rathenau Institute were not forthcoming. It was 
not clear when the policy memorandum on Spatial Planning would even-
tually emerge. We decided to approach the national ad hoc Committee on 
Water Management in the 21st Century, which had been formed in 1999 by 
the government and the Union of Water Boards in response to serious local 
flooding in 1998, which was the third such major event after the floods of 
1993 and 1995. The Committee was asked to offer is advice on sustainable 
water management in the Netherlands, and the government would react to 
this advice and discuss its stance with Parliament. Backed by the Rathenau 
Board, I offered to make the yet-unpublished project results available to the 
Committee in the spring of 2000. The Committee, by then, had commis-
sioned numerous technical studies on the consequences of climate change 
and was considering its advice. It invited us to make a presentation, which 
convinced its members of the relevance of the institutional aspects of sus-
tainable water management. The Committee decided to subsidize the Ra-
thenau case studies, and began commissioning studies on public awareness, 
as well as planning some workshops on institutional matters. In referring to 
the Rathenau Institute’s studies(Committee Water Management for the 21st 
Century 2000: 30), the commission concluded that Dutch water manage-
ment ‘was not ready for the 21st century. Politicians had to acknowledge its 
importance, and institutional and strategic behaviors had to be confronted, 
including fragmented steering (divisions between water management and 
spatial planning) and the lack of commitment of spatial planners and citi-
zens. The commission also criticized the water management sector for being 
insufficiently concerned about the related costs. It also recommended great-
er involvement by citizens and spatial planners, a water assessment instru-
ment to assess the consequences of spatial decisions involving sustainable 
water management, a more influential role for the provinces and a reduction 
in the levels of bureaucracy.
 Combining concerns in the policy advice
The Rathenau Report was being prepared for presentation to Parliament. 
We had to deal with several concerns. Politicians, who were unaware of the 
problems that hampered local sustainable water management, had to be in-
formed about these issues, but we had make sure that we did not antago-
nize the involved stakeholders, who (we had discovered) were very sensitive 
to any criticism. For instance, one employee at the Ministry of Transport, 
Public Works and Water Management who had seen a draft of this report 
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criticized it for being too negative, for fixating on the problems, and that if 
it were to be published in the then present form, he would advise his State 
Secretary to reject it. A compromise was reached by adding a disclaimer that 
the research was ongoing and nowhere near complete, but that it needed to 
be expedited and that it needed political support. The Director of the Ra-
thenau Institute advised that we also include a more attractive vision of what 
sustainable water management could be in the future, a vision that included 
floating homes and greenhouses and hilly landscapes, where water could be 
periodically stored. To justify the Institute’s involvement in water manage-
ment policies, we included technical information on the current water man-
agement system. We shied away from any statements involving formal chang-
es in the roles of the provinces and the Water Boards, which touched upon 
a number of complex and sensitive issues, which certainly needed further 
exploration. Finally, to enhance the attractiveness of the Report for politi-
cians, we added some comments that were based on our local practices study 
and on the conclusions made by some of the relevant committees. These 
committees (including the ‘Committee 21st century’, whose draft report we 
had seen) had recently made comments about water management organiza-
tion and financing.
Box 4 Major Issues Contained in the First Report to the Parliament
! e Rathenau Institute’s report to Parliament included summaries of the results from 
the basin study and additional case studies. It is stressed that water is only marginally 
considered in spatial planning, due to the fragmentation of tasks and lack of contacts 
between spatial planners and water managers. It suggested that sustainable water 
management also provided opportunities for the future.
 ! e policy recommendations included: stimulating cooperation and integrating 
spatial planning with water planning; reducing fragmentation in the water management 
system by allowing for more avenues for forming so-called ‘water chain ﬁ rms’ (against 
a background of an emerging discussion on the liberalization of the water chain 
ﬁ rms); a stronger coordinating role for the provinces who are central players in Dutch 
spatial planning policy; and an innovation fund. Furthermore, the report suggested 
that citizens be better informed about the new policy paradigm and be encouraged 
to become more involved in interactive planning procedures. Finally, the report also 
recommended a monitoring system and evaluations of the process of change in 
practice.
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 Trying to attract the attention of parliamentarians
We decided to publish the Rathenau report, in August 2000, on the eve of 
the publication of the recommendations to Parliament by the Committee on 
Water Management in the 21st Century. Two reputable national newspapers 
covered the Rathenau results and several radio programs invited the Rathe-
nau Institute to discuss the issue of water management and the Committee’s 
conclusions. But a real political debate had to wait. The government’s views 
were published in December 2000 under the title ‘Dealing differently with 
water’ (Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management 2000). 
It endorsed the new social and more spatial perspective on water manage-
ment as promoted by the Committee on Water Management in the 21st Cen-
tury, and accepted a National Agreement between the national government, 
the provinces, the municipalities and the Water Board for a more sustainable 
local water management policy, a Water Assessment Instrument as recom-
mended by the Committee 21st Century and a public information campaign, 
but it did not urge a major reorganization of the Dutch water management 
system. A discussion in Parliament followed a few months later. By then we 
had updated the project results (Van Rooy and Sterrenberg 2001), based on 
new developments and we were invited to give a presentation to the Commit-
tee on Water Management in Parliament, with some members posing ques-
tions about the Rathenau results in a debate with the State Secretary. But no 
formal amendments to water policies were made at that time; politicians were 
apparently ready to rely on the government’s new water management policies.
 Using and creating opportunities for a follow up
Th e Institute had limited ﬁ nancial resources and capacities for a follow up to 
this project, but fortunately the national Advisory Board on Public Adminis-
tration approached the Institute because it had been asked to make recommen-
dations on the reorganization of the water management sector. Th e Board’s 
recommendations quoted the Rathenau report extensively, concluding that the 
reorganization of the water management sector (actor conﬁ guration, rules and 
resources) was necessary (Raad voor het Openbaar Bestuur 2001).
 Another channel for a follow-up was an informal platform consisting of 
politicians, managers, board members and experts, which had just elected a 
former Minister of Transportation, Public Works and Water Management 
as its chair. She wanted to revive this platform and transform it into a place 
of innovation. After a presentation by the project leaders, she decided that 
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‘politics could no longer beat around the bush,’ and, citing the Rathenau find-
ings, which pointed out that the fragmented nature of the water management 
organization was breeding inefficiency, she contacted the Minister of Finance 
and her party’s spokesman to discuss the creation of a more efficient water 
management infrastructure. This led to the launch of an interdepartmental 
research project in which the Rathenau external project leader was invited to 
participate. The project report recommended four options for reorganizing 
the water management sector. The government chose the option that allowed 
the present players to hold onto their tasks but with demands for increased 
financial accountability among the Water Boards (Interdepartementaal 
Beleidsonderzoek 2004).
 A third channel was via Habiforum, an independent organization found-
ed by the Dutch government to produce research on ‘multiple land use.’ Our 
projects external leader was involved in this project and Habiforum’s adjunct 
director was sensitive to the findings of the Rathenau Institute regarding the 
fact that ‘water needs’ were ignored by the spatial planning experts. A contest 
called ‘Future Water Landscapes’ was organized in 2001 to produce innovative 
ideas in the area of sustainable water management. The Ministry of Trans-
portation, Public Works and Water Management co-sponsored the contest. 
Habiforum, meanwhile organized various design sessions with the relevant 
stakeholders. Some of these sessions stimulated development planning pro-
cesses that included ‘water assignments.’ The external project leader was re-
quested to give presentations to the Water Board and other provincial civil 
servants. He also chaired various courses on sustainable water management.
 Summary and Reﬂ ection
This case mirrors Carol Weiss’s findings (Weiss 1980; 1991), which basically 
noted that policy analysis is rarely used directly and instrumentally – and is 
certainly not applied in cases of conflicting interests – but more often has a 
different, conceptual impact (‘enlightenment’). Indeed the impact of the Ra-
thenau Institute’s policy analysis was chiefly conceptual.
 Our case study also revealed the complex and conflicting agendas and in-
stitutional interests through which sustainable water management was being 
addressed. Donald Schön and Martin Rein have suggested that, when it con-
cerns complex and controversial cases like this one, the policy design approach 
should be based on triadic policy analysis and a situated analysis. Essentially, 
their rational design approach entails three layers (Schön and Rein 1994: 166-
173): At the most basic layer the individual designer(s) iterate(s) between de-
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fining the substance of the problem in a particular context and constructing 
appropriate ways to deal with it. This involves ‘backtalk’ including ex-ante 
testing of solutions in view of the opportunities and constraints implied in 
the context’s material and political features. The second layer encompasses the 
actual design and maintenance of the design network. Here design rational-
ity becomes a form of ‘double designing’: both the substance and the design 
network itself have to be designed. The third layer is where the design process 
finds itself embedded in social debate and stakeholder conflicts.
 An essential condition for success, however, is, the development of mutual 
trust between the members of the coalition or design network. Trust, howev-
er, has been generally lacking when we look at the Rathenau Institute’s policy 
analysis and thus the second and third layers of rational policy design became 
interwoven. The various stakeholder frames produced power struggles that 
involved the (de)legitimization and (de)authorization of the policy analysis, 
which offered no easy resolution. As a consequence, Schön and Rein’s recom-
mendation that ‘the substantive design moves must not threaten the integrity of 
the designing system’ (Schön and Rein 1994: 186) was difficult to accomplish. 
The strategies were, on the one hand, applied as reactions to the delegitimiz-
ing eﬀ orts by creating a more robust body of knowledge, and coming up with 
minor adaptations to the reports regarding style and content. On the other 
hand, we also witnessed strategic coalition building, which means the use of 
various design coalitions based on the phase of the policy analysis project and 
various developments in the social and political debate. It was a strategic coali-
tion and ‘advocacy coalitions’ with other favorable (outside) change agents, in-
cluding the inﬂ uential Committee 21st Century – and Habiforum that helped 
legitimize the project’s conclusions on institutional change. Th is case reﬂ ects 
another of Carol Weiss’s conclusion that policy analysis is generally part of a 
process of ‘decision accretion’ in multi-actor processes (Weiss 1991).
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7 Evaluation as Policy Work: Puzzling and Powering
 in a Dutch Program for Sustainable Development
Anne Loeber
 Introduction
The pursuit of sustainable development is a major goal of Dutch environ-
mental policy. To facilitate this development in the new millennium, a highly 
experimental independent body was created: the National Initiative for Sus-
tainable Development (in Dutch: NIDO). NIDO was established as a tem-
porary, publicly financed foundation which operated at arm’s length from 
the government, and whose purpose was to ‘structurally anchor’ initiatives in 
society that would facilitate dramatic changes leading to a more sustainable 
society.
 This meant that the organization had to engage in a very specific form of 
policy work. While all policy endeavors may be described as a combination of 
‘puzzling and powering’ (Heclo 1974) or, alternatively, of design and instiga-
tion (Hoppe 1993), in the case of NIDO, this combination was more compli-
cated because of the temporary nature of the organization. What sustainable 
development might entail was and remains quite unclear, but the concept im-
plies a fundamental break with current unsustainable social dynamics. The 
designs NIDO was hired to produce thus had to foster radical (economic and 
technological) innovation in the long run. However, they had to be designed 
so that, in the short run, they would encourage actors (‘change agents’) to in-
stigate immediate change.
 NIDO set out to elaborate this challenge by identifying and strengthening 
so-called sustainable initiatives in society. It coordinated two to three-year 
programs that brought together forward-thinking people from industry, gov-
ernment, scientific community, and social organizations to foster collabora-
tive attempts to translate the concept of sustainable development within the 
contexts of their own professions. In doing so, NIDO embarked on what 
later became known in Dutch academic circles and policy jargon as ‘transition 
management’ (Rotmans 2003; Grin et al. 2009), that is, as a coherent series 
of activities intended to help bring about a transformation in policy involving 
types of development that thrive on sustainable dynamics.
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 The associated notion of transition management, which was coined by the 
research group of Jan Rotmans and Rene Kemp, indicates the ‘governance 
principles, methods and tools’ that deal with transitions (cf. Loorbach 2007: 
17). It has provoked quite some criticism because of its ‘grand design’ con-
notations, implying large-scale social engineering (Shove and Walker 2007). 
In our current networked society, where power is polycentric and knowledge 
quintessentially contested, the idea of ‘malleable’ social developments that can 
be influenced by some higher managerial powers, seems oddly anachronistic. 
Given that ‘sustainable development’ is a fairly elusive policy ambition, the 
challenge for policy workers is enormous.
 The managers and academics whose task it was to give shape to the NIDO 
experiment were well aware of the challenging nature of their assignment. 
In the first few months of NIDO’s development, they produced two fun-
damental design choices to deal with the issue. First, NIDO used existing 
social developments and ‘sustainable initiatives’ as a point of departure in the 
design of its programs, and further developed these. Secondly, NIDO was 
further designed to function as a learning organization where it could reflect 
on its own experiences and activities as part of its operational procedures, 
allowing it to generate systematic feedback loops and establish an evaluation 
and monitoring program. Policy scientists from the University of Amsterdam 
were contracted to evaluate the program.
 Th is chapter argues that both NIDO managers and evaluators were engaged 
in policy work, which involved both puzzling and powering. Th e NIDO manag-
ers’ puzzling and powering concentrated on a range of social actors, mostly from 
the corporate sector. And while the evaluators initially envisioned their activ-
ity as detached research, objectively analyzing NIDO’s work from an academic 
perspective, they also found themselves engaged in puzzling and powering, both 
in relation to NIDO’s managers and the NIDO organization itself. We begin 
our analysis by tracking how NIDO policy workers constructed and pursued 
‘transition management,’ and then shift to how the evaluators developed their 
own roles in relation to the policy workers and the organization itself.
 Ambitious plans in the polder: Transition management as a new area of 
Dutch policy
Th e Brundtland Commission’s notion of sustainable development, deﬁ ned in 
1987 as a development of increasing productivity that does not deprive future 
generations of their natural resources (WCED 1987), ﬁ ts in well with the Dutch 
environmental policy of those days. Disappointment with policy achievements 
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since the 1970s, which built on traditional administrative regulatory strategies 
for pollution control, set the stage for the development of an entirely new ap-
proach to institutionalized environmental policy in the Netherlands. In the 
mid-1980s, policy combined environmental concerns with economic interests. 
Pieter Winsemius, who was the Environmental Minister during the 1982-1986 
period, spoke of the need to stimulate an internalization (verinnerlijking) of en-
vironmental responsibility (Winsemius 1986). If environmental notions could 
be integrated into the economic behavior of various market players (consum-
ers and producers), it would better ensure that economic decisions reﬂ ected 
environmental concerns along with criteria like proﬁ t and eﬃ  ciency.
 The WCED’s new discourse of sustainable development presented eco-
nomic and environmental goals as being compatible and provided a suitable 
storyline for the new shift in environmental policy. In 1989, the incoming 
Dutch government adopted the notion of sustainable growth and proposed 
that ‘sustainable development had to be accomplished within one genera-
tion’ (Staatscourant, 27 November 1989, cited in WRR 1994: 27). The ensuing 
policy was laid out in a series of Environmental Policy Plans (the NEPPS) 
and was based on a range of newly developed principles and notions such 
as the ‘standstill’ principle, which marked the current state of environmen-
tal degradation as the absolute bottom line of pollution levels for the future, 
the ‘polluter-pays principle,’ the principle of ‘abatement at the source’ and the 
policy of the ‘closing of substance cycles.’
 Despite these well-developed principles, which were internationally appre-
ciated (Weale 1992), some ten years later, the envisioned sustainable society 
was still nowhere in sight. Among the barriers that were identiﬁ ed was the very 
structure of society in which the actors operate privately and professionally. 
Even if environmental considerations were incorporated into both personal 
morality and economic activities, the actors tended to fall short of their goals 
because the transaction costs of enacting them were considered too high. Even 
the most conscientious public transportation user may end up buying an au-
tomobile if public transportation does not perform reliably and eﬃ  ciently. As 
a result, society is faced with a number of persistent structural problems that 
arise from patterns and processes that are deeply embedded in, and privileged 
by, the current institutions of state, science, market and civil society (Grin and 
Weterings 2005). Mere behavioral changes enacted by the various actors, some 
authors and commentators concluded (Rotmans 2003; Kemp et al. 2007), were 
not enough to have a sizeable impact on sustainable development. Th is requires 
a drastic re-organization of the entire structure of society. More importantly 
perhaps, it requires a fundamental re-thinking of how (economic) progress 
and development are deﬁ ned and validated in present-day society (Grin 2005).
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 A new paradigm that offered possible solutions for persistent problems 
focused on how society needed to shift from its present course to a more 
sustainable one and was developed by various academic authors. It eventually 
made its way into the environmentalist policy arena (Kemp and Rotmans 
2009). By 2001, its catch phrase ‘transitions’ had been adopted as part of the 
fourth National Environmental Policy Plan: ‘transitions.’ In a review of the 
events that led to the inclusion of these academic views on sustainable social 
transformations by policymakers on the national level – itself an interesting 
discussion on boundary work – the academics involved concluded that ‘[t]he 
NEPP4 needed an overarching concept and a vocabulary for a discourse on 
persistent problems’ (Kemp and Rotmans 2009). The notion of transition 
seemed to provide an apt narrative, and was officially adopted by the Dutch 
government in 2001 with its ‘transition policy for sustainable energy.’
 Transitions were considered ongoing, long-term processes of change that 
fundamentally alter culture, structure and practices in specific social subsys-
tems (cf. Rotmans et al. 2001; Geels 2002). Efforts undertaken to co-influence 
these processes of change from the perspective of a sustainable future were 
dubbed ‘transition management’ (Rotmans 2003). By adopting this language, 
the NEPP4 effectively identified the persistent problem areas (the loss of bio-
diversity, climate change, overexploitation of natural resources, health threats 
and threats to external safety, deterioration of the environment) and named 
the transition processes that would deal with these as the transition toward 
sustainable energy, a transition toward sustainable use of biodiversity and 
natural resources, a transition toward sustainable agriculture and a transition 
toward sustainable mobility.
 It is within this highly dynamic context of science-policy interactions that 
involved designing new governance approaches for sustainable development 
that an experimental program for fostering sustainable change took shape. It 
commenced in December 1999, well before transition management was of-
ficially endorsed in NEPP, and the National Initiative for Sustainable Devel-
opment may be regarded as a program that pioneered transition management 
before the term became more common.
 NIDO’s emergent design for managing transitions
The National Initiative for Sustainable Development has a remarkably short 
history. In hindsight, one could argue that it was designed ‘too early’ to benefit 
from the government-wide focus on shifts towards a sustainable development 
that was institutionalized with the NEPP4. NIDO may be considered one 
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of the first off-shoots to develop in what later developed into the ‘transition 
tree,’ preparing the way for further growth only to be overshadowed by other 
programs – in 2004, NIDO failed to receive adequate subsidies for its second 
five-year term and was dismantled just as it was becoming a significant factor. 
Its defeat was built into its structure, some might argue, from the very start.
 At the time of its formal establishment, NIDO was little more than an 
idea. The idea was that sustainable development was something that could 
be consciously aspired to, and that government could have a role in its con-
ceptual development. How this could happen, and which role government 
would take, were questions that the newly established organization needed to 
answer. NIDO was formally instituted to initiate ‘leaps towards a sustainable 
society,’ and in doing so, it would also contribute significantly to the Dutch 
knowledge base on sustainable development.
 Th e individuals hired to create this institute began struggling with this dual 
challenge. Th e ﬁ rst objective came from the Ministry for the Environment, 
which wanted to establish a worthy sequel to a highly appreciated experimental 
program that addressed questions of sustainable development from the per-
spective of technological innovation (the interdepartmental Program on Sus-
tainable Technological Development, cf. Weaver 2000). Th e second objective 
was formulated because NIDO was set up with government money derived 
from the country’s natural gas supply revenues that had been earmarked for 
developing the Dutch infrastructure. Th at goal was now broadened to include 
the ‘knowledge infrastructure,’ in its pursuit of sustainable development.
 Th e dual objective reﬂ ected the two challenges of ‘sustainable development’ 
as a policy goal: it requires insight into what sustainability may entail in a par-
ticular ﬁ eld, and involves the practical necessity of bringing about social change. 
Th e initial NIDO staﬀ  and advisors, with their backgrounds in academia, 
marketing communications and business, opted for a practical approach to 
this design-cum-stimulation mission. Th ey chose to develop insights into what 
the concept means, in collaboration with professionals already working on this 
question rather than elaborating the idea of ‘sustainable development.’ By com-
bining their research with that of others, they hoped not only to develop plans, 
but also to increase the chances that initiatives for change would actually follow.
 Sustainability as an outcome of joint puzzling
NIDO developed its core axioms on puzzling and powering in the early 
months. First, they decided to focus on existing trends as a starting point for 
elaborating program themes. The aim was to accelerate and strengthen the ex-
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isting dynamics of innovation rather than introduce new developments. The 
initial idea was that NIDO would function as a kind of broker organization, 
to link representatives from governments, NGOs, business and academia, 
to make their efforts in dealing with the concept of sustainability a shared 
struggle. NIOD consulted its most trusted advisors and decided that private 
firms should be its primary partners, thus maximizing its chances for affect-
ing actual change.
 Thus NIDO consciously tied the ‘puzzling’ part of its policy work to the 
‘powering’ part. This practical approach would enable NIDO’s staff to link 
the substantive question of what sustainable development might entail with 
regard to a specific theme, business or policy area to the procedural issue of 
how to design programs that could produce the desired ‘leaps’ toward a sus-
tainable society. The meaning of the notion of ‘sustainable development’ thus 
became the outcome rather than its point of departure. The sole substantive a 
priori elaboration was that sustainable development should be understood in 
so-called ‘Triple P’ terms (Elkington 1997), indicating a balance between eco-
nomic prosperity (‘profit’), ecological quality (‘planet’) and social well-being 
(‘people’). Rather than being a conscious act of program-building, this focus 
emerged implicitly from the choices made within NIDO’s first program on 
corporate social responsibility.
 In this vein, some eight programs were launched in the first two years (to 
which two programs developed outside NIDO were added and were consid-
ered promising). Each program was run by a ‘program manager’, and assisted 
by a ‘process manager’, all hired for the duration of the program. They came 
from academia, consultancy or commercial organizations. The process man-
agers met weekly to exchanges views and experiences. The full team, including 
NIDO’s director, convened once a month. The idea behind this set-up was 
that the program managers would bring in specific networks and knowledge 
on, say, urban innovation, logistics or marketing. The process managers pro-
vided insight into the operations of the program. NIDO began taking shape 
because of their collective efforts, despite being comprised of only a director, 
and administrative staff in a prestigious office building.
 It was in the daily operations of running the programs that the tensions 
built into NIDO’s strategy of ‘puzzling through powering’ and vice versa 
came to the fore. The strategy of using existing trends as a point of depar-
ture was considered a strategic choice to ensure the cooperation of various 
change agents, dubbed ‘forerunners,’ but soon proved to have some serious 
drawbacks. A program manager recalled that her open approach to new ideas 
from her partners was quickly perceived as a lack of direction on the part 
of NIDO. ‘They don’t have a clue what sustainable development is and how 
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they’re going to handle it’ was an example of a common reaction, and NIDO 
dreaded losing its reputation before it had even had a chance to prove itself.
 To avoid an impression of indecisiveness, the manager of the program on 
corporate social responsibility consciously limited the initial discussions to 
a small circle of trusted and valued partners. It was only after decisions had 
been made on the main features of the program that she opened up the dis-
cussion to a broader range of actors. The ‘sustainable marketing,’ program 
underwent a similar fine-tuning round but it did not turn out as expected. 
Here, the question of ‘what is our focus and how are we going to organize this 
program’ was the central issue of the first two or three meetings. Representa-
tives from various firms that sought to produce sustainable consumer goods 
in a commercially viable way attended these meetings. They were all seeking 
to expand the market segment for sustainable consumer goods (from paint to 
foodstuff ) beyond the ‘alternative consumer’ niche market. They considered 
the program’s added value vague and attendance at the meetings declined 
rapidly. The same ‘join them or lead them’ tension was evident at gathering of 
another program, but the results were quite different. In the urban renewal 
program, which, unusual for NIDO, was aimed at the public sector – pro-
gram managers were surprised when they met a wall of indifference among 
the potential participants. Efforts to develop this program failed time and 
again because they refused to answer the question ‘so what does sustainable 
urban renewal actually mean?’ The program’s staff wanted to raise awareness 
on the issue of housing and urban development from a different perspective 
than the typical technical approach. Most of the professionals from the field 
had received their professional training at the Delft University of Technol-
ogy. To them the term ‘sustainable’ meant material innovations and energy 
reduction, using available and conventional urban extension plans. The pro-
gram’s staff was able to break through mainstream technical engineering be-
liefs, and they readjusted their ambitions to a ‘pre-programming’ phase. An 
optional course on sustainable urban renewal was eventually developed and 
introduced into the curriculum at the Delft University of Technology as a 
spin-off of NIDO’s program.
 Almost all of NIDO’s programs adopted the language of their respective 
participants and sparring partners to reach the professionals in the private 
and public sector, and to launch NIDO’s ‘puzzling’ activities. For instance, 
the urban renewal program shed typical NIDO jargon to such an extent that 
even the word ‘sustainable’ in the program’s agenda and activities became ta-
boo. This shift had two different but equally unproductive effects. First of 
all, it contributed to the enormous diversity within NIDO, in terms of pro-
gram themes, objectives and approaches. These themes varied so greatly that 
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NIDO’s staff sometimes found it difficult to communicate with one another. 
This meant that outsiders never got a clear picture of NIDO’s identity.
 A second effect, related to the latter, was that parties operating in the par-
ticular fields that NIDO programs targeted were often frustrated about what 
the added value of NIDO actually was. As one program manager pointed 
out, one discussion partner once responded quite bluntly: ‘If the government 
wants us to develop a more sustainable policy, why not just give the tons of 
money that NIDO now receives directly to us [established players in the 
field], then we can begin to achieve some miracles.’ This kind of criticism was 
reinforced by NIDO’s position as a newcomer and a temporary one at that, 
with a decidedly generic philosophy – which was further fuelled by NIDO’s 
strategy of invisibility. This leads us to a discussion of NIDO’s ‘powering’ 
activities.
 (Em)powering initiatives towards a sustainable transition?
NIDO chose to adopt an aforementioned facilitative role that sought to 
strengthen nascent sustainable initiatives. In an early brainstorming discus-
sion at the time of its establishment, NIDO’s role was defined as ‘not stand-
ing on a table’ and, instead, consisted of ‘sitting around a table together with 
all of the stakeholders,’ which would stimulate and strengthen their learning 
processes. Moreover, NIDO also chose its role by shifting program results 
to other players in order to relate outcomes to the dynamics dominating a 
particular field. The discrepancy in terms of duration between a two-year 
program period and NIDO’s long-term objectives forced program staff to 
consciously manage the social embedding of their program’s findings and dy-
namics.
 NIDO’s potential impact on specific program dynamics essentially hinged 
on how it was received in specific domains. In turn, the way NIDO was per-
ceived varied between programs and was largely dependent on both the char-
acteristics of the field and the ability of the program’s staff to carve out an 
identifiable niche for itself. In a fully developed field, such as urban renewal, 
which was already dominated by a set of well-established institutions, NIDO 
faced more resistance than in areas such as corporate social responsibility, 
where the contours of a new domain were still emerging and no institutional 
arrangements were yet in place. NIDO’s position was much stronger when 
a program manager could clearly define the assets NIDO’s program could 
bring to the field.
 For instance, NIDO arrived at the right time in the case of corporate social 
responsibility. Incidents such as Shell confronting public and environmen-
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tal organizations (Brent Spar) and human rights organizations (in Nigeria), 
showed that corporations were increasingly being pressured to accept respon-
sibility in the public interest and not simply comply with current social and 
environmental legislation. In addition to developments in the financial world 
(i.e., the launch of ‘sustainable’ investment funds) and philosophies and strat-
egies regarding ‘good entrepreneurship’ might entail, public pressure created 
incentives for increasing numbers of firms to take social needs into greater 
consideration. However, it remained unclear how these firms could convert 
this into actual practice, and what the implications were for the corporate 
strategies. NIDO stepped into this ‘institutional void’ (Hajer 2003) left by 
tension between expectations and traditional settings, to develop ideas, pro-
vide a clearinghouse for information to stimulate the exchange of ideas on 
relevant developments elsewhere, and to help establish standards that could 
help pave the way.
 In contrast, the added value of the program on ‘sustainable outsourcing’ 
had to be consciously identified but also hidden – at least the staff felt. Under 
the apt title ‘Who will take the curtain call?’ (literally: ‘Who gets the flowers?’) 
program manager De Kuijer presented his views during a NIDO staff meet-
ing to stimulate long-term changes. Because the impact of NIDO’s programs 
was going to outlast their duration, it was imperative that other parties in the 
field with a permanent presence, would take the initiative to both implement 
the plans assume NIDO’s role as designer cum instigator. This implied that 
identification of these parties (dubbed ‘trekkers,’ literally ‘pullers’) was to be 
part and parcel of a NIDO program. These parties had to see and present 
themselves as the ‘owner’ of the ideas developed, and they had to engage in 
stimulating activities.
 The positive effects of passing the baton as part of NIDO’s strategy of its 
eventual dissolution had two distinctive drawbacks, in hindsight. It contrib-
uted significantly to NIDO’s poor visibility, from the perspective of prospec-
tive NIDO stakeholders who were to assume the status of full partners in 
a specific program, because financing requirements by the Ministry of Eco-
nomic Affairs made co-funding by participating firms mandatory. As a result, 
it became increasingly difficult to launch programs because it was limited 
by the requirement to establish co-funding with corporate partners before 
anything could happen. NIDO found it increasingly difficult to find partners 
willing to sign these co-funding agreements.
 Moreover, its ‘strategy of modesty’ also contributed to NIDO’s poor vis-
ibility among its political patrons. It significantly weakened its own position 
when the transition concept took hold, a few years after NIDO was founded. 
By then it was too late to take credit for earlier actions.
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  e evaluators’ evolving role in monitoring NIDO’s learning-while-doing
NIDO’s aim was to generate knowledge by implementing learning-by- doing 
programs. It took an active role in developing and documenting lessons 
learned from its programs. An evaluation and monitoring project was set up 
to enable systematic reflection on NIDO’s experiences and to reap the fruits 
of its experiments.
 Th is project aimed to build on the theoretical insights regarding the analy-
sis and interpretation of the interplay between processes of social change and 
technological development generated within the University of Amsterdam’s Po-
litical Science Department (see, e.g., Grin and Van de Graaf 1996; Aarts 1997; 
Loeber 2004). Th ese insights were to be used in two ways: ﬁ rstly, they would 
serve as a theoretical point of reference in guiding the empirical work, provid-
ing ‘sensitizing concepts’ to direct the data collection (Blumer 1969); secondly, 
they would be used as a kind of ‘mirror’ for encouraging reﬂ ection on the part of 
NIDO’s staﬀ , to ultimately improve the puzzling and powering aspects of the 
various programs. Th e activities to trigger reﬂ ection-on-action among NIDO’s 
staﬀ  were part of a so-called ‘advisory trajectory’ of the evaluation project, for 
which the senior researcher was responsible. While I was employed as a post-
doctoral researcher in the University of Amsterdam’s Political Science Depart-
ment, evaluated NIDO experiences, by setting up a comparative case analysis.
 The evaluation and advisory projects commenced in October 2001 and 
would take five years. The initial design and the project’s focus changed dras-
tically relatively soon after its launch. The evaluation eventually produced a 
learning experience that was as experimental as the programs it was evaluat-
ing and supporting. In retrospect, three phases can be distinguished in the 
evaluation’s design.
 Watching a NIDO program develop: Evaluation from a ﬂ y-on-the-wall 
position
The evaluation’s original design included two in-depth case studies, to be con-
ducted on the basis of participant observation, document analysis and inter-
views, in order to provide an answer to the project’s chief research questions: 
How are NIDO’s programs designed and implemented; how do they relate 
to the theoretical and methodological insights regarding the management of 
‘transitions towards a more sustainable society’ (based on empirically studied 
experiences elsewhere); and what can we learn from these programs about 
actually organizing ‘leaps’ towards this kind of development?
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 The first case I selected was NIDO’s corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
program. The program’s objective was to initiate and support processes of 
change among companies wishing to create a link between their financial per-
formance and their ecological and social concerns (Cramer and Loeber 2004). 
The program ran from May 2000 until December 2002 and focused on the 
interactions between nineteen participating companies and their stakehold-
ers. The program consisted of two projects: (1) implementing CSR in busi-
ness practices and (2) marketing communication efforts about CSR (Cramer 
2003). NIDO organized monthly four-hour meetings for both project groups 
in order to share experiences in the area of CSR implementation in business 
practice, discuss common problems and interact with external stakeholders. 
Moreover, every participating company carried out a specific in-house project 
on the issue during the period January 2001 – July 2002. These projects were 
discussed and evaluated during the meetings. The discussions and conclu-
sions of these meetings were documented in extensive minutes. The program 
manager visited the participating firms every five months to trace their prog-
ress. In addition to coordinating both project groups, NIDO also participat-
ed in various CSR initiatives, in order to reinforce both the NIDO program 
and these initiatives. The participating companies and NIDO disseminated 
the program results to other companies and the public, through conferences, 
media exposure and publications (among them, Cramer 2003).
 A more elaborate description of the CSR program and the evaluations 
have been published elsewhere (Loeber 2003; 2007). The focus here is on 
the evaluation process. I felt like an anthropologist in NIDO land during 
the first meeting I attended in October 2001. The program manager formally 
welcomed me to the meeting, and then, as we had discussed beforehand, they 
carried on as usual. This set the tone for the way I participated in subsequent 
meetings; I seldom spoke, preferring to observe the deliberations from my 
fly-on-the-wall position.
 Representatives from all nineteen participating firms shared their insights 
from their experiences in introducing and implementing CSR in their respec-
tive companies. I observed and took notes on what was said in relation to the 
issues I considered relevant based on earlier fieldwork on the studies per-
formed by University of Amsterdam colleagues. Moreover, I identified and 
‘tagged’ new notions that seemed important in understanding the process, 
developing (in a Grounded Theory-like fashion) a repertoire of what could 
be considered CSR-related learning. I recorded the group dynamics, the pro-
gram manager’s role, the influence of some specific setting and so on.
 The program’s participants and the program manager appreciated my po-
sition and accepted my silent presence, which did not in any way (I am con-
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vinced) disrupt or influence the project meetings. Thus, I was able to observe 
both the management style of the program manager and witness the formal 
but cordial exchanges of the business representatives. Towards the end of the 
program, the program manager asked me to present my research to the par-
ticipants, which I was happy to do.
 However, my presentation completely failed in its efforts to justify my at-
tendance. I had organized it based on the theoretical insights that guided my 
empirical work and used the language and concepts derived from the political 
science and organizational learning literature. I could not have made a poorer 
decision. The academic language and my perspective were alien to most of 
the participants and downright annoying to some. They (politely) expressed 
their annoyance over the fact that I presented what was dear to them in a way 
that made no sense to them at all. The event did not have a negative impact 
on the final stages of the research, due to my good relations with the program 
manager However, I considered my experience the first sign that in record-
ing practice-based experiences, the use of context-specific wording and the 
acknowledgement of an actor’s intent are essential.
 This lesson was further hammered home during the ‘advice and consulta-
tion’ trajectory that ran parallel to the evaluation process. The advisory and 
evaluation processes were planned for NIDO’s full staff meeting held every 
six weeks. These meetings formed the backbone of NIDO because they were 
the only occasion when the entire staff was present to exchange ideas and 
information, and learn from each others experiences. The idea of the advi-
sory process was to share information on relevant political science concepts 
and public administration and transition theory literature with NIDO’s staff. 
That information would then provide the basis for evaluating NIDO’s own 
concepts and activities. To that end, the evaluation project leader sent out 
selected readings prior to the meetings.
 Th e reasoning behind promoting self-evaluation among NIDO’s staﬀ  was 
that even the most innovative and creative ideas – i.e., designing ‘leaps towards 
a sustainable society’ – could be undermined by the very conditions one seeks 
to change. Th ese conditions were not only institutionalized in the (‘unsustain-
able’) socio-economic and technological organization of present-day society, 
but were also embedded in the actor’s assumptions of what is a reasonable, 
feasible and justiﬁ able way to act in a certain situation. Th ese fundamental as-
sumptions and beliefs may implicitly limit an actor’s (say, a NIDO manager’s) 
ability to overcome system failures and persistent problems and embark on a 
genuinely innovative journey towards fundamental, ‘sustainable’ change.
 The literature on organizational learning (e.g., Argyris 1990; Schön and 
Rein 1994) consistently argues that the degree of self-reflection that is re-
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quired to become aware of one’s basic assumptions (and thus to potentially 
engage in a process of reviewing these) is difficult to achieve on one’s own. 
The advisory meetings were established to create conditions where a funda-
mental evaluation process could take place.
 Despite being informative and agreeable, the meetings did not have the de-
sired effect according to numerous attendees who never suggested that we had 
succeeded in creating a learning atmosphere. First, the need to include ‘scien-
tists’ (us) in the development of NIDO’s mission statement and its strategy 
was strongly questioned by some of the managers. One of the program man-
agers observed that ‘we are just the guinea pigs running for your tests. Well, as 
long as you leave me to my devices, you’re welcome to look over my shoulder. 
But don’t bother to tell me what you think about what I do.’
 Another reason for the lack of success was that the concepts we wanted to 
discuss and the phrases we used to describe the staff ’s activities and inten-
tions never struck a chord. Our depiction of the work that the NIDO man-
agers performed in terms of ‘system innovation,’ ‘system delineation,’ ‘future 
visions,’ or even ‘problem definition’ did not hit home with most of NIDO’s 
staff. This became clear, for instance, when I presented my findings on the 
corporate social responsibility program at one of the full staff meetings.
 With the dismal presentation of the CSR program evaluation fresh in 
mind, I now tried to organize my research into categories that were based 
on the ideas and concepts developed in that very program, reflecting the 
practical experiences gained as well as invoking insights from the relevant 
literature. To my surprise, several of these ‘categories of intricacies’ in what 
was now loosely called ‘managing transitions,’ which, in my view, seemed to 
leap from the pages so self-evidently made no sense to some of the staff 
members. It was not just our conceptualizations based on academic litera-
ture that were not easily recognized. Key notions and perspectives developed 
within the CSR program were also not shared by other NIDO managers. In 
other words, what we said only very remotely had anything to do with the 
managers’ individual projects. It was high time to re-evaluate the advisory 
trajectory, and the entire evaluation itself.
 Evaluation through active engagement: puzzling along
The first adjustment we made was to eliminate the notion of informed 
discussions during the full staff meetings. Instead, we began attending the 
small, informal staff meetings of the process managers to discuss our views 
about the precise kind of advice that was necessary. It became clear that the 
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process managers mostly needed a way to communicate their ideas and ex-
periences with one another despite the significant differences between their 
programs.
 Secondly, these differences forced me to relinquish the notion that the de-
sign of a corporate social responsibility program was synonymous with ‘the’ 
NIDO approach. The assumption was not only wrong, but it also irritated 
the other managers. It turned out that they were annoyed by the pressure to 
use the NIDO approach as a template for their own projects. The presenta-
tion of my research findings had unwittingly reinforced that pressure. While 
the corporate social responsibility program was highly appreciated and re-
spected, many felt that their own programs called for a different approach or 
management style.
 I set out to re-design the format of the evaluation project to include all of 
NIDO’s seven programs, in a way that would enable NIDO staff to meaning-
fully communicate their experiences to one another. I dubbed my design the 
‘view master,’ after that plastic slide viewer toy:
Th e view master: the magic lamp from the 1960s. A story is told in a se-
ries of images, brought together on a carbon disk. Each image has its own 
frame. Put the disk in the stereo viewer, and the image gains perspective. 
One push on the button, and the next frame is visible. Please note, in 3D: 
not merely the theme and perspective of a program-activity become vis-
ible, but also the way in which it is experienced by the person telling the 
story. Action, objectives as well as (learning) experience all become visible 
to the interested observer (Loeber 2002).
The idea was that, regardless of the differences between the programs, the 
various activities of the program’s staff could be evaluated from a limited 
number of angles. The format was organized by categorizing the program 
staff ’s ‘reasons for action’ along with a list of goals. The resulting format has 
been described in greater detail elsewhere (Loeber 2007). The focus here is on 
the experience with the new evaluation process.
 The design and the evaluation project’s new strategy were met with great 
enthusiasm. The evaluation’s objective was now to assist NIDO managers to 
reflect on their modus operandi, to help facilitate an exchange of ideas and ex-
periences and to help develop a common language and identity. Furthermore, 
the idea was to record and thus disclose the learning experiences for others 
outside NIDO to enable them to learn from the NIDO experiment.
 The new evaluation format was explicitly intended to serve as a ‘search 
design,’ providing a basis for structuring the discussions on experiences 
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gained. The design itself was also the subject of further discussion (I em-
phasized time and again that we were talking about a ‘view master’ and not 
a ‘master view’), and, indeed, the design subsequently underwent several 
more drastic changes. The process managers found the design workable, and 
they were fairly satisfied with having someone think along with them on a 
regular basis to evaluate their activities. The main question for the process 
managers was whether they were on the right track, or more fundamentally, 
how would they know they were even on the right track. Moreover, if each 
program demanded its own approach, what would that mean for ‘the NIDO 
approach’?
 I had to find answers to these questions. I had left my fly-on-the-wall posi-
tion and found myself in the ‘puzzling’ game, swimming along (rather like a 
fly in the soup). One thing was clear: none of the concepts developed in the 
literature were ‘ready to wear.’ They needed significant alterations to satis-
factorily fit the contours of any one specific program. While process manag-
ers requested literature suggestions on specific topics, they used the material 
provided mostly as a general reference point, to ‘benchmark,’ so to speak, their 
own ideas and experiences, and place these in a more general context, rather 
than using them as a concrete source of inspiration.
 The lessons learned were then shared. For instance, there was a consid-
erable amount of tension between the desire to influence actual strategies 
and the participants’ operating procedures in the short run, and NIDO’s 
long-term aim of fostering genuinely sustainable change. This tension was 
reinforced by the need to encourage firm to invest financially, and the dif-
ficulty of effectively articulating NIDO’s poorly phrased objectives. As a 
consequence, program staff members were tempted to reap the ‘low hanging 
fruit,’ that is, to actively contribute to the attainment of concrete goals set by 
their respective partners. Attaining long-term objectives proved to be much 
more difficult.
 Another point was that the ‘triple-P’ interpretation of sustainable develop-
ment (implying a balanced approach in terms of ‘planet’ and ‘people’ as well as 
‘profit’) in practice seldom led to any concrete action. Time and again, NIDO 
managers were confronted with project plans by participating firms that ei-
ther incorporated two of the three P’s (people and profit, such as an ‘employee 
in the classroom’ project; or planet and profit such as investing in a small har-
bor near a factory to gain access to shipping lanes).
 The collective ‘to and fro’ between theory and practice as well as the 
structured yet frank exchanges on NIDO-specific themes (based on the 
evaluation categories) were inspiring. So much so that some program man-
agers – the NIDO staff members who met every six weeks, in contrast to 
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the process managers who met every week –occasionally asked if they could 
participate to discuss their work in a constructive atmosphere. Apparently, 
the full staff meetings every six weeks proved to be too much of a naval 
review, with programs presented as tall ships, leaving little room for the dis-
cussion of uncertainties and the formulation of innovative ideas and ques-
tions.
 But it was almost no easier to discuss failures and uncertainties during 
the process manager meetings dedicated to the evaluation project. While 
these provided the most valuable lessons, the pressure to appear success-
ful increased over time. A mid-term (external) NIDO evaluation was due, 
and dark clouds could be seen gathering over the sustainability issue in The 
Hague. However, there was hope among the NIDO staff who were con-
vinced that their work had contributed convincingly to the attainment of 
the two objectives, a conviction that I shared then and still do. This is par-
ticularly due to the fact that NIDO’s learning approach and dedication to 
self-reflection developed a vast amount of knowledge on translating sustain-
able development ambitions into policy practice. It was high time to disclose 
these insights to a wider audience.
 Evaluation as part of the power games over the ‘transition’ agenda
During the long evaluation process, the ‘search design’ had been altered and 
adjusted to fit NIDO’s practices of designing and instigating changes towards 
sustainable development. By grouping sixteen identifiable themes into three 
sets of activities – analysis, intervention, and output management – the ‘view 
master’1 gained its final shape.
 Although some of the participants always identified their activities more 
with the presented outcomes than others, by that time, a shared identity was 
being embraced. The director definitely felt some relief after ‘the NIDO ap-
proach’ had been identified and recorded (namely as a route through these 
sets of activities). While creativity and innovation had always been encour-
aged, the ever-present pressure to comply with the standards set by the first 
program (on corporate social responsibility) at times seemed like pure ‘group 
think.’ Two programs in particular that were built on entirely different prem-
ises from the rest of the programs were often criticized. The evaluation proj-
ect aimed to develop a common language and identity, but inevitably became 
part of these dynamics.
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Box 1  e ‘view master’ search design for evaluating NIDO’s sustainability policy work
Goals
Motives
Positioning Creating / expli-
cating added value
Knowledge 
production
Developing ‘clout’
Problem 
identiﬁ ca-
tion
Exploring trends 
and opportunities
Identifying 
problems and 
bottlenecks
Exploring and 
identifying 
motives and 
desires
Exploring mutual 
relations and 
positions
Project 
design
Exploring one’s 
own space and 
role
Designing 
experiments 
and settings for 
learning 
Helping to 
connect long-term 
focuses with daily 
practices
Mobilising people, 
money and other 
means
Engaging 
others
Exploring long-
term orientations 
and focuses
Linking people 
and activities; 
creating new 
spaces for ‘novel 
encounters’
Developing new 
insights and 
understanding
Producing 
concrete, tangible 
results (books, 
training courses et 
cetera.)
Anchoring 
dynamics
Exploring 
possibilities 
for structurally 
embedding NIDO-
initiated action
Initiating new 
platforms; 
‘bestowing’ others 
with the role of 
taking the lead
Strengthening 
the ‘knowledge 
infrastructure’
Inﬂ uencing 
policies and 
markets
 With the format finally in place, it now began to function quite differently, 
namely as an organizational principle for disclosing the lessons that NIDO 
staff had learned to outsiders. These lessons were supposed to be narrated as 
‘learning histories,’ a format for recording a series of events as well as the re-
flections on these events by those involved, as developed by Roth and Kleiner 
(1998). NIDO’s director had picked up on that idea while discussing sustain-
able development governance schemes in the United States. I adjusted the 
concept to fit the NIDO context, and we (by then, an assistant had also been 
assigned to the evaluation project) set out to record learning histories based 
on new interviews and previously collected material.
 At one point, NIDO requested that the evaluation project present its main 
finding in a small brochure, explaining what ‘the NIDO approach’ entailed. 
During the drafting of this brochure, more and more information was re-
quested to substantiate the claims NIDO was making. By the time I was fin-
ished, the result was a small booklet. However, the abundance of information 
was appreciated, and at that time, it was decided to elaborate the issue in a 
book (Loeber 2003). Instead of the originally planned scientific output, the 
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evaluation project produced a NIDO publication, with much consideration 
going into its layout and presentation. I wholeheartedly agreed with the sug-
gestion that the ideas be developed into a book, because the insights would be 
very informative to everyone involved in ‘transition management’ and policy 
plans in that particular field. We were not aware at that time that NIDO’s 
fate was already being debated. That we had a role in the sustainability/tran-
sition policy goals became painfully clear when the external review decided 
not to use any of NIDO’s publications regarding the involved programs. For 
the assessment of ‘knowledge infrastructure on sustainable development’ only 
the evaluation project’s products (and not those of the managers) were con-
sidered. We as ‘scientist-advisors,’ suddenly discovered that our work was nec-
essary to legitimate (and protect) NIDO as an organization.
 This was not a comfortable position to be in because failure was not an op-
tion. But the race had already been concluded before we even started. Work-
ing documents and e-mail exchanges from that period show how little politi-
cal clout NIDO and its patrons had. The political and research agendas for 
sustainable development were to be set at that time. Political ambitions, com-
bined with new financial resources (large amounts of natural gas earnings) 
caused conflicts between sustainable development approaches. In one e-mail 
exchange regarding information relevant to the political debate in Parliament, 
someone from NIDO suggested that ‘in order to sharpen the argument, we 
use terms like “transitions” and “transition management”.’ These phrases had 
acquired strategic meaning. They had gained so much prominence in the pol-
icy discourse on sustainable development that the NIDO book highlighted 
these terms throughout. Despite this development, the book and the website 
based on the evaluation were of no avail. NIDO was dismantled by the end of 
2004.
 Conclusion
NIDO was set up to address the challenges of sustainable development goals. 
It was designed, not in advance, but in and through its activities. The general 
idea was to help realize public policy ambitions by tapping into the dynam-
ics of private organizations, and focusing on facilitating learning processes 
among the involved stakeholders. The function of the NIDO managers con-
sisted of combining puzzling and powering vis-à-vis the various sectors in 
society, especially the corporate sector. The puzzling notably included efforts 
to help these parties think ‘beyond the obvious,’ stretching ambitions beyond 
conventional wisdom. The powering function involved creating leeway for in-
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novative and creative ideas in the immediate contexts of NIDO’s partners and 
more in society in general. Among the many activities they developed, was the 
brokering between the various networks to help the involved parties benefit 
from each other’s ideas and opportunities.
 Several of the organization’s features were conducive to puzzling and de-
signing and contributed to its relative weakness when it came to inspiring 
and, eventually, ensuring its own practical survival. The organization’s unsta-
ble arrangement as a temporary, partly privately funded ‘initiative’ (note that 
the ‘I’ in NIDO did not stand for institute) operating at arms’ length from the 
government, meant the NIDO staff had a considerable amount of leeway in 
developing creative approaches to what was later dubbed ‘transition manage-
ment.’ Its feeble institutional position, however, also required NIDO to carve 
out its own niche time and again in the face of more established institutions 
operating in the particular domains that its programs focused on, as well as in 
the ‘transition’ field as such.
 The evaluation project, which had been designed to evaluate the NIDO 
experience and gains lessons from it, became entangled in the policy work of 
its object of study. While the evaluation commenced as a regular ‘objectifying’ 
research project, the evaluators were rapidly equally engaged in the process of 
puzzling and powering, namely in relation to NIDO’s managers and NIDO’s 
organization as such. Puzzling, in their case, involved efforts to encouraged 
self-reflection among NIDO’s staff regarding their operational procedures. 
While the development towards ‘co-puzzling’ was a conscious step that en-
hanced the evaluation program’s effectiveness, the step towards ‘co-powering’ 
was not. However, the evaluators eventually found themselves deeply entan-
gled in the organization’s struggle to survive.
 NIDO’s dismantling was untimely from the perspective of several of its 
programs. Many of these, however, found a new institutional setting along 
with former partners, which matched NIDO’s original goals. In spite of 
 NIDO’s untimely demise and lack of proper impact studies, in hindsight, its 
heritage includes its focus on ‘competences’ in and for transition management, 
which has been institutionalized in the shape of the Competence Centre for 
Transitions (employing some former NIDO staff ), a lasting national interest 
and focus on learning histories as a method of recording experiences involving 
transition management, and a fragmented, although ongoing, appreciation 
of the lessons learned regarding what it means to perform ‘transition policy 
work’ in practice.2 As for the role of the social sciences and policy science with 
regard to sustainable development, the NIDO experience made it clear, once 
again, that it is only through actual policy work that we learn about how poli-
cies work.
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 Notes
 First published in Critical Policy Analysis (), published with permission from CPA.
 See: www.inbrekeninhetgangbare.nl (in Dutch).
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EPolicy Work Beyond the 
Nation-State
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Introduction
Discourse about policy tends to be cast in a form that assumes ‘the govern-
ment’ – either the national government itself, or a body operating on its behalf 
– which is comprised of authorized leaders who determine goals or set norms, 
which are then applied in practice by officials. In these accounts, policy can be 
traced back to sovereign authority.
 Increasingly, however, policy work is conducted across national boundaries. 
New regional bodies are emerging whose ability to make rules can override 
national government authority, such as the European Union. There are also 
global regimes such as the World Trade Organization, to which governments 
yield some of their sovereign authority. There are also areas where sovereignty 
is disputed, like the Antarctic, but governments have sought to construct ac-
ceptable regimes of governing. Two of our case studies concern policy work 
within the European Union, which is perhaps the most developed of these 
trans-national regimes. One study is by an official (Woeltjes) reflecting on 
her own work; the other (Geuijen and ’t Hart) reports on research on Dutch 
officials who deal directly with the EU. They offer a particularly interesting 
perspective because the policy workers involved in these cases can draw on a 
number of identities – as officials of functional national agencies, as part of a 
national engagement with the EU, as ‘good Europeans,’ constructing the new 
regime, and often, also, as professional experts whose professional knowledge 
is shared across national boundaries.
 There are a number of common themes that emerge from these studies. As 
Woeltjes points out, the problems that this policy activity is concerned with 
cannot be contained within national boundaries, and we can see the develop-
ment of a body of specialized knowledge regarding this problem and its man-
agement. Geuijen and ’t Hart suggest that the institutionalization of these 
concerns creates new sites for policy practice, with their own norms, rules 
and specific practices. This gives rise to ambiguity in the relationship be-
tween these locations for international rule-generation and the constitutional 
formulations, which validate rules by referring back to the national political 
leadership. In these cases, political leadership remains ambiguous because the 
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leaders may have no particular views on the issues under discussion, or may 
even avoid taking a position when the issue is considered a ‘hot potato.’ Ques-
tions may be described as ‘technical’ when leaders approve of what the oﬃ  cials 
are doing, and ‘political’ where they disagree. It is assumed that oﬃ  cials should 
be voicing a national position, but they often ﬁ nd it diﬃ  cult to discern what 
this is, not having been advised by their national leaders. National stances 
may have to be improvised and sometimes represent long-held positions, even 
when the rationale for these positions can no longer be recalled. Th e potential 
for tension between professional, agency, national and European perspectives 
means that policy workers often ﬁ nd themselves playing a mediating role, try-
ing to show players in one institutional context why it is necessary to take note 
of the meaning and signiﬁ cance of the issue in other contexts.
 In any case, the issues should not be seen as preceding policy action. They 
do not create the need for structures to deal with them so much as reflect 
the activity of these structures. Woeltjes argues that an important element of 
policy work at this level is ‘problem formation,’ which is an interactive process, 
partly negotiation, but partly a process of exploration, searching for framings 
which are consistent with the perceptions of the participants and the con-
texts in which they have to work. Policy work is a continuous stream of activ-
ity. National officials may sometimes pro-actively raise issues; while at other 
times, they may react to the initiatives of others, or to matters that ‘just pop 
up’ in the ongoing process of interaction. For these policy workers, directives 
and cues from political leaders are only a part of their stimuli– certainly, an 
important part, but not important enough as a point of departure for analysis.
 These policy workers continuously find themselves in dynamic circum-
stances, and their activity is less concerned with strategic vision than with re-
sponding appropriately to an immediate situation. Networking is important, 
particularly when it involves international partners. Policy workers do not try 
to solve problems so much as attempt to construct and maintain relationships 
through which problems can be addressed. They may be expected to frame 
and pursue national positions without much firm ground to stand on. This 
is why Geuijen and ’t Hart argue that their activity is not so much a series of 
responses to official directives – the classic image of bureaucracy – as ‘profes-
sional bricolage,’ constructing an acceptable outcome from the materials read-
ily at hand.
 That the accounts of a practitioner and a researcher in this new field of 
policy work are so compatible is very significant and raises questions about 
what this means for the analysis of policy work. A widely shared view is that 
the development of the EU has generated new forms of policy practice, but 
we should also be open to the possibility that there have been changes in 
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how we account for policy practice. The EU, certainly a new site for practice, 
has an explicit goal of creating new regimes in a wide range of areas of social 
activity (with often tacit resistance from existing regimes). So we can expect 
policy work to adapt to the new challenges, to be marked by more fragile 
links between political and bureaucratic activity, and more ambiguity about 
the outcomes.
 At the same time, we should ask whether these characteristics that have 
been identified as a unique new European mode of policy activity have previ-
ously been used in national contexts, but seen as deviant and not reflected in 
analytic accounts of policy. It is not unusual to hear policy workers complain 
that the interest of the political leaders in the issues with which the policy 
workers have to contend is fragmentary, disconnected and ambiguous. They 
will point out how they seek to accommodate the needs of different institu-
tional players and will often talk about the importance of personal relation-
ships in the accomplishment of policy work. To be sure, these elements are 
not part of the generally accepted account of policy and policy work, but per-
haps this suggests that there are different accounts of the policy process – and 
policy work within it – in use.
 We can see that policy workers may offer different explanations of policy – 
e.g., the same policy outcome may be characterized as something that ‘meets 
the standards of the profession,’ ‘is acceptable to all the major stakeholders,’ 
and implements the government’s policy on x.’ Three distinct accounts of pol-
icy have been identified (Colebatch 2009). The dominant account in public 
discourse is one of authoritative choice, which presents policy as the result of 
a decision by the appropriate political or bureaucratic leaders to achieve some 
objective. In less public contexts, policy workers are more likely to use an ac-
count of structured interaction, which sees policy as the outcome of interplay 
between institutionalized participants with distinct agendas and understand-
ings and varying dispositions to collaborate. They will probably also recog-
nize an account of social construction, which sees policy as ‘collective puzzling’ 
(Heclo 1974), identifying problems (e.g., ‘global warming’ or ‘domestic vio-
lence’), the valid knowledge about them, and appropriate responses to them. 
They know that authoritative choice is a ‘sacred’ account, and policy outcomes 
should be presented as the work of authoritative decision makers. That these 
outcomes may reflect hard bargaining between stakeholders inside and out-
side government (structured interaction) and parameters of public acceptance 
(social construction) is more ‘profane’ knowledge, which can be deployed in 
more private discourses among policy workers.
 But while policy workers have become adept at distinguishing between ‘sa-
cred’ and ‘profane’ accounts (‘front office’ and ‘back office,’ as De Vries et al. 
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(see chapter 5) put it) in national contexts, it may be that learning to do it in 
an international context is, for many of them, a new game. In the national con-
text, public agencies tend to be based on the institutionalization of specific 
forms of knowledge with their own regimes of practice, and a good deal of 
policy activity is concerned with defending agency stances against the claims 
of other agencies and competes for the ability to define the position of ‘the 
government.’ In the new context of the construction of a European regime, 
the tensions between the different institutional frameworks are more evident 
and there is less scope for smoothing them over with sacred presentations; 
‘the government has decided’ seems a more acceptable and achievable position 
than ‘the EU has decided.’ Perhaps the newness of the context makes the ten-
sions more evident, and the work of managing them more challenging.
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8 Policy Work Between National and International 
 Contexts: Maintaining Ongoing Collaboration
Tanja Woeltjes
 Introduction
Policy is often seen as a form of ‘problem solving’: the government (and thus 
the policy advisor) faces a social problem for which solutions are needed. In 
everyday practice, however, policy workers face a more complicated world, 
and it is the nature of this more complicated practice that will be discussed 
in this chapter. It will address policy-making in international and European 
contexts, and focus on two specific policy issues: the transport of dangerous 
goods, and measures taken in anticipation of natural and man-made disasters, 
known as ’civil protection.’ Both of these policy issues are of an international 
nature, and highlight the significance of context for policy work.
 Transport of dangerous goods
The safety regarding the transport of dangerous goods is a global problem, 
which can not be dealt with by individual nations. Transport usually does not 
stop at a nation’s borders, which means that national regulations only apply to 
those transporting goods within the borders of that one nation. Policy work 
regarding the transport of dangerous goods therefore involves regulations 
across national borders, in fact, it concerns safety addressed at an interna-
tional level, which means that national policy workers will become increas-
ingly engaged in various international negotiating structures.
 In the case of the transport of dangerous goods, the national policy ad-
visor will attend meetings at the United Nations, the leading international 
organization in this policy field. The United Nations has a well-established 
system for framing international safety standards; general recommendations 
are made by expert groups, and these recommendations are then adopted by 
the rule-making bodies for specific modes of transport. The UN Sub-Com-
mittee of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods (UN SCETDG) 
meets semi-annually. Here recommendations are discussed for every type of 
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transport, be it by rail, road, air or sea. Although these recommendations have 
no formal status, they frame the rules for consideration and are the starting 
point for the discussions in the formal rule-making bodies for the different 
modes of transport. There is, for example, a formal meeting of the dangerous 
goods subcommittee of the International Maritime Organization (DSC sub-
committee of the IMO) on the transport of dangerous goods via containers 
on ships, and there are similar meetings for other modes of transport. The 
recommendations of the UN SCETDG are discussed in these meetings and 
are usually immediately translated into formal rules.
 Civil Protection
Civil protection, or the provision of assistance after a natural or man-made 
disaster occurs, provides another example of international policy making. Al-
though national governments are primarily responsible for the safety of their 
own citizens, when a crisis overshadows the capacity of a member state to 
respond, other EU member states will provide assistance, and structures are 
in place to facilitate this assistance.
 In order for EU member states to offer assistance through the EU, some 
basic structures and rules are necessary, and policy work is needed to develop 
and maintain these structures. This is done through the negotiating struc-
ture of the EU. Proposals for the civil protection structure must come from 
the European Commission, be discussed and decided upon in the Council of 
Ministers, and then implemented by the Commission. The policy views of 
member states may be raised in the Council of Ministers, but before the Com-
mission proposal reaches the Council of Ministers, a lot of preparatory work 
is done by the policy advisors of the various member states in the meetings of 
the Council Working Group on Civil Protection, which is ‘the proper gateway’ 
to the Council of Ministers.
  e institutional framework of policy work
The work of a policy advisor can either be reactive or pro-active, depending 
on the issue, and in particular, on the international institutional structure. 
Policy work on the transport of dangerous goods in the United Nations is 
an example of a pro-active policy area. Countries participating in the expert 
group are free to make national proposals or joint proposals with other par-
ticipating countries. The proposals may take the form of official documents, 
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or participating countries may decide to present informal papers in which 
they react to the formal papers of other participants. Official papers and 
especially the joint papers of different countries have more impact in the 
international negotiations than the informal papers that are received at a 
later stage.
 For the civil protection policy area, however, the ability to maneuver is dif-
ferent because of the constitutional structure of the European Community, 
which provides for very different decision-making procedures in relation to 
various sorts of policy issues, and policy workers in the European environ-
ment have to be aware of the category and the decision-making procedures 
that apply in each case. The structure is complex and proposals for change are 
ongoing, with the Treaty of Lisbon having been signed in 2007 but not yet 
fully ratified. The EU’s three pillars that form its basic structure are the:
1. First or Community pillar, which covers the original concern to develop a 
common market. Only the Commission can submit proposals regarding 
these matters. These go to the Council of Ministers and the European 
Parliament, and a qualified majority is sufficient for a Council act to be 
adopted.
2. Second pillar, which is devoted to the common foreign and security poli-
cy, which comes under Title V of the EU Treaty.
3. Th ird pillar, which is devoted to police and judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters. It falls under Title VI of the EU Treaty. In matters covered by the 
second and third pillars, both the Commission and the Member States can 
submit proposals, and unanimity in the Council is generally necessary.1
In practice, this means that for first pillar matters, the work of a policy advi-
sor is mostly concerned with seeking or preparing instructions on how to 
participate in the international meetings, and whether or not to intervene on 
a subject. Since the right of initiative on these matters lies with the Commis-
sion, the activity of a national policy worker in this area is much more reactive, 
and it is less common for policy workers to be involved in the preparations of 
national seminars in order to bring a new subject to the attention of the EU. 
But, in the second and third pillar environments, more time is spent on the 
preparation of proposals and so the work is more pro-active.
 A complicating factor is that some policy areas do not entirely fit under one 
pillar. For instance, with civil protection, which is seen as a first pillar issue, 
the Commission has the right of initiative, but the final decision is made in 
the Council of Ministers (the Justice and Home Affairs Council, JHA Coun-
cil) in which decisions must be unanimous, as is the case with third pillar 
policy matters, so the policy advisor must navigate carefully amongst the re-
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quirements of the first and third pillar worlds. In practice, this means that the 
policy advisor does the preparatory work for the national views, which may 
be expressed in the Council of Ministers, through the preparatory work in 
the Council Working Group on Civil Protection, where the proposals of the 
Commission are discussed and may be changed, but the policy work largely 
reacts to the Commission’s original proposal.
 The possibility of putting a national theme on the EU agenda is limited. 
The best option for a policy worker is for the member state to organize a 
seminar or conference on a theme it wishes to raise. For instance, in 2007, the 
Dutch Ministry of the Interior organized a conference on civil-military coop-
eration, in conjunction with the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense. 
The aim was to improve cooperation between military and civil agencies, and 
to bring the subject to the attention of the international community. This was 
achieved by bringing the relevant NATO and EU stakeholders together. In 
meetings like the Directors-General Conference on Civil Protection, policy 
workers from a member state may give a presentation on a new topic and this 
may arouse the interest of the Commission, which may subsequently make a 
new Commission proposal.
  e impact of the international environment on policy work
Policy work in an international context requires constant adjustments between 
national preparations and international structures. A policy advisor working 
on the transport of dangerous goods spends some time preparing for meet-
ings (programmed and ad hoc) with the transport sector, with other minis-
tries, or the Transport Inspectorate. Th ese are the national meetings in which 
problems are framed. Some meetings are informal in nature and characterized 
by ‘brainstorming,’ other meetings are more formal, such as the ‘national pre-
meetings’ at which the civil servants of the policy department of the Ministry, 
civil servants of the Inspectorate and representatives of trade and industry 
come together to discuss the upcoming international meetings – what is to be 
discussed, and what position the national representatives should take.
 Problem fi nding
While problem-solving policy is common, in practice, policy workers are just 
as concerned about problem finding – identifying the issues that warrant at-
tention. Problems ‘pop up’ without any formal selection process even in rela-
tively formal meetings. Some problems become real policy items and some 
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problems just disappear; it depends on the conditions: whether the problem 
has been mentioned before in another setting, the standing of the speaker or 
party who brings the problem to the table, the consequences if the problem is 
not resolved in a short period of time, and just sheer gut feelings. Sometimes 
a problem is not identified in national meetings but is presented by foreign 
colleagues, the media, the public, scientific research or major incidents. For 
instance, the explosion of a fireworks warehouse in the Dutch city of En-
schede, which killed 20 people, led to lengthy discussions on the transport 
of fireworks. Again, without a formal selection process, the policy advisor 
seemed to present the problems, which appeared to be serious and fitted the 
policy area for which he or she was responsible.
 The policy work is not simply to identify the problem, but to clarify the 
nature of the concern, where it may be a matter of ‘sense-making,’ which can 
link different participants together. For instance, the regulation of the trans-
port of infectious substances was defined in 1995 on the basis of risk groups, 
which were developed by the World Health Organization. Soon after the 
introduction of these regulations, problems arose, which reflected the fact 
that the groups at risk were based on laboratory conditions, which are differ-
ent from the circumstances in which these substances are transported, and 
people working in the transport sector who were not familiar with infectious 
substances, did not quite understand the meaning of the risk groups and the 
correct way to apply them. This obviously posed problems in the interna-
tional transport sector, and to achieve greater compliance, the regulations 
were simplified, so that there were just two categories: A (very infectious) and 
B (less infectious). In 2002, the Transport Inspectorate in the Netherlands 
visited several organizations to inspect their compliance with the transport 
regulations on infectious substances. The Inspection process uncovered prob-
lems with both category A and B systems. For instance, diagnostic specimens 
(samples of blood and tissue for routine testing of cholesterol and diabetes, 
for example) were not clearly excluded from the regulations. Moreover, some 
of the organizations that were inspected complained to the National Health 
Inspectorate about the regulations and the Health Inspectorate contacted the 
Transport Inspectorate and the Ministry of Transport to request changes in 
the regulations. The policy advisors at the Ministry then hosted several meet-
ings with the Health Inspectorate, the Transport Inspectorate, and national 
and international colleagues to evaluate the complaints and explore alterna-
tives, which led to an agreement among the involved parties. In the end, the 
conclusion was that the issue was important enough to present to the United 
Nations. In all of these cases, policy work focused on identifying the problems 
that deserved attention and the appropriate venues for pursuing the process.
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 Negotiation and preparation of proposals
Much of an international policy worker’s time is spent negotiating – the 
‘meetings and papers’ that Noordegraaf (2000) identified. Sometimes the ne-
gotiating is initiated by the Netherlands, but more often the Netherlands is 
responding to the negotiations initiated by other countries.
 When the Netherlands takes the initiative, the negotiations start with the 
identification of the problem in the national meetings and an agreement that 
the regulations need to be amended. A proposal will usually be presented at 
an international meeting, to be drafted (and redrafted) by the policy advi-
sor in consultation with the relevant stakeholders. The relevant stakeholders 
concerning the transport of dangerous goods are primarily dangerous goods 
experts, the inspectorate and trade and industry representatives, and they at-
tend the official national meeting to finalize the Dutch position before the 
international meeting is called. Issues of public concern like a policy on fire-
works as a consequence of the Enschede tragedy, consume even more time, 
because the relevant civil servants, the minister and the national parliament 
all require a lot of information.
 The initial opinion regarding the transport of infectious substances was 
that the regulations were too strict and this led to a series of lengthy negotia-
tions. Numerous proposals were made and discarded before the first draft for 
the United Nations appeared on the table. The policy advisors had to care-
fully navigate their way through the various interests of the relevant stake-
holders. Health care organizations wanted as little regulation as possible. 
The transport sector was resistant to change, but above all wanted results 
that would ensure the safety of its employees, while the packaging industry 
saw the commercial advantage of having some form of regulation on pack-
aging. The international community, as represented by the United Nations 
 SCETDG, were reluctant to change regulations that had only just recently 
been adopted. Therefore, the policy advisors contacted Canada (an impor-
tant player in the adoption of these new regulations) to help persuade the 
international community to make changes in the regulations. Good working 
relations with other international partners such as the World Health Organi-
zation were also important.
 After thorough national and international preparations, the first propo-
sals were discussed in the UN SCETDG, but when they were first present-
ed, the proposals did not pass and, despite their redrafting in ad hoc work-
ing groups and lunch breaks, had to be resubmitted at the next SCETDG 
meeting six months later. During the period between these two meetings, 
the negotiations on the proposals continued and the regulations were ul-
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timately changed. Routine diagnostic specimens were excluded from the 
regulations; but to accommodate the concerns of the transport sector on 
health risks, a strong recommendation insisting on leak proof packaging 
was included.
 Negotiations in the policy field of civil protection are slightly different. 
Because the work in the Council Working Group on Civil Protection is more 
reactive than those at the international transport meetings, no national pro-
posals are drafted here. Instead, national instructions on the current state of 
an issue in the Council Working Group are prepared in which the various 
national points of view are recorded as well as possible interventions during 
the negotiations. Most of the time is thus spent on negotiating with the other 
ministries to prepare the strategy and instructions for the Council Working 
Group, as well as reports and letters on the subject submitted to national 
parliaments. The policy advisor on civil protection will draft an initial in-
struction or paper that he or she will send to the partners in the other min-
istries. To draft a good instruction paper the policy advisor assembles the 
relevant facts and figures and comes up with an effective line of argumenta-
tion. The partners from the other ministries usually respond to the initial 
paper and add arguments or proposals to amend the instructions. Sometimes, 
a short telephone call will resolve the issue, but sometimes lengthy meetings 
are necessary to resolve certain details of an issue. For instance, drafting the 
instructions for the Civil Protection Financial Instrument required thorough 
consultation sessions, especially with the ministries of Foreign Affairs and 
Finance. When a disaster occurs, member states may offer equipment to help 
the stricken country cope with the situation. In the Commission’s proposal, 
the transport of this equipment would be financed by the EU. The Nether-
lands (as well as some other member states) objected to, first because it would 
run against the principle of subsidiarity (each member state is responsible for 
its own civil protection), secondly because the budgetary implications were 
unclear, and thirdly (and most important) because experience suggested that 
‘free transport’ distorted the provision of aid, with unnecessary assets being 
shipped to the stricken country.
 In these circumstances, it was crucial for the policy advisor to have access to 
important international partners, and to be absolutely certain that the various 
ministers supported the policy advisor’s actions in Brussels. During the dis-
cussion the advisor wrote several documents to high officials at the Ministry 
of the Interior as well as the minister himself to make sure that the objections 
were fully supported. Meanwhile numerous meetings with the ministries of 
Finance and Foreign Affairs were necessary to ensure that they supported 
the initiative. The Netherlands had to petition its allies, i.e., Germany, the 
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United Kingdom, Sweden and Estonia for their support. Several meetings 
during the breaks of the Council Working Group and a high level meeting in 
Bonn were used to develop strategies for the upcoming negotiations. At that 
point, the Netherlands and some of its allies were considering a variety of 
scenarios, solutions and negotiating strategies. The Council Working Group 
remained divided about the EC’s financing of transport, which meant that the 
issue had to be addressed during a meeting of the ambassadors and eventually 
the Council of Ministers. The ambassador and minister’s involvement in the 
meetings were prepared by the policy advisor. The bloc of five member states 
was eventually divided by an ingenious maneuver by the Finnish Minister, 
which meant that the Netherlands ended up having to agree to a compromise 
of the EC financing 50 of transport costs.
 Domestic diplomacy
There are also policy tasks that involve the national government within its 
own borders. The policy advisor was called upon to offer advice on the broad 
international context of this policy area. The policy process relies on good 
communications between stakeholders, other ministries, and within the pol-
icy worker’s own ministry. For instance, the directorate for civil protection 
requested that the International Cooperation division produce a short over-
view of the civil protection structures in various other countries. If the policy 
worker used his or her international experience and contacts, the task could 
be executed in a reasonable amount of time.
 The policy advisors responsible for the transport of dangerous goods at the 
Ministry of Transport, were able to participate in the formal meeting preced-
ing an international meeting on insurance against damage to cargo because of 
their experience of the meetings on dangerous goods on ships. Actual partici-
pation in this international meeting was, however, reserved fora policy advisor 
from another department at the Ministry of Transport.
 Policy workers may also be called upon to use their networks to facilitate 
projects. The Ministry of the Interior, for example, wanted to contact Euro-
pean training facilities to find out whether it would be wise to develop a big 
training facility in the Netherlands to train relief workers to handle crisis 
situations, or whether it would be more efficient to use existing national and 
European training facilities. Meetings with representatives of the foreign ex-
ercise facilities were held with the assistance of the Civil Protection Council 
Working Group. Considering national developments at that time, it was con-
cluded that there were already enough appropriate private initiatives to meet 
the facility needs.
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 A great deal of time was spent maintaining contacts concerning the policy 
area, which meant producing presentations for visiting foreign guests, re-
sponding to e-mails, offering advice to the relevant stakeholders and writing 
articles on new rules in relevant trade journals. Moreover, advice on relevant 
international workshops and seminars was offered and whether or not it was 
relevant for the domestic policy advisor to attend a particular workshop or 
seminar. Policy work also involves supporting the minister in responding to 
parliamentary questions and sending updates to the Council of Ministers or 
Parliament on the international policy theme. Policy work also involves en-
suring that United Nations rules and European directives are implemented 
into national law. Because of the facilitating character of these tasks, most of 
the policy worker’s tasks are ‘reactive.’
 Th ere is little room for genuine ‘new’ national policy during the implemen-
tation of European directives. An example is the implemention of Directive 
2001/96/EC on the safe loading and unloading of solid bulk carriers into na-
tional law.2 Th e European Commission issued a directive on the safe loading 
and unloading of solid bulk carriers because there had been numerous accidents 
in the past. When a bulk carrier is loaded or unloaded too quickly, the (un)
loading process may structurally weaken the ship; this may not be noticed in 
the harbor, but later, in heavy open seas, the ship may actually crack and ulti-
mately sink. Th e European directive followed the Bulk Loading and Unloading 
Code (BLU-Code) of the International Maritime Organization, which was not 
mandatory. At the time of implementation, the directive applied to only one 
ship sailing under the Dutch ﬂ ag, but it had to be implemented as written; not 
implementing the directive, or implementing it in such a way that it would apply 
to more ships under Dutch ﬂ ag, was not allowed. Most of the implementation 
process was spent writing the explanatory memorandum. Because the directive 
was so speciﬁ c about how a ship’s captain and the terminal representative must 
exchange information, as well as the speciﬁ c characteristics of the bulk carriers 
to which the directive would apply, a clear and thorough explanatory memo-
randum was necessary. Th e accurate drafting of this law and memorandum re-
quired several meetings with the industry and Transport Inspectorate.
 Conclusion
This chapter has shown that the international policy environment has created 
the need for negotiations and collaborative relationships; how applicable this 
is in domestic policy processes is something for researchers to judge (also see 
Noordegraaf 2000) and may depend on the policy area.
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 From conventional policy accounts, one would think that a policy advisor 
was particularly concerned with strategy or vision, but most policy advisors are 
rarely concerned with long-term strategy. In everyday practice, policy advisors 
who work for the government are mostly concerned with the development and 
maintenance of a capacity for collective action in a complicated ‘policy world.’ 
Policy work is concerned with negotiating, developing strong working rela-
tions and facilitating work that is done in other parts of the ministry. Most of 
the time is consumed with daily business like informing the involved parties, 
preparing instructions for meetings and then negotiating them.
 There is no one single problem that needs to be solved. A variety of issues 
are always being considered at any one time. The illustrations in this chapter 
showed that policy making in practice is not simply about finding solutions 
for policy problems, but also deals with problem finding – generating a shared 
recognition of a need for collective action. Time for actual strategic thinking 
is rare. Policy work has much more to do with communications and nego-
tiations with relevant partners, via the domestic or international negotiating 
structures, or the less complicated answering of emails and giving presenta-
tions on a specific policy topic.
 The international context for a large part determines the room that a policy 
advisor has to maneuver in. The illustrations in this chapter have shown that 
the policy work regarding civil protection legislation is more ‘reactive’ because 
of the pillar structure in the EU: the Commission has the right of initiative. In 
the policy area of the transport of dangerous goods, national proposals are ac-
cepted. This policy area may thus be characterized as more ‘pro-active.’ How-
ever, the example of the deregulation of the transport of infectious substances 
showed that the policy problem was introduced by an external organization, 
in this case, the Health Inspectorate, and the solution had to be found in con-
junction with the national and international stakeholders. In other words, the 
policy advisor’s tasks in the Ministry of Transport were not that pro-active 
because the policy advisor was responding and ‘reacting’ to the policy prob-
lem that had been introduced by another institution. But what topics become 
policy issues, and who takes responsibility for them, is not completely deter-
mined by the institutional structure, but reflects the continuing interaction 
among the participants, in which policy workers tacitly accept responsibility 
for matters that are clearly within their policy area and seem serious enough.
 This chapter shows that it is essential for a policy advisor to have good 
working relations with other policy workers. At the national level, there is a 
need for good relations with fellow policy advisors within the ministry and 
in other ministries, as well as groups outside government, not only for the 
support they may need in international negotiations, but also to strengthen 
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the capacity for collective action. At the international level, these links are 
of vital importance, particularly the relations with the international policy 
advisors and the policy advisors of the other relevant national ministries. In 
official European meetings, the national point of view is presented, instead of 
the view of a particular minister or ministry. When international negotiations 
become difficult, it is essential to have good working relations with fellow in-
ternational policy advisors as well as high officials within the ministry and in 
partner countries.
 To paraphrase Marx, policy workers make policy, but not as free agents. 
They are not completely free to identify the policy problems that need to be 
solved or to choose the arena in which the solutions are found. Policy work-
ers are engaged in predefined structures, in which policy problems can be put 
on the table by external pressure or network relations, and the negotiating 
structures and working relations basically define the solutions and the correct 
endorsement of negotiated outcomes.
 Notes
 Europa glossary, http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/eu_pillars_en.htm, consulted 
January .
 Europa Treaty of Lisbon website, http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/glance/index_
en.htm, consulted January .
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9 Flying Blind in Brussels: How National Oﬃ  cials 
 Do European Business Without Political Steering
Karin Geuijen and Paul ’t Hart
 Flying blind: A policy bureaucrat’s predicament
Most democratic governments have a well-established norm concerning ‘poli-
tics’ and ‘bureaucracy’ in the executive branch: ministers set goals and assign 
priorities whereas civil servants advise them and strive to implement minis-
terial and cabinet decisions. Decades of research into the relations between 
politics and administration in numerous countries have shown that this norm 
is alive and well, but, at the same time, it does not accurately describe practice 
at either the national or local government levels (Savoie 2003; Peters 2001; 
’t Hart and Wille 2006). Politicians cannot keep track of, let alone explic-
itly direct, everything their vast, complex, highly specialized bureaucracies 
are involved in. Hence many officials, even those working in governmental 
departments that are relatively close to the political executives, spend a lot 
of time and energy anticipating, second-guessing or actively seeking ‘a steer’ 
from their superiors, who, in turn, will seek to obtain ministerial guidance 
(Page and Jenkins 2005). The further away from the political centre civil ser-
vants operate, the more fictitious the idea becomes that their work is dictated 
by explicit political decisions or directions.
 Many civil servants in service delivery agencies, particularly ‘street-level 
bureaucrats’ have learned to cope with this, to the extent that they would re-
gard political ‘micromanagement’ of their day-to-day work processes as highly 
undesirable interference in their professional domain (Maynard-Moody and 
Musheno 2003). But, for departmental civil servants, acting without a clear 
sense of political direction amounts to ‘flying blind.’ What should they be en-
gaged in when politicians don’t know, don’t care, or don’t lead? What coping 
mechanisms have they developed for dealing with this normatively anomalous 
situation? And what does this mean for the shaping of public policy and for 
the nature of the politics-administration nexus within the executive branch?
 These are the questions that inspired this chapter. To explore it empiri-
cally, we have chosen what we regard as a clear-cut case of civil servants work-
ing in a ‘political leadership vacuum’: the policy work engaged in by national 
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officials who participate in processes of international governance in ‘low poli-
tics,’ ‘technocratic’ areas. We shall present an in-depth study of Dutch officials 
who are involved in cooperative European policing efforts. Below, we briefly 
introduce the case, its relevance for our present purposes, and the research 
methods used to study it. Then we go on to examine how European police 
cooperation takes shape. We do so first by offering a ‘thick description’ of how 
a particular aspect of police cooperation, namely the management and protec-
tion of sensitive data on national citizens and entities is processed. The case 
vignette illustrates how difficult it is to fashion, articulate, let alone defend, 
a coherent ‘national position’ on it. We then go on to let Dutch officials who 
‘do’ European police cooperation speak about their experiences, focusing in 
particular on how they experience and cope with handling an issue area where 
clear, politically sanctioned policy compasses are lacking. We conclude by dis-
cussing the implications of ‘professional bricolage’ replacing ‘political respon-
siveness’ as the main principle of civil service practices in this kind of setting.
 Eurocrats in transnational networks: Serving who or what?
Politics and bureaucracy have shifted to new locations. The well-known and 
mostly well-entrenched national arena is no longer the only one in which 
ministers and departmental civil servants work. As Slaughter (2004) has ob-
served, international cooperation has intensified and international regimes 
have proliferated in recent decades, both in number and in scope and depth. 
As a result, transnational networks of civil servants have come into being who 
breathe life into these international regimes and the bodies that epitomize 
them.
 The civil servants who populate these networks have to juggle multiple 
identities and roles. On the one hand, they are policy experts, specialized in 
certain, often rather technical, areas, exchanging information, cooperating on 
enforcing regulation, and jointly constructing laws, regulations and practices 
that they as experts all believe will work. On the other hand, these civil ser-
vants are not free-floating intelligensia. They participate in these networks 
with a mandate from their national ministries or agencies to represent the 
national government.
 One of the new sites where these transnational networks emerge is within 
the European Union. Although agreement among experts about figures turns 
out to be surprisingly difficult to obtain, there is little question that in re-
cent decades a significant portion of hitherto national regulation and policy 
development is now being produced in European arenas. These European-
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ized policy-making processes involve an intricate and often complex interplay 
between actors and institutions at the (sub)national and EU level. Europe-
anized policy arenas have developed distinctive rules, norms and practices 
that govern this interplay (Richardson 2006). Knowing how to exploit these 
distinct features is a crucial condition for any actor – be it a national ministry, 
a trans-national pressure group or a multinational firm – seeking to wield 
influence over European policy-making processes (Van Schendelen 2003).
 A sophisticated policy management capacity at the European level is 
something that all member states seek to achieve. They know that in order to 
safeguard their national interests, they need their representatives to under-
stand and manipulate the peculiar agenda-setting mechanisms, institutional 
rhythms, opportunity structures and veto points of European policy making. 
It is what ministers whose portfolios are in highly Europeanized policy do-
mains expect their civil servants to deliver. These expectations are not always 
met: studies in various countries show that knowledge, institutional capacity 
and effective coordination at the national level are often patchy and variable 
(Hanf and Soetendorp 1998; Kassim et al. 2000; Laegreid et al. 2004; Geuijen 
et al. 2008).
 Building up this type of coherent policy management capacity is difficult, 
partly because the European project as such places pressures on one of its 
chief agents: the civil services of the member states. When operating in EU 
arenas, national civil servants are not acting solely as national representatives; 
they are also encouraged to engage as technical experts. Eurocrats, defined 
here as national civil servants for whom dealing with and acting in EU bod-
ies is their main task, have to juggle two (or sometimes three) identities: as 
‘servants of the (national) crown,’ as ‘members of professional fraternities that 
transcend national boundaries and interests,’ and every now and then as ‘su-
pranationals’ or ‘Europeans.’
 How much of each role guides their beliefs and actions depends on the 
kinds of settings in which they operate. There is, for example, a world of 
difference between national civil servants participating in expert Commis-
sion committees dealing with the implementation of EU regulations and 
those who attend Council working parties; the former fosters a ‘postnational’ 
identity as a member of a profession whereas the latter’s position and proce-
dures conduces toward a role conception as national representative (Beyers 
and Trondal 2004; LaRue 2006; Thedvall 2006; Trondal 2002). From Beyers 
(2005). However, we also know that Belgian civil servants who participated in 
Council working parties and who felt that they had received unclear instruc-
tions, experienced poor domestic coordination and policy preparation, and 
had a relatively strongly developed supranational role conception.
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 So, Eurocrats qua national bureaucrats are supposed to take their cues 
from the political-administrative hierarchy, which employs them; Eurocrats 
qua experts are driven to cooperate with colleagues to solve common or trans-
boundary problems and thus foster a ‘European project’ in their professional 
realm. Given these conflicting imperatives, it becomes essential for their po-
litical (and hierarchical) superiors to provide direction and constrain inclina-
tions to ‘go native’ in Brussels. Yet, for a variety of reasons ministers (and their 
political staffers) often fail to do so. When this happens, whom do Eurocrats 
take their cues from? We answer this question by looking at a particular case: 
Dutch Eurocrats working in the field of European police cooperation.1 It is 
part of a larger study in which we wanted to find out which civil servants in 
the Netherlands were involved in European policy processes, how they ap-
proached their European tasks, what they actually did, and how their be-
liefs and practices were shaped by the organizations in which they worked 
 (Geuijen et al. 2008).
 We examined these issues using five different, complementary methods of 
data collection. We studied the relevant reports, documents and academic lit-
erature. We incorporated several questions into a large survey on job charac-
teristics, satisfaction and public sector motivation administered by the Dutch 
Ministry of the Interior (the so-called POMO survey). The survey was con-
ducted in the first months of 2006 and was completed by 4502 civil servants 
working in central government organizations. It gave us a unique, quantitative 
assessment of the number and type of civil servants involved in EU decision 
making, as well as their judgment of the organizational aspects of their tasks. 
Thirdly, we conducted structured, thematic interviews on police cooperation 
with 21 middle-ranking and top officials from the relevant ministries, execu-
tive agencies and the Dutch Permanent Representation in Brussels. We asked 
them about their experiences in ‘doing’ European policymaking (and, to a less-
er extent, policy implementation) in The Hague, in Brussels, and anywhere 
else that their jobs took them. Fourthly, we engaged in observation of the 
Europe-related work routines of officials in different parts of the Dutch po-
lice, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Justice. Finally, we conducted 
five expert meetings with middle-ranking and top-level officials throughout 
the Dutch government, in order to check on the broader salience of these 
initial findings, and further deepen our insights on what it means to be, and 
organize, national ‘Eurocrats.’ A total of 27 officials participated in these ses-
sions, which lasted 2.5 hours each. They were taped and transcribed.
 Before turning to the case study, it may be helpful to first get some more in-
formation about the organizational setting they work in and on the mandate 
Dutch civil servants receive when going to Brussels. Depending on how much 
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time their officials spend on average on EU-related activities, we classified the 
ministries into three categories: Eurocratic bulwarks, Eurocratic runners-up, 
and national champions (or Eurocratic laggards). Eurocratic bulwarks (e.g., 
the Ministries of Agriculture, and Economic Affairs) have more than 50 Eu-
ropeanized civil servants, Eurocratic runners-up (e.g., the Ministries of Social 
Affairs, and of Finance) have between 30 and 40 Europeanized civil ser-
vants, and Eurocratic laggards have well below 30. The Ministry of Justice 
is a Eurocratic laggard with no more than 17 of its civil servants involved in 
EU-related work, spending about one hour a week on this task (median time). 
European police cooperation is one of the EU-related tasks that officials are 
responsible for at the Ministry of Justice. This task is taken up by a small 
number of specialized civil servants. Large parts of police work and criminal 
policy are (or seem) firmly domestic in scope.
Table 1 Response by civil servants working in ministries with diﬀ erent levels of 
Europeanization to the statement ‘When I participate in EU-level meetings, I 
receive a clear negotiation mandate.’
Degree of 
Europeanization
Disagree Neutral Agree N
Mandate Low %3% '/% '3% >1
Moderate %/% 2%% %$% %'0
High %%% '3% >%% $13
Source: Geuijen, ’t Hart, Princen and Yesilkagit (%--/: >1)
We asked civil servants in our survey to what extent they would agree with 
the following statement: ‘When I participate in EU-level meetings, I receive a 
clear negotiation mandate.’ As the table above shows, it turned out that there 
were some differences in how mandates were handled between ministries 
with a high, moderate or low level of Europeanization. Only a bit more than 
one third of these civil servants who participate in EU-related tasks say their 
mandate is clear, and about a quarter thinks it is not clear at all. The rest do 
not agree or disagree. The really interesting question is how civil servants who 
do not have a clear mandate handle this situation when they are in Brussels. 
To put it bluntly: How do they know what to do and say?
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 Governing without politicians: Inside a Eurocratic outpost
I am here to represent the Netherlands, and my colleagues back home 
sometimes have diﬃ  culties in appreciating that. Th ey do the individual 
ministries’ bidding. Th eir arena is about pulling and hauling between 
ministries. Here the arena is about pulling and hauling between countries 
(An oﬃ  cial at the Dutch Permanent Representation to the EU).
Since the expansion of the EU to 25 (and now 27) member states, coopera-
tion in the sensitive field of justice and home affairs is hampered by concerns 
about sovereignty and lack of trust among member states. Some years ago, 
the Dutch Minister of Justice, Piet-Hein Donner, launched a rather bold plan 
to develop European cooperation towards a common European legal space. 
This plan received little support amongst the member states of the European 
Union, and nothing similar has replaced it, so there is no European vision for 
increasingly ‘post-national’ legal cooperation. Nor is there a Dutch one, with 
the responsibility for policing historically split between two ministries, which 
have at best maintained a ‘complicated’ relationship because of it. National 
politicians – Dutch or otherwise – perhaps conscious of the strong public 
sentiments attached to policing which make it a political ‘hot potato,’ and op-
erating in the open, young, not yet highly institutionalized field of Justice and 
Home Affairs, are evidently either unwilling or unable to produce a coherent 
post-national policy on police cooperation. Let us see how civil servants in 
this field cope with this fact.
 The case of data availability
Data availability is one of many topics on the agenda of European Justice 
and Home Affairs institutions. The transnational sharing of information on 
anything – people, communication data, (stolen) vehicles, arms, explosives, 
poison, money – that might lead to a threat to safety and security in member 
states is widely considered vital to all EU governments. But plans to facilitate 
this information sharing have aroused serious privacy concerns, fears about a 
loss of sovereignty in this key domain of state activity, as well as charges that 
these measures may undermine the rule of law. Different national viewpoints 
on data sharing have surfaced repeatedly in the preparations for the European 
Council of JHA Ministers, and, as such, this case provides us with a poignant 
view on how Dutch Eurocrats deal with such a topic. Below we report on our 
observations and interviews in a low-level, working party and a high-level 
committee where this issue was processed.
177Flying Blind in Brussels
 A low-level committee:  e Working Party on Police Cooperation
On 25 January 2006, a meeting was held at the Dutch Ministry of the Interior 
in The Hague. Its purpose was to prepare the Dutch position on a proposal 
from the Austrian Presidency for a European Council decision on improving 
police cooperation between member states of the European Union. A major 
part of the proposal concerned procedures for improving transnational infor-
mation sharing among police forces. The leader of the Dutch delegation was 
supposed to present the Dutch position on the proposal the day after, during 
a meeting of the Police Cooperation Working Party, one of the countless com-
mittees that prepare and help implement European policies and programs. 
The delegation leader, who was a senior official from the Interior Ministry, 
chaired the discussion. Four of his counterparts at the Ministry of Justice 
(the Ministries of Interior and Justice share responsibility for Dutch policing 
policy) also attended the meeting. There were also two representatives from 
the Dutch National Police, both of whom were veterans who had seen their 
last active duty years ago.
 These were the people effectively making Dutch policy on European police 
cooperation: a small group of specialized civil servants. They worked within a 
ministry and within the National Police Force, neither of which, for the most 
part, were particularly interested in this topic. But the EU Working Party 
on Police Cooperation exists and every member state has to be present at 
its meetings and present the national position on the items to be discussed. 
At the preparatory meeting, the Dutch Eurocrats constructed the national 
position. But they had to do so without having a clear political position, and 
without a clear political lead, because top civil servants are not inclined to 
construct a position either. As one mid-level civil servant, the head of this 
unit, told us: ‘We stick to the last known political position on the issue. Some-
times we are against a proposal because we have always been against it even if 
no one knows exactly why.’
 During the preparatory meeting, the participants discussed an Austrian 
proposal. There was much talk about what seemed to be technical aspects: 
could the Dutch police departments meet the requirements envisaged in the 
proposal, would they have to adjust their information systems, and could 
one expect other countries’ police forces to do likewise? From this it became 
clear that for them a major goal of bargaining was that national systems did 
not need to be adjusted. The relevant treaties, which might bear upon the 
measures proposed, were presented. No mention was made of ministerial or 
parliamentary decisions or opinions on the subject. There was no real de-
bate about anything on the agenda: the participants seemed to agree, and the 
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‘Dutch position’ simply emerged from that consensus. It involved ‘wheeling 
and dealing’ and the coordination – in fact, the piling up – of interests. The 
result seems to be a fuzzy position. One of the policemen present did not 
seem to be fully aware of the procedural ‘nitty-gritty’ of European policymak-
ing, asking about the role that the European Parliament plays in all of this. 
With thinly veiled disdain, one of the civil servants at the Justice Department 
suggested he attend ‘a course on European matters’ that would be taught soon.
 The next day, the meeting of the Police Cooperation Working Party took 
place in Brussels. A full-day affair, it was set in the same enormous conference 
room where the Justice and Home Affairs ( JHA) Council of Ministers meets, 
the eventual ‘end station’ for all these preparatory meetings. All of the partici-
pants were allowed to speak in their native language as interpreters translated 
to and from all of the official languages of the member states, and everyone 
wore headphones throughout the meeting. Cameras were an essential part of 
the interaction process because everyone had a screen on their desk on which 
the speaker appeared in close up, for everyone to read his/her facial expres-
sions. There were also several enormous screens hanging from the ceiling on 
which the same images appeared. The Dutch delegation consisted of three 
members. There was the delegation leader, sitting at the conference table, 
with an official from the Dutch Permanent Representation to the EU sitting 
next to him, and the third member sitting behind them.
 Th e most striking part of the meeting ritual was that participants were re-
ferred to not by their own name, but by the names of their countries. Th e 
delegations were seated at a huge oval table, behind shield with the countries’ 
names. A participant who wished to make a statement had to put his shield 
on its side. Th e chairperson would then grant him permission to speak, saying 
things like ‘Th e Netherlands, the ﬂ oor is yours,’ and would close the interjection 
with words like ‘Th ank you, the Netherlands.’ Th ere was little contact between 
members of the various delegations. Everybody was polite but controlled, and 
stuck strictly to the accepted format. Th ere were few informal greetings or ca-
sual asides. Th e Dutch delegation leader did leave his lunch before the others 
to meet with the Irish delegation on a project the Irish proposed, which partly 
overlapped with a Dutch proposal that was also up for discussion.
 Previous studies of council working groups portrayed the meeting pro-
cess in comparable terms: they are diplomatic events rather than technocratic 
meetings of experts who share a common professional background and a ‘sense 
of urgency’ to solve operational problems. Our observations and interviews 
strongly suggest that they are still first and foremost about countries talking 
to countries, through their representatives. The multinational perspective is 
reinforced by the meeting’s rituals.
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 During the meeting, the various parts of the proposal on the agenda were 
discussed in depth. It was a long day with arcane technical matters receiv-
ing sustained attention. The key proposal under scrutiny had been discussed 
before in other Council working groups like ENFOPOL, ENFOCUSTOM, 
CRIMORG and COMIX. Remarkably, hardly anyone ever referred to these 
discussions in other forums; it appeared as if the participants had not been 
briefed about them. One of our informants characterized it as an example of 
the so-called third pillar’s2 ‘organized anarchy.’
 The Austrian chairperson meanwhile tried to reach an agreement on as 
many parts of the proposal as possible. She had a few private discussions with 
her assistants and members of the Secretariat of the Council and would then 
propose differently worded parts of the proposal. This meeting was about 
weighing, shaping and bending words until everybody agreed. The goal was 
clearly to get an agreement on as many issues as possible within the so-called 
technical setting of the lower-level working party. At the end of the discussion, 
the chairperson gave a short summary of the suggested changes to the pro-
posal, on which she assumed there was general agreement. She also summed 
up issues for which no consensus-inducing words had been found. The pro-
posal was then forwarded to the Comité de l’Article Trente-Six (CATS), a co-
ordinating committee of senior civil servants. CATS would focus on those 
parts of the proposal on which no consensus had been reached, i.e., what 
were now referred to as the more ‘political’ parts of the proposal as opposed to 
what would be defined as being the more ‘technical’ parts since civil servants 
were able to reach consensus on them (cf. Fouilleux et al. 2005). After CATS 
had discussed, perhaps modified and signed off on it, the resulting proposal 
would be sent further up the European policymaking hierarchy, to the Co-
mité de Représentants Permanents (COREPER), the committee of the mem-
ber states’ ambassadors to the European Union. Once approved there, the 
proposal would finally come up for a political decision in the JHA Council of 
Ministers.
 A high-level committee: CATS
An official from the Ministry of Justice and formerly from the Permanent 
Representation in Brussels who participated in the preparation of the CATS 
committee pointed out that he was acutely aware of the disjointed nature of 
the working group system. He thought the European Commission actually 
exploited the ‘organized anarchy’ in the third pillar by offering its proposals to 
different working groups, hoping that at least one of these channels will serve 
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to lead this proposal up to the Council. However, the leader of the Dutch 
delegation to the CATS committee disagreed. He did not feel the Commis-
sion was playing the system. He thought it would be a great improvement if 
all of the proposals to the Council in the third pillar were made by the Com-
mission. This would at least bring some consistency to this messily disjointed 
terrain. Currently there was none. His chief concern with the current system 
was that ad hoc political pressures led high-level actors in CATS and JHA 
to choose hasty, patchy proposals coming ‘from nowhere.’ According to him, 
‘the culture of the European arena is such that any decision is better than 
no decision at all.’ He deplored the adhocracy this tended to produce, citing 
instances in which some decisions clearly conflicted with prior CATS deci-
sions or decisions made by another forum in the JHA field. He summed it 
up poignantly: ‘In this policy process, lack of decisiveness is less of a problem 
than lack of coordination.’
 The Dutch delegation leader also observed another important form of 
pressure on the CATS committee process. At the end of the day, all of the 
participants in CATS are accountable to their own national bureaucratic con-
stituencies. Hence, he and his counterparts from the other countries vet each 
proposal put before them with one key criterion in mind: is there something 
in it for ‘us’? The bottom line of the CATS meetings is that the participants 
are first and foremost national civil servants, and feel compelled to act as such 
– or face uncomfortable questions from colleagues and superiors back home.
 The CATS delegation members identify themselves first and foremost as 
national civil servants, just like the participants in the Working Party on Po-
lice Cooperation described earlier. They seemed to know each other better 
than their lower-level counterparts did, addressing each other (by way of the 
chairperson) by their first names during the meeting. The Dutch delegation 
leader said that he would prefer acting more like a genuine ‘European,’ siding 
with the common good rather than Dutch national interests as his reference 
point for assessing proposals and taking positions. Unfortunately, he said, 
his colleagues in The Hague, as well as his counterparts in forums such as 
CATS are overwhelmingly locked into their national perspectives. They seem 
primarily intent on preserving their existing national policies, procedures and 
judicial systems. He welcomed the pressure put on his colleagues by the For-
eign Ministry and the Permanent Representation, ‘who regularly argue that 
something has to happen, some improvements have to be made. If it wasn’t for 
that, everybody would simply lie back and wait.’
 The CATS delegation leader considered himself lucky to at least have an 
‘EU-minded’ minister at the time. This gave him a lot of support in urging his 
colleagues to ‘get on with it.’ The Dutch Minister of Justice had made crime 
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fighting his top priority and was very aware of its European dimension. The 
CATS delegation leader pointed out that this provided him with opportuni-
ties. ‘Within the Netherlands, you often act as the representative of an EU 
position: you overact your European allegiance in order to create some room 
to maneuver. You do the reverse in Brussels, by saying: “I cannot possibly take 
this back to my superiors at home.’’’
 Navigating and re-interpreting mandates was part of the job. He was very 
aware that the national position that he was supposed to represent had been 
only constructed by himself and his colleagues, not a cast-in-stone translation 
of clearly expressed ministerial preferences. So, he took it with a grain of salt 
and tweaked it depending on the setting in which he was operating. He made 
on-the-spot decisions about what to say when and to whom, even though he 
in fact did have written instructions that had been discussed in some detail 
and agreed upon in the preparatory meeting before the CATS meeting.
 Getting by without direction: Eurocrats refl ect
There seem to be at least two different reasons for a lack of political steer-
ing towards a future of European cooperation in the field of police activities, 
at least in the Dutch case. The first is that political superiors are simply not 
interested. The other is that political superiors may take an active interest but 
feel they lack the power to make a difference because relevant parties at both 
the national and European level are not interested in pursuing cooperative so-
lutions to joint problems. One civil servant reflected on how the JHA Council 
of Ministers operates: ‘The ministers don’t say: “this is how we’re going to do 
it,” they just cannot come to an agreement. In practice, they send a proposal 
back to the working parties with some vague directions for “technical” revi-
sions. But it just went from these working parties to the Council of ministers 
so that they could make a political decision.’ A member of the Permanent Rep-
resentation conﬁ rms this point of view: ‘Th ere is very little vision regarding 
what direction to take when it comes to police cooperation. Th e general idea 
is to try to avoid inconveniences due to anything new. However, it would be so 
much better to try to beneﬁ t from new initiatives.’ As a result, civil servants are, 
to some extent, left in the dark. In response, they generally choose to stick to 
existing national systems and practices as their point of reference. A colleague 
from the Ministry of Interior hints at why civil servants seem to act the way 
they do: ‘As long as there is no clear political vision about a certain theme, there 
isn’t much vision that is developed among civil servants either.’
 At the national level, relevant Dutch actors are consistently unable to arrive 
at a uniﬁ ed national viewpoint on the European future in police cooperation. 
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A former Dutch CATS delegation leader who subsequently became delegation 
leader for the Management Board of Europol sighed: ‘Now that it is clear that 
there isn’t going to be a positive attitude toward further cooperation at either 
the national level or at the European level, it makes no sense to develop a sub-
stantive vision on the European future on cooperation regarding police and 
judicial aﬀ airs ... Th ere is no national position on this, neither on the formal 
level, nor anything that is internalized by civil servants.’ But with or without 
a coherent political position on the issue, Dutch Eurocrats have to anticipate 
and respond to ongoing moves at the EU-level policy game on police coopera-
tion. Th ey have to attend the meetings that are organized by the presidency, 
with each presidency hoping to achieve some tangible results.
 And so they have to be creative in inferring a position where there really 
is none. For example, a senior Eurocrat at the Ministry of Justice argued that 
there is, in fact, a Dutch national position on European police cooperation, 
only it can’t be found anywhere on paper. It is more of an established mindset, 
which he sums up as follows: ‘It is clear what we do not want: no violation of 
the principle of territoriality [national sovereignty on criminal justice affairs], 
no minimum standards for punishment. But it is not very clear what we do 
want ... We do want a clear division between first and third pillar affairs, 
we want to push back the influence of the European Commission.’ He also 
referred to the plan a former Dutch Minister of Justice proposed some three 
years ago, which was a common European legal space for criminal justice. 
This plan was shot down by a broad coalition of other member states. It was 
proposed again to the Cabinet of JHA Commissioner Frattini after some re-
vision, but here they felt that ‘the time wasn’t ripe for this yet.’
 With these efforts having come to naught, the Dutch attitude toward 
European police and judicial cooperation has turned predominantly nega-
tive. Optimizing one’s own performance and making pragmatic trans-border 
deals with neighboring countries are now the priority. Police ministries have 
reached an anti-Europe Eurocratic consensus: ‘We want to be bothered as 
little as possible by Europe.’
 There are exceptions to this general picture. More explicit political steer-
ing does occur from time to time, primarily on particularly sensitive issues 
such as drugs policy and organized crime where ministers and top civil ser-
vants have intense discussions concerning their positions. Moreover, during 
the preparations for the Dutch Presidency of the EU, not only were min-
isters personally involved in a much wider range of issues, but many top-
level civil servants in the ministries were also interested in various European 
agendas. Time and energy were devoted to making the period of the Dutch 
presidency a success, and it was: in the JHA field, The Hague Programme3 
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was often mentioned as one of the European successes of the Dutch civil 
service.
 The activist mood and the perceived need to act in unison at the EU level to 
be successful, however, quickly evaporated after the Dutch presidency ended. 
The system simply returned to ‘normal.’ During our fieldwork period (2005-
6), we noticed a decided lack of political steering most of the time concerning 
most of the police cooperation issues agenda. So, what did the involved civil 
servants do in this case? How did they cope? How did they know what to do?
 One Eurocrat observed that council working party civil servants like him-
self simply decided what the national position on a certain theme would be. 
They did not receive written mandates. ‘It is often difficult to prepare a posi-
tion. We receive the relevant documents for meetings very late, generally only 
a few days before a meeting is scheduled. A revised version is often received 
just before a meeting is about to begin. There is seldom any time left to dis-
cuss things. And it is difficult to predict what will even be on the agenda.’ 
Another civil servant said she often wrote her own instructions the day be-
fore a working party meeting. ‘I mail some ideas to our representative at the 
Permanent Representation, then we call each other in the evening and then 
I write it all down.’ At the technical level, there were often no interdepart-
mental negotiations either: individual civil servant acted as they saw fit. They 
used some of the policy documents on related themes to read up on earlier 
decisions, recommendations or directives they needed to keep in mind when 
formulating their own instructions.
 They might even tell the delegation superior about their positions and 
the outcomes of a working party meeting as the proposal ascends the lad-
der to the level of the COREPER, where a minister has little discretion left 
for steering the proceedings. Although this situation provided them with a 
significant amount of scope to influence policy, most of the Dutch Eurocrats 
we spoke to were not very satisfied with the current situation. One of them 
observed that ‘it does not reflect what the relationship between a minister and 
the civil servants should be ... Ministers should ultimately have the first and 
last word. They should set the parameters to be developed at the level of the 
working parties. But, in practice, this is not how things proceed, sometimes it 
actually works the other way around.’
 Our data availability case shows that issues do go through preparatory 
meetings in which a national position is discussed. But how do civil ser-
vant operate in these types of situations? It depends. In the preparatory 
meeting for the working party on police cooperation we saw that a national 
position was constructed via a series of discussions between departmental 
civil servants and Eurocrat representatives from the national police (not 
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representative of the entire Dutch police force). One of the problems with 
these practices is that there is simply too much bureau-political wheeling 
and dealing. This produces fuzzy positions that accumulate and do not inte-
grate or prioritize various parochial views and issues. Consensus tends to be 
achieved at the lowest common denominator with many insisting that new 
EU policies should interfere as little as possible with existing national sys-
tems. The civil servants involved in this process were not particularly happy 
with this ‘freedom,’ because they felt that they lacked strategic ministerial 
support.
 Dutch civil servants were responsible for constructing their own national 
position even in situations such as the CATS delegation in which there was 
an active and interested minister willing to make a phone call to a colleague 
from another member state to expedite the decision-making process or gener-
ate support for the Dutch position.
 These observations stand in stark contrast to another policy sector we stud-
ied in depth for another, larger study (Geuijen et al. 2008). Veterinary policy, 
an old and deeply Europeanized first pillar field, is an policy area where the 
civil servants can depend on well-developed and clear political choices made 
by the minister and the policies established by the department’s management 
board. The Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries’ administrative routines are 
geared towards incorporating and facilitating EU policy-making processes. 
Here civil servants are sometimes also required to write their own instruc-
tions, but they always have clear policy markers, which establish the limits 
of their discretion. In Brussels they can be trusted to keep the ‘national posi-
tion’ in mind. Moreover, veterinary policy is part of a close-knit expert com-
munity in which officials have considerable leeway in determining their own 
priorities and positions. Veterinary experts deliberate with one another at 
the departmental level, at the level of the ‘field’ – i.e., industry, veterinarians, 
laboratories, etc. – and also at the regional, national, and EU levels. They 
accept each other as experts, sharing a similar educational and professional 
background.
 The expertise needed to discuss the issues at the committee and working 
party levels is sometimes so specialized that even their heads of department 
may not fully comprehend the technical complexities. As a result, officials re-
ceive only a certain limited amount of steering leeway from the department’s 
political and administrative leadership. But they know what to say and do 
because they perform within an agreed-upon policy framework, which means 
that they can be trusted by their superiors as well as by their (transnational) 
colleagues.
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 Responsiveness or bricolage?
Doing business on European police cooperation is not an easy task for Dutch 
Eurocrats. A cogent policy framework and the attendant set of institutions 
have yet to be developed. In fact, it is not clear that the EU as such will be the 
main forum for police cooperation; there are many smaller regional, ad-hoc, 
issue-based groups (such as police forces and judicial agencies) who are al-
ready collaborating. Moreover, as we have seen, Eurocrats – at least the Dutch 
ones – are more often than not left without any specific political guidance 
during the preparations for deliberations with their colleagues from other 
member states. One proviso is in order, however. The field of our case study 
is still a relatively new European policy area. So it is perhaps not so surpris-
ing that the policy processes, politicians, and civil servants are still finding 
their way in these loosely related, multi-level networks through which EU 
governance evolves, particularly in the third pillar where the European Com-
mission’s role is very limited in the intergovernmental model.4
 In this study, we have tried to show how the setting in which Eurocrats 
operate forces Dutch civil servants in the field of police cooperation to act in 
certain ways. There are a number of crucial aspects to this scenario. One, nei-
ther Dutch political leaders nor civil servants were very inclined to strive for 
an increase in European cooperation in this field. Instead, they preferred to 
focus on ‘what is in it for us’ in the short run and to cling to their sovereignty 
in this field in the long run. Thus, Dutch civil servants are not always pro-
vided with a clear mandate other than ‘we don’t want ...’ Another point is that 
national representatives in general do not approve of European Commission 
efforts to steer the bargaining processes or propose new policies of its own 
accord. Another aspect is that whichever nation has the presidency at any 
point usually seeks tangible results during its presidential term, rather than 
focusing on what expert would call a ‘high-quality agreement.’ All this is done 
within a regulated rhythm of meetings within which the national positions 
are expected to be presented and bargained. This results in a ‘messy’ process 
without any clear sense of direction (Ekengren 2002).
 Civil servants have to learn to cope with this situation. In national set-
tings they probably have no problem adjusting to changing circumstances 
because policy processes usually have some political steering. However, in 
an EU setting, meetings are scheduled and have to be attended and national 
positions have to be satisfactorily represented, even though there may be no 
clear declared national position. Civil servants become part of this ongoing 
‘machine.’ They have no choice in this respect – they are obligated to partici-
pate.
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 We have attempted to show how civil servants in this setting cobble together 
an understanding of the situation and establish possible courses of action. Lévi-
Strauss’s concept of ‘bricolage’ may be an interesting concept for better under-
standing the logic of this process. Lévi-Strauss constructed a comparison be-
tween the bricoleur and the engineer. Th e engineer invents new concepts, whereas 
the bricoleur perceives his universe of instruments as ﬁ nite. Th e rules of the brico-
leur are to always make do with ‘whatever is at hand,’ in other words, make some-
thing out of one’s limited resources. His resources or ‘material’ are heterogeneous 
because they bear no direct relation to the current project, or indeed to any par-
ticular project, but are the contingent result of earlier occasions and actions. A 
bricoleur can rely upon an available set of tools and materials and choose certain 
materials for the problem at hand (Lévi-Strauss 1962: 28-29).
 The point of bricolage is making the most out of what is at hand to ac-
complish a specific goal. The resources on hand consist of the accumulation 
of previous manipulations and one’s experience and knowledge in the context 
of a specific goal, which influence the process. The items in the set are not 
limited to a single use or a single meaning, but their properties limit their 
options. Eurocrats are often required to act like bricoleurs because their goal 
is to construct a national position to enter European negotiations with based 
on limited resources and input. They are forced to adopt resources from the 
national setting (with variable degrees of political steering from ministers and 
control by parliament) and to a Europeanized setting. In this new setting, civil 
servants do not act as policy experts with clear instructions and ministerial 
guidance, striving for transnational epistemic consensus. Instead, they con-
struct their own national position on a theme that will be discussed in Brus-
sels. They have an intuitive ‘antenna’ for this, ensuring they don’t go too far, 
and act both ‘effectively’ and ‘appropriately’ (March and Olsen 1989) in these 
less-institutionalized, unregulated fields.
 Th ey piece together several resources in this context: (inter)departmental bar-
gains among civil servants; meetings with experts from the ﬁ eld; policy documents 
on related subjects; decisions taken earlier in other forums, and recognized po-
litical positions taken on related subjects (by a minister, or opposition parties in 
parliament). Th ey attempt to come up with a suitable position despite contradic-
tory signals, which includes the positions of various political and administrative 
leaders, their colleagues, the European working parties, etc. Some of them may be 
more concerned with not doing the wrong thing, to protect their jobs. Others, who 
are less risk-averse, may try to stretch the limits of possibility, which may end up 
being accepted by the various stakeholders. All in all, professional bricolage seems 
to fairly accurately describe ‘public service responsiveness to political direction’ as 
a key modus operandi among these Eurocrats.
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 The civil servants in this process seemingly move seamlessly between act-
ing as a unit or as a department civil servant involved in intra- or interdepart-
mental agency politics, as a domain expert involved in developing a profes-
sionally sound position, and as a ‘classic’ civil servant serving his superiors 
and the hierarchy in general. Once they join the European Union arenas, the 
dominant identity of these civil servants again undergoes a metamorphosis. 
Although they are aware of the bricolage process, they are expected to perform 
as national representatives who articulate and defend the national position 
vis-à-vis national representatives from other member states and Commission 
civil servants. However, this last dominant identity continues to show traces 
of other identities related to one’s unit, department, profession or government 
when the delegation leader re-interprets the ‘national position’ in the process 
of intergovernmental bargaining that produces Council policies.
 We have attempted to show that Dutch Eurocrats who operate in areas 
with low levels of political (or hierarchical) political steering identify them-
selves as national representatives, not as experts or supranationals. This ob-
servation differs from what Beyers (2005) found in his study of Belgian civil 
servants participating in Council working groups who experienced their in-
structions as weak. These civil servants were inclined to adopt a somewhat 
more supranational attitude. Why were our findings different in this study of 
Dutch civil servants in the field of police cooperation? This might be better 
understood if we take note of the setting in which they operate.
 The problem these civil servants face in the field of European police co-
operation is that, at the national as well as at the European level, there is no 
political will to develop a coherent perspective towards greater supranational 
cooperation. In the absence of a larger European vision, they have no real op-
portunity to identify with some kind of European project. This leaves them 
with no alternative but to identify with their nation. They learn to cope with 
a situation that finds them working in a setting, which requires them to act 
as national representatives, by constructing the national position that they 
subsequently continue to represent. In this way their dominant identity as a 
national civil servant can be maintained.
 Conclusion
In this chapter we presented a case study of ‘goal-less’ policy work, of national 
public servants improvising, inventing and interpreting political mandates as 
they take part in transnational policy networks. Our study portrays a situa-
tion of structured improvisation: all of the involved players know that there 
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is no sheet music, no conductor, but they have a general understanding of the 
music they are supposed to produce and of the roles they are expected to play 
in this production. The Eurocrats we studied had mastered this art of impro-
visation to perfection. But that does not detract from the problems of this 
style of policymaking and the significant amount of discretion they wield in 
making it work. Who or what do they represent? In the absence of political or 
strategic managerial guidance, how do they know they are serving ‘the public 
interest’? How are their actions controlled and accounted for? The Eurocratic 
policy work we observed may be admirable in its professionalism and for its 
ability to produce pragmatic, jointly constructed solutions for that ‘work,’ but 
its practices barely contribute to allaying the misgivings that European citi-
zens continue to harbor about the fundamentally technocratic nature of large 
swathes of EU policymaking.
 Notes
 Formally the Dutch national government’s EU coordination mechanisms have been 
scrutinized repeatedly, and their strengths and weaknesses have been clearly articu-
lated (Andeweg and Soetendorp ; Raad voor het Openbaar Bestuur ; De 
Zwaan ). In this study, we regard the Europeanization of national policymaking 
not just as a coordination challenge but as an emerging, differentiated set of political 
and professional practices that participants in European policy processes need to 
master in order to be effective (Heritier et al. ). Europeanization, in this sense, 
has been much less researched in the Netherlands (Schout ; Sie Dhian Ho and 
Van Keulen ) than in some other countries (Smith ; ; Jacobson, Lae-
greid & Pedersen ; Baetens and Bursens a; b).
 The main characteristic of the so-called third pillar is its intergovernmental struc-
ture. 
 The Hague Programme is the agenda for - in the JHA field. It was adopted 
at the end of the Dutch presidency in November . 
 For an analysis of various forms of committee governance cf. Egeberg, Schaeffer and 
Trondal ().
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 Introduction
We have seen that there are different ways of giving an account of policy, 
and have distinguished between first-, second- and third-order accounts. This 
section asks the questions: Do these different accounts speak to each other? And 
if so, how or, how should they speak to each other? This reflects the notion of 
applying of the ‘double hermeneutic’ to policy. This is a well-known strategy 
in the social sciences whereby the social practices and the terms that scientists 
use to describe them, have impact on one another. Policy scientists interpret 
the language and actions of policy workers; scholars describe these interpre-
tations for practitioners; and practitioners talk to each other, often in the 
terms introduced by the policy scientists, but they also talk back to the policy 
academics – and the fact that it is, generally speaking, the policy practitioners 
who finance the work of the scholars makes these exchanges particularly rel-
evant for an understanding of policy work.
 The founding fathers of the policy studies approach in the 1950s and 
1960s would have considered this an odd question. Policy science is usually 
traced back to Harold Lasswell’s endeavor to systematically and methodi-
cally link the (social) sciences to the needs of long-term, strategic, public 
policymaking. The first ‘policy analysts’ saw themselves as simply drawing 
on scientific knowledge (concepts and theories), and giving objective advice 
to decision makers. This is well expressed in Wildavsky’s ‘speaking truth 
to power’. In subsequent decades, society began talking back louder and 
louder to science’s claims on ‘truth’, a development known as the move from 
Mode-1 to Mode-2 science, or from normal to post-normal science, or from 
mono- to multi-, inter- and transdisciplinary science. For policy studies 
this implied a move from ‘speaking truth to power’ to ‘making sense togeth-
er.’ Of course, there are still some who believe in objective policy advice 
that rests upon evidence-based analysis. But changing views on the nature 
of rationality from monologic to dialogic, and from the scientist as a privi-
leged advisor to just one of the many different voices informing politics, 
have ushered in many new modes of argumentative and interpretive policy 
analysis.
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 A key issue for researchers studying policy has become how should schol-
arly research relate to the needs and interests of policy practitioners? The 
dominant perspective is collaborative and instrumental: research should be 
concerned with how to best deliver research results so that they have an im-
pact on the policy community and serve to engage policymakers more effec-
tively. Invoking the two-communities metaphor to empirically describe the 
tenuous nexus between university research and public policymaking in Cana-
da, Williams seeks to bridge this perceived gap. Assuming that policymakers 
and researchers share an aim to create effective policies that meet citizens’ 
needs, she embarks upon a survey of promising ideas for fostering a culture 
of engaged communication between researchers and practitioners, improved 
strategies for the dissemination of scientific evidence, and incentives for the 
acceptance of research in policy.
 In chapter 11, Shore takes the opposite position, asking: ‘Should social sci-
entists follow the policy gaze or seek to critique it?’ As in Williams’s case, ask-
ing the question betrays the answer: policy analysts should not be concerned 
with learning to think and talk more like policymakers; rather, by exploring 
different, even deliberately opposing paths of understanding, they may play 
the role of critical scientists, changing policymakers’ views of social and politi-
cal problems in the long run by creating new sensitizing concepts, paradigms 
and solution alternatives.
 Thus, this section brings together two diametrically opposed views. Shore 
as the esteemed opponent views science as the countervailing power to gov-
ernment and politics. This resembles the enlightenment model of science, 
where new insights slowly trickle down through the policymaking process, 
and scientists bear no responsibility for the use or abuse of their findings. 
Williams chooses co-production models, where scholars and policy workers, 
in a negotiable division of labor, share responsibility for knowledge produc-
tion, dissemination and use. This diversity of views should not be all that sur-
prising. There are after all many different views of the science-politics inter-
face both in theory and in practice. Loeber (chapter 7) shows the difficulty of 
trying to be a candid critic and still maintain an audience. The challenge is to 
accept these different perspectives of policy work, as well as the emphasis on 
an interactive Mode-2 model of science in governing circles, while determin-
ing the appropriate framework for knowledge utilization in the 21st century.
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10 Is Evidence-Based Policy Making Really Possible? 
 Reﬂ ections for Policymakers and Academics on 
Making Use of Research in the Work of Policy
Amanda Williams
 Introduction
It has been persuasively argued throughout this book and elsewhere (Cole-
batch 2006; Radin 2000) that mainstream Western accounts of the policy-
making process often bear little resemblance to the realities of those who ‘ac-
complish’ the actual policy work on a daily basis. Th e discussion that follows 
examines an area where the disjuncture between outcome-focused accounts 
of how things ought to work, and interpretive descriptions of how the policy 
process is experienced is pronounced. It involves the translation of academic 
research into something that is useful in policy work.1 In this case, the lack of 
congruency between process challenges and outcome expectations occurs at all 
levels of the knowledge-creation process (i.e., in the production, dissemination 
and utilization of results), and diﬀ erently by diﬀ erent participants, thereby 
increasing the level of complexity associated with attempts to understand and 
resolve this problem. Th is discussion seeks to illuminate this topic by high-
lighting the diﬀ erent concerns that researchers and policymakers bring to it.
 This chapter examines the exchange of knowledge between university 
researchers and policymakers (such as elected officials, advisors and civil 
servants), drawing on successful examples of research use in the Canadian 
context, the insights from organizations dedicated to thinking about these 
issues, and current empirical findings on this subject. In Canada, the nature 
of the university-policy nexus is of particular concern because it has been sug-
gested that the federal government presently lacks a strong in-house capacity 
for conducting research (Howlett 2007; Perl and White 2007), while pub-
lic funding bodies are trying to induce academic researchers to give a higher 
priority to the utilization of their research. Nevertheless, I do not address 
the case of think tanks or the advisory bodies (formal and informal regional, 
national, and or international) established to provide specific information to 
governments, which are sites where the transfer and utilization of research 
also occurs. My discussion assumes that:
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– creating effective policies for citizens is a goal that policymakers and aca-
demic researchers often share;
– both researchers and policy workers tend to overlook the challenges for 
‘the other’ when thinking about using research in policymaking;
– both groups need to think critically about the role they play in perpetuat-
ing divisions;
– specific strategies can be pursued which may encourage more successful 
collaborations.
While this chapter draws on the knowledge-translation literature, it is also 
based on personal experience. I have occupied many positions within the 
academy and government; consequently, the concepts that are emphasized2 
are those that resonate the most with my experiences as a Canadian policy 
worker and scholar.
 I begin by considering the dilemmas associated with trying to be a policy-
maker who effectively uses evidence, and a researcher who produces policy-
relevant research. Next, I identify the types of claims made by both groups 
against the ‘other’ when trying to promote successful collaborations. Finally, I 
provide several recommendations for moving forward.
  e central problematics for the modern day policymaker and researcher
 Problematic one: To be ‘ruled by evidence’ or to be ‘managed by 
measurement’?
Policy workers are urged, on the one hand, to use evidence in making poli-
cy decisions (Black 2001; Solesbury 2002), and, on the other, to ‘manage via 
measurement’ – what Noordegraaf and Amba (2003) describe as the urgent 
search for ‘objective’ indicators as the basis for initiating and evaluating ac-
tion. Both these expectations are outcome-focused but are often incompat-
ible. Consequently, policy workers are often forced to decide what is of great-
est value: activities that promote the systematic integration of research into 
policy decisions and require a significant investment of human and financial 
resource, or appearing to be a responsible manager of funds? It is not easy to 
present the use of research as a return on investment (a central rhetoric in 
business, and increasingly in government), although some organizations have 
begun to try to quantify the impact of research (Grant 2006), and examples 
of fiscally responsible, research-rich, policy environments are hard to find. 
Moreover, Sanderson (2003) argues that we must not only question whether 
being ‘ruled by evidence’ and ‘managed by measurement’ are mutually attain-
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able but also whether these objectives are desirable in light of the complexity, 
ambiguity, and the moral/ethical dimensions of contemporary policy issues.
 Problematic two: How to cope with disorder while still maintaining 
legitimacy?
A second dilemma arises from the fact that accounts of policy are also part 
of the policy process and a narrative may be ‘a good account’ for reasons other 
than its descriptive accuracy. In the conventional account of policy as the au-
thoritative choice of goals by the government, there is a role for research first, 
in identifying appropriate goals, and second, in ascertaining the extent to 
which they have been reached: research can deliver ‘objective answers’ to these 
questions, and in doing so help policymakers to achieve better results. Never-
theless, interpretive policy scholars such as Fischer (2003), Stone (1988; 2001) 
and Yanow (2000) have demonstrated the need to view policy not as a simple 
process of instrumental choice that can be guided by academic research, but 
rather as an interactive, discursive and negotiation arena, in which academic 
research is only one of the valid meaning-frames possible. This means that 
policy workers may be uncertain about what makes research ‘useful.’ On the 
one hand, they may appreciate an interpretive reading of their activities be-
cause this more accurately describes their everyday practice, however they 
still must rely on the trappings of authoritative instrumentalism (such as 
cost-benefit analyses, environmental impact assessments, and ex post evalu-
ations) to make policy actions credible and valid. In this context, the current 
enthusiasm for evidence-based policy can be useful as part of the rhetoric of 
validation, but it is also a potential constraint on the policy worker’s room to 
maneuver, to be treated with ‘cautious skepticism’ when it does not fit com-
fortably into the interactive reality of daily activities (Sanderson 2003). Policy 
workers must contend with a core dilemma: if they acknowledge the messi-
ness of policymaking – which Colebatch (2006) calls the ‘profane’ (i.e., the 
‘interests,’  ‘contests’ and ‘ambiguity’ inherent in policy work) – will the policies 
that are the outcomes of these contests be seen as legitimate? The dominance 
of ‘instrumental rationality’ in current ‘acceptable public discourse’ about gov-
ernment reflects social expectations of how democracies ought to operate as 
a means to build trust (Colebatch 2006). Citizens in a rationalist Western 
democracy expect to be assured that the application of public authority is 
determined by clear decisions arrived at through informed and systematic 
choice; it thus may not be ‘helpful’ to describe these decisions as provisional 
and ambiguous outcomes reached through the interplay of partial and parti-
san perspectives.
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 Problematic three: How is ‘impact’ to be weighed against other norms 
of inquiry?
While policy workers are often urged to integrate research more fully into 
policy, academics are subject to more explicit resource pressures to make 
sure that their research has a policy impact. For example, in Canada,3 public 
funding agencies are calling for evidence of the impact of research. Our lead-
ing grant agency, the Social Sciences and the Humanities Research Council 
(SSHRC) recently stated that ‘maximum knowledge impact’ and ‘interac-
tive engagement’ would guide all future funding decisions (SSHRC 2005). 
This means that researchers who study policy need to consider how best 
to structure their research so that it has a visible impact on policymakers. 
Nevertheless, while SSHRC’s expectations will guide its funding decisions, 
such values are not those of the traditional norms of independent critical 
inquiry by which scholarly work is judged and academic careers are built in 
Canada and elsewhere, academics develop their research around their per-
sonal curiosity about the social world, and are expected to engage with a 
small group of other intellectuals in a specialized research domain, attend-
ing conferences and producing publications in peer reviewed journals; all 
activities for which they are rewarded. There is also the issue of who the 
policy actors are for whom the research is expected to be relevant and useful. 
While internal and external funding expectations have started to encourage 
Canadian academics to structure their research agendas so they meet the 
strategic priorities of the federal government, in the academic sphere there 
has also been a growing interest in seeing research subjects as the primary 
users of research with methodologies such as participatory action research 
promoting precisely this ambition. Moreover, researchers acknowledge that 
there is a distinction between relevance and impact; for instance, a crimi-
nologist’s research may show that ‘getting tough on crime’ does not reduce 
its incidence but this rarely has much impact on political leaders and this is 
not always because the research results are expressed in some obtuse aca-
demic language. Consequently, academics are not sure that the interest in 
the impact of research is entirely appropriate. This discomfort was evident 
in a response to SSHRC’s desire to produce research with an impact when 
scholars asked: how should research mobilization be measured; who would 
determine success; and, most importantly, how can we maintain intellectual 
endeavors of a more theoretical, non-practical nature that may be of value, 
given the requirement to have an impact (Knowledge Mobilization Sympo-
sium 2005)?
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 Problematic four: How can research-based knowledge have an impact if 
it acknowledges the validity of other forms of knowledge generation?
The two demands that policy be based on evidence and that academic re-
search be shown to have an impact on policy are grounded in an assump-
tion that research will produce a higher-order, ‘objective’ knowledge that will 
therefore produce better policy outcomes. Nevertheless, this widely shared 
assumption has itself been challenged by academic research. The ‘postmodern 
turn’ in the social sciences has argued that the knowledge academics produce 
is not the only knowledge of any value and that experience (for instance) can 
also produce valid knowledge. Many researchers still claim that they main-
tain an appearance of  ‘objectivity and trustworthiness that is incontrovertible’ 
(Huberman 1994: 13) and strive to mask the messiness of both their process 
and ﬁ nal results (Law 2004). But, if postmodern social scientists question the 
objective status of social science research, social science quickly loses its capac-
ity to ‘claim superior knowledge and privileged expertise’ (Huberman 1994: 13). 
Researchers are thus required to exchange their ﬁ ndings ‘on equal footing with 
practitioners, both in terms of their status and in the validity of their data’ 
(Huberman 1994: 13). Th is type of equality questions both the validity of aca-
demic research and the demand that evidence be the basis of policy.
  e barriers to collaboration created by the ‘other’
Attempting to balance efficiency and research utilization, legitimacy and 
disorder, impact and curiosity, and relevance and multiplicity are among the 
most challenging problematics that policymakers and academics experience 
when they consider how best to integrate research into policymaking. More-
over, as a result of these broad institutional barriers, these groups have been 
highly critical of each other. Identifying these key points of contention sup-
plies additional insights into why these two communities tend to function as 
‘unlinked’ and ‘asynchronous’ entities (Lavis 2006).
 The problems with policymakers (as seen by academics)
– Access. Academics are acutely aware that they have limited access to gov-
ernment documents, people and processes, particularly the core artifacts 
that help move policy forward (within the Canadian context this includes 
Cabinet correspondence, briefing notes, consultation papers); many of 
these objects remain protected (even with the additional flexibility that 
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legislation around access to information permits) and are not available on 
public sites (Atkinson-Grosjean 2006). Even for those actually engaged 
in ethnographic work, in which they observe the daily activities of poli-
cymakers, there is a great deal of what they see that cannot be reported 
or which they choose not to reveal due to the nature of their relationship 
with their research participants (Schrecker 2001). This means that aca-
demic descriptions of particular policy situations may not capture all that 
has been observed, making it difficult for those academics on the outside 
looking in to appreciate how the policy world operates and anticipate 
where specific gaps in information exist.
– Communication of needs and awareness/respect for the research process. Aca-
demics have accused policymakers of making insufficient effort to tell the 
research community clearly what information they want, why they would 
like particular findings, and how they intend to use research (Whitehead 
et al. 2004). Moreover, when policymakers do seek out precise knowl-
edge, they often treat research as a product and position themselves as 
consumers that should be able to pick from a series of pre-packaged re-
search products in order to help answer complex questions in a short time 
frame. As Lomas (2000) notes, ‘This view recognizes neither the depth or 
breadth of studies that could be done, nor the numerous stages involved 
in choosing which of those studies to do and how to do them’ (p. 141). 
Huberman (1990) expresses the discomfort academics feel with policy-
makers’ awareness of the research process: ‘if it takes a research team two 
years to get hold of its study conceptually, why should we assume that 
reading a single research report in a few days ... will bring enlightenment 
(for the decision maker)’ (p. 22)? Moreover, some policymakers have fairly 
negative attitudes towards the research process, and lack the skills and to 
interpret and use results (Lavis 2006). In sum, academics have difficulty 
in knowing how their research can help policymakers, and often feel that 
policymakers lack awareness of, comfort with, and respect for, their re-
search contribution.
– Misuse. Researchers spend a great deal of time selecting the appropriate 
theories and methods they will use in their work. Since research probably 
has professional and personal value for most scholars, a fear that some-
times manifests itself regarding the use of their findings in policy delib-
erations is that their results will be taken out of context, misunderstood, 
or misrepresented. Policymakers themselves admit that they sometimes 
use research for quite different purposes than was intended, illustrating 
that this concern is by no means unfounded (Petticrew et al. 2004). Pub-
lic policy is developed and delivered explicitly ‘through the use of power’ 
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and that the coercive influence of the state remains in the hands of ‘demo-
cratically accountable politicians’ (Solesbury 2002: 95). The utilization of 
research in the art of persuasion is not something that all academics are 
comfortable with, making some scholars less likely to produce results that 
can easily become an integral part of the ‘policy spin.’
 The problems with academics (as seen by policymakers)
– Awareness and political savvy. In a study of public officials’ attitudes to 
integrating research into the policy process, academics were described as 
‘blissfully unaware’ and ‘politically naïve’ (Petticrew et al. 2004). Among 
the key factors that researchers tend to underestimate when thinking 
about decision making are: the pressures of the legislative calendar, the 
stress of managing competing interest groups, the shifts associated with 
media attention, and the short terms of political appointees (Rist 1998). 
It has been suggested that academics’ biggest mistake is that they remain 
committed to a view in which policy is conceptualized as an event, ‘as if 
policy were made by a small discrete group of actors clustered in a room 
at a specified time, perhaps until a puff of white smoke is emitted’ (Lomas 
2000: 140). By treating decision-making as a discrete moment rather than 
an extended process, academic researchers often miss out on contributing 
in areas where their input could be quite constructive (Rist 1998). When 
thinking about how best to contribute to the policy world, academics tend 
to ignore or underestimate the complex pressures faced by their counter-
parts and fail to appreciate the diffuse, and sometimes unpredictable, 
decision-making realm.
– Relevancy/Applicability of Research. In relation to the sorts of work that 
most researchers are producing, policymakers have been critical of the 
general relevance and applicability of the studies that are presently avail-
able. The current body of research that exists has been described as ‘pol-
icy free’ (Petticrew et al. 2004) and criticized for being ‘inward looking, 
too piecemeal, too supplier driven ... rather than focusing on key concerns 
to policymakers’ (the DfEE cited in Sanderson 2003: 334). As one poli-
cymaker asserted, ‘many researchers do not see it as their responsibility 
to think through the policy implications of their work – they need to 
move beyond preaching to other researchers’ (Petticrew et al. 2004: 813). 
Researchers have been encouraged to ‘give up the gold standard’ and de-
velop methods that are appropriate to the policy area they are interested 
in assessing (Petticrew et al. 2004). Among the type of information that 
policymakers have suggested might be of the greatest use to them are 
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evaluations of the cost effectiveness of programs and initiatives (money 
always talks in the policy world), predictive studies, the development 
of indicators to achieve targets, and systematic reviews (Petticrew et al. 
2004).
– Communication/Dissemination Strategies. While the academic commu-
nity devotes a great deal of time recognizing the limitations when pre-
senting their research much of the policymaker disapproval is focused on 
most scholars’ inability to effectively communicate their results in a com-
prehensible and useful format to other audiences (Petticrew et al. 2004; 
Puchner 2001; SSHRC 2005). A shift in thinking has been recommended 
because questions regarding ‘methodological soundness’ and ‘degree of 
uncertainty’ (which remain central in typical journal articles and disserta-
tions) often ‘cloud the message’ (Petticrew et al. 2004: 814). Policymakers 
want clear, straightforward narratives, not carefully qualified accounts of 
academic research; in a recent study, a policymaker claimed that ‘what is 
important is how convincingly the evidence is presented, and how inter-
esting you make it ... The face validity of a good story is an example of 
how policy style can influence politics’ (Petticrew et al. 2004: 812). They 
also tend to favor the establishment and maintenance of knowledge rela-
tionships through face-to-face contact (Martens and Roos 2005).
 Possibilities for moving forward and bridging the policy/research gap
The aforementioned discussion illustrates that there are a number of pres-
sures that make it difficult for policymakers to use evidence effectively, or for 
researchers to produce policy-relevant findings. However, change is possible, 
if both academics and practitioners are willing to change their daily practices 
and make additional efforts to increase interaction between the two commu-
nities. So we conclude with a consideration of those strategies that may im-
prove collaboration between policymakers and researchers.
 First, we need to lay the groundwork for supporting a culture of engaged com-
munication across academic and policymaking communities. While studies that 
evaluate specific initiatives aimed at fostering partnerships are somewhat 
limited and spread across many different disciplines (Landry et al. 2001), 
what is apparent in the reviews available is that the early and active engage-
ment of policymakers throughout a research project (including the invest-
ment of funds) dramatically increases the likelihood of its findings being 
used at some point within policy deliberation. Direct involvement fosters 
a much stronger sense of ownership and accountability becoming attached 
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to the research process (Lavis 2006; Lomas 2000; Martens and Roos 2005; 
Nutley et al. 2002).
 There are at least two major steps involved in establishing a solid founda-
tion for exchange between the two communities (Nutley et al. 2002). The first 
is to reach a common understanding of what constitutes evidence. This means 
taking stock of the policy problems we can actually expect to be able to re-
search; encouraging an ‘openness to methodological pluralism’ in which both 
qualitative and quantitative studies are perceived as valuable; and, accepting 
that knowledge generated from other sources (including the experience of 
policymakers) is worthwhile. In doing so it is expected that a wider climate 
of respect and trust can be fostered. The second step involves a more targeted 
activity in which a focused effort is made to develop research and develop-
ment (R&D) strategies around policy issues. The overall aim here should be 
to determine how best to produce a rich and robust knowledge base upon 
which policymakers can depend. Formulating a corpus of research such as 
this means confronting such questions as:
– what both policymakers and researchers consider sound research;
– how to balance new primary research with the secondary analysis of exist-
ing data;
– given the need to produce timely findings of practical relevance, what are 
the criteria of validity and reliability for research;
– how can gaps be identified in our current knowledge base;
– how should we prioritize which issues require the most urgent attention; 
and
– how might we balance the need for researchers to remain free from politi-
cal coercion with the desire for close cooperation between the providers 
and users of research? (adapted from Nutley et al. 2006: 4).
Policymakers and researchers need to address these issues if they want to 
work together effectively. Researcher-organized workshops, government-led, 
priority-setting exercises, and scoping activities designed by funding agencies, 
are the sorts of venues where these types of exchanges might occur (Lavis 
2006). In addition, encounters in which researchers and policymakers are ex-
posed to the daily routines and pressures of the other may be another valuable 
tool for promoting a sustained dialogue (Nutley et al. 2002; Whitehead et 
al. 2004). These strategies, which help to take stock of specific policy areas, 
are designed to assist researchers and policymakers establish some common 
goals. In doing so, researchers are offered a greater sense of awareness of what 
type of research is needed (making them less likely to focus on irrelevant 
concerns), while policymakers are forced to actively reflect upon where they 
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could best use the academic findings (requiring them to have a much stronger 
sense of their own organizational needs and abilities).
 Secondly, we need to find new and creative solutions for dissemination and 
access. For researchers, this means being amenable to generating their research 
findings in diverse formats, for a variety of audiences, using multiple channels 
(particularly different kinds of media), but this must be done cautiously and 
realistically. Fenwick (2008) provides a thought-provoking account of her ef-
forts to present social science findings differently, and argues that new ways of 
presenting knowledge often require skills that go far beyond the typical exper-
tise of academics, particularly when it comes to using alternative formats such 
as theatre. She suggests providing accessible summaries of research (executive 
summaries, take home message handouts, short sound bites); using language 
that will engage readers; and, always aiming to draw out policy implications 
from research findings (Nutley et al. 2002; Petticrew et al. 2004; Lavis 2006; 
Martens and Roos 2005). Scholars are also encouraged to ‘be proactive’ and 
make concerted efforts to stay in contact with relevant policy and delivery 
bodies (Nutley et al. 2006). Funding agencies might allow dedicated resourc-
es within research grants to be deployed for alternative dissemination activi-
ties (beyond conference attendance and peer reviewed publication); consult 
policymakers when commissioning research; and, provide funds for research 
synthesis and evaluation activities (Knowledge Mobilization Symposium 
2005; Nutley et al. 2006). Policymakers and bureaucrats could increase access 
to documents which reveal how policy decision are made; highlight research 
that has fed into policy decisions; and, require departments to show evidence 
of research use when applying for program funds (Nutley et al. 2006). Collec-
tively, these types of solutions make it easier for policymakers to use research 
(since it becomes available in accessible forms) and provide academics with 
greater insight as to where, when, and how their research is being deployed (if 
at all).
 Thirdly, we should facilitate, recognize and reward the uptake of research 
in policy. In terms of encouraging utilization, the establishment of ‘one stop 
shopping’ sites where policymakers have immediate access to up to date re-
search and a rapid response to any of their questions has been recommended 
(Lavis 2006). In addition, researchers and policymakers may be able to work 
together to develop self-assessment tools that determine an organization’s ca-
pacity to adapt and utilize research (Lavis 2006). It has also been suggested 
that policymakers can and should be given specific training about how to read 
and interpret findings (Lavis 2006; Nutley et al. 2002). In terms of recogniz-
ing and rewarding policymakers for using research one promising possibility 
is to link R&D strategies to departmental business plans (Nutley et al. 2002). 
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We are still struggling to build a solid knowledge base about information ex-
change in the policy domain (Abramson et al. 2007; Landry et al. 2001), but 
implementing these sorts of suggestions would increase the capacity of poli-
cymakers and researchers for collective learning about this process.
 In Canada, an excellent example of an organization that has been a true 
leader in meeting all of these recommendations is the Canadian Health Ser-
vices Research Foundation (CHSRF) (Lavis 2006). Among the types of 
materials they supply are: ‘mythbusters,’ research summaries that offer evi-
dence that tends to be contrary to accepted wisdom in Canadian healthcare 
debates; the ‘evidence boost,’ which includes brief discussions of healthcare 
issues where research findings point to a preferred course of action in policy; 
and, ‘promising practices in research use,’ which highlight specific healthcare 
organizations that have invested their time, energy and resources to improve 
their ability to use research. In addition, CHSRF oﬀ ers the Executive Train-
ing for Research Application (EXTRA), a two-year program for capacity and 
leadership to optimize the use of research evidence in managing Canadian 
healthcare organizations. Th ey also provide assistance for new and established 
academic researchers, allowing them to work with mentors in order to reorient 
their work toward applied health services or policy research. Th ey also orga-
nize ‘Listening for Direction,’ a policy-scoping activity in which they identify 
short-term (one to two years) and longer-term (three to ten years) health sys-
tem priorities. Finally, CHSRF’s funding goes to projects that bring the best 
available evidence together, highlight how to act based on such evidence, and/
or promote speciﬁ c transformations within the healthcare system itself.
 Moreover, a newly established partnership in Canada that illustrates 
promise in the context of such recommendations is Research Impact (Phipps 
2008). This joint initiative, partially funded through the SSHRC, brings 
together two universities (York University and the University of Victoria). 
Their website supplies highly accessible research summaries in a variety of 
areas (education, social welfare, crime and justice), representing many dif-
ferent disciplines (such as anthropology, fine arts, law, philosophy, humani-
ties and women’s studies), all of which provide recommendations on some 
level for both knowledge users (policymakers) and knowledge creators (other 
researchers). They also offer a comprehensive database of Canadian and in-
ternational organizations dedicated to facilitating knowledge transfers and 
exchanges between academic researchers and policymakers. Moreover, both 
universities have integrated a permanent knowledge brokering capacity into 
their institutional structure in which they actively seek out the relevant re-
search issues and needs of government decision makers and then link them to 
appropriate researchers (faculty and students).
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 Conclusion
The challenges for policymakers seeking to use evidence effectively, or re-
searchers trying to be policy-relevant cannot easily be overcome. There are 
divergent expectations and competing accounts of what policy and academic 
work ought to be. As this chapter has argued, among the biggest concerns 
for policymakers are efforts to balance efficiency and research utilization and 
find legitimacy while acknowledging ambiguity. For researchers, it involves 
regulating expectations around doing research with impact and satisfying the 
standards of general curiosity within the academic community, along with 
managing concerns of relevancy in an intellectual climate that embraces the 
multiplicity of different forms of knowledge. Moreover, for the recommenda-
tions above to become common practice both parties will have to change their 
behavior. On the one hand, policymakers will have to willingly provide more 
meaningful access to their internal processes, be prepared to learn about dif-
ferent methods and projects, and reflect critically about their individual and 
organizational needs and capacities in regards to using research. Academics 
(and academic institutions), on the other hand, will have to begin recognizing 
the practical constraints that policymakers face when trying to use research, 
transform how they write and what they focus upon when presenting their 
findings, and, be amenable to rewarding, and being rewarded for, reaching 
audiences beyond simply their peers.
 The transformations listed above cannot be expected to occur quickly or 
easily. Consequently, we must be prepared to be realistic about our expectations. 
It has been suggested that ‘evidence influenced’ or ‘evidence aware’ decisions 
as opposed to evidence-based is a more reasonable perception of what we 
can anticipate attaining (Nutley et al. 2002). Moreover, we must recognize 
that if academic evidence is to shape policy debates, this will often occur in-
directly through channels such as ‘mediated dialogues’ between stakeholders 
and through an effort to ‘interpret for policymakers who inhabit one world 
what it is like to live in another’ (Elliott and Popay 2001: 330). All told, our 
goal should be to work together ‘to create contextual understanding about an 
issue, build linkages that will exist over time’ and to collectively educate each 
other (Rist 1998: 403). Advancing such a moderate aspiration may be a disap-
pointment to some readers, who were hoping that this chapter would contain 
straightforward ideas about how to ensure that research influences the policy 
process; yet, given the complexity of the challenges involved, this would be a 
target that both researchers and policymakers might aim to achieve.
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 Notes
 As Landry et al. () have shown, ‘use’ can have a variety of meanings including 
a basic transmission activity on the part of the researcher in which they make their 
findings available; cognition related activities in which researchers assume their work 
was read and understood; referencing in which the actual work is cited by policy-
makers; efforts in which an attempt is made to adopt research results; activities which 
suggest that results influenced decision making; and, finally, instances in which speci-
fic results seemingly give rise to an extension and application by policymakers.
 As a policy practitioner, I have worked as a policy advisor who tries to offer the best 
possible information to both senior bureaucrats and political leaders about future 
policy directions and priorities; as a policymaker developing the parameters around 
regulatory and legislative changes for a specific policy initiative; and as a policy im-
plementer, aiming to apply certain policy directives at the ‘street level,’ the interface 
with clients. Moreover, as an academic, my work has primarily focused on a consi-
deration of the context in which policy initiatives have emerged and an exploration 
of ensuing controversies (such as pinpointing sites of dissonance, resistance and/or 
change).
 This is happening elsewhere as well. Solesbury () documents the nature of these 
trends in the UK.
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11 Locating the Work of Policy
Cris Shore
 Getting close to policy1
What exactly do social scientists seek to achieve when they engage in policy 
work? Is it dialogue with, or influence over policy professionals? Is it a way 
for academics to shape the formation or implementation of public policy, or 
is it to analyze and deconstruct policy in order to explore deeper patterns and 
processes pertaining to the organization of society? In short, should social 
scientists follow the policy gaze or seek to critique it?
 The answers to these questions necessarily depend on a host of other vari-
ables, including professional ethics, the nature of the policy in question, and 
one’s own particular political disposition. These reflexive and epistemological 
considerations are central to social anthropology’s methodology (Scholte 1972; 
Hammersley and Atkinson 1995; Meyerhoff and Ruby 1982; Davies 2007). 
But, while anthropologists excel in highlighting cultural complexity and the 
various sides of any argument (including their own subject-positioning), they 
frequently complain that government agencies and policy elites who commis-
sion research typically want simple conclusions and ‘quick fixes.’ For critical 
and interpretive social scientists, engaging with policymakers often seems like 
a ‘dialogue of the deaf.’ This has led some scholars to call for a change in the 
discourse and practice of the social sciences. As one prominent US professor 
summed it up, ‘we need to learn to think and talk more like policymakers.’2
 This chapter aims to critique that argument and question its underlying 
assumptions. Far from offering social scientists a way forward, learning to 
‘think and talk like a policymaker’ may be the problem that good social sci-
ence needs to overcome. What gives anthropology its analytical edge when 
confronting policymakers is precisely its capacity to challenge received wis-
dom and think outside of the conventional policy box. My ambition, therefore, 
is to illustrate how anthropological approaches and perspectives might help 
us to better understand what is at stake when we confront policy processes. 
Social anthropologists are experienced at tracking the genealogies and flows 
of particular policies and their impact on people’s lives and everyday behavior. 
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But they are equally good at interrogating the meanings that those policies 
hold for those actors whose lives they touch and the cultural logics that struc-
ture those ‘policy worlds.’ In this sense, they ‘relocate’ or ‘destabilize’ seemingly 
well-known phenomena like policy. Instead of accepting conventional com-
monsense accounts – ‘there are policymakers, who make policy’ – anthropolo-
gists recognize other, local accounts and emphasize the plurality of meanings 
and contested nature of these accounts. In doing so, they also show how or-
dinary people who are not policy professionals construct these phenomena 
that we term ‘policies.’ To paraphrase Clifford Geertz (1973: 5), I consider the 
analysis of policy to be ‘not an experimental science in search of a law, but an 
interpretive one in search of meaning.’
 This chapter addresses the consequences of this anthropological sensitiv-
ity. First, I will show how anthropology and (mainstream) policy studies dif-
fer in their approach to policy, with particular emphasis on the dispositions, 
concepts and methods that anthropology offers. These enable researchers to 
come close to policy work, but also to understand it in radically different 
ways. Next, I will explore how we should (re)conceptualize ‘policy’ and what 
theoretical lenses are most appropriate for understanding how policies ‘work.’ 
I will argue that the way policies are objectified and used provides insight 
into some of the deeper cultural codes and ordering principles that structure 
society, particularly the regimes of power that shape the way individuals con-
duct themselves. Finally, I consider the problem that several contributors to 
this volume highlight regarding the disparity between the ‘systemic accounts’ 
of policy processes given by academics and the ‘experiential accounts’ of policy 
professionals themselves. Should we be concerned by the lack of fit that exists 
between outsider (academic) and insider (experiential) accounts of policy, and 
what are the implications of this disparity for our understanding of policy? I 
will also draw out some methodological lessons on how to get close to policy 
work, in order to understand where, how and why policy ‘really’ happens. I 
shall illustrate these themes using ethnographic examples that highlight the 
complexity and ambiguity inherent in all policy analysis.
 Mainstream policy analysis
The dominant account of policy among policy professionals casts policy in 
terms of authoritative instrumentalism: i.e., there are objective entities called 
‘policies’; they are addressed to solving particular ‘problems’; they are the re-
sult of decisions made by some rational authority (e.g., a government, com-
mittee, management board, chief executive etc.); and they are intended to 
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produce some known outcome. In this account, the work of policy consists of 
analyzing (identifying the problem and appraising possible responses), choos-
ing (selecting a response on sound and rational grounds), implementing (car-
rying out the choice) and evaluating (checking that the action taken produced 
the desired outcome).
 With some notable exceptions,3 this approach also dominates academic 
thinking about policy. For instance, in Moran, Rein and Goodin’s Oxford 
Handbook of Public Policy (2006), while the editors aim to be broad and inclu-
sive and to give voice to the whole spectrum of different perspectives on public 
policy, the way the book is framed echoes much of the ‘high modernism’ they 
criticize, as in their definition of policies as programs ‘by which officers of the 
state attempt to rule.’ Public policies, the editors declare, ‘are instruments of 
this assertive ambition,’ and while they try to distinguish their approach from 
‘policy studies in the mode that emerged from operations research during the 
Second World War [which were] originally envisaged as handmaidens in that 
ambition’ (Moran, Rein and Goodin 2006: 3), they end the book with two ap-
pendices containing a précis of the 2004 Queen’s Speech outlining the British 
government’s legislative program, and a summary of President George Bush’s 
2004 ‘State of the Union Address.’ The clear message for the reader is that 
policy is, in Dye’s classic phrase, ‘whatever governments decide to do or not to 
do’ (Dye 1972). Despite talk of ‘postpositivism’ in the policy sciences (DeLeon 
and Martell 2006: 39), the mainstream literature continues to be framed as 
a process in which authorized actors pursue goals and analysts measure the 
desirability and effects of policy in terms of their calculable costs and ben-
efits. Some scholars do recognize the importance of language, rhetoric and 
persuasion as keys to understanding policy processes (Fischer 2003; Gottweis 
2006; Yanow 2006). However, many continue to view policy analysis as a qua-
si-scientific activity that requires a clinical approach. Iris Geva-May’s book 
(2005) Thinking Like a Policy Analyst epitomizes this perspective. For Geva-
May (2005: 2-5), learning to ‘think like a policy analyst’ is not unlike learn-
ing to ‘think like a doctor’ or other ‘clinical disciplines’: both require proper 
professional training, mastery of the appropriate ‘tricks of the trade’ and the 
diagnostic skills of a practising clinician. Policy analysis, she opines, is far too 
important to be left to untrained amateurs.4 For critical social scientists, the 
task is to go beyond ‘learning the tricks of the trade,’ and examine how they 
work in practice, the conditions that create and sustain them, and the kinds of 
relations and subjects they produce. Our aim should also be to challenge the 
typical view of policy that treats it as a rational, linear, top-down process that 
begins with policy formulation and ends with implementation and outcomes.
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 Anthropological understandings of policy
In contrast to the formal neatness of the instrumental model of policy, social 
anthropology emphasizes the messiness and complexity of policy processes, 
particularly the ambiguous and often contested manner in which policies are 
enacted and received by people in different situations. Anthropologists focus 
on how people make sense of things; i.e., the cultural meanings and sym-
bolic significance that policy holds for them. They are interested in the ‘na-
tives’ point of view,’ i.e., the ‘folk-model,’ or actors’ frame of reference (see Ma-
linowski 1961 [1922]; Geertz 1983; Clifford and Marcus 1986). To understand 
how policies ‘succeed’ or ‘fail,’ we need to know something about how they 
are received and experienced by people whose lives they intersect with. What 
makes the State of the Union Address (or Queen’s Speech) anthropologically 
interesting is not simply its content or use of language, but what people say 
and think about it, what they do with it and how it affects their everyday lives. 
An anthropology of policy takes the concept of policy not as an un-analyzed 
given, but as something to be problematized. In order to do so it poses a few 
critical questions:
– What does policy mean in this context?
– What functions does it serve?
– Whose interests does it promote and what are its social effects?
– How does this policy concept relate to other concepts, norms or institu-
tions within the particular society?
– And what are the conditions – and preconditions – that made this policy 
possible?
 Case Study: Locking the Dumpsters
Barbara Cruikshank’s book The Will to Empower: Democratic Citizens and 
Other Subjects exemplifies this approach with a vivid ethnographic vignette. 
Around 1989, she noticed that most of the garbage bins in her neighborhood 
in Minneapolis had been fitted with locks. A key consequence of this was that 
homeless people and recyclers who relied on ‘dumpster diving’ (i.e., scavenging 
food from the large dumpster bins placed outside supermarkets or close to 
shopping malls) were now much less free to live on their own terms. In short, 
those struggling to stay outside the arms of the ‘poverty industry’ would now 
either have to steal or submit themselves to social service charity. Padlocking 
the dumpsters meant a whole means of subsistence was being foreclosed.
 As a civil rights activist, Cruikshank set out to find out who had ordered 
the dumpsters to be locked, and why, in order to protest and reverse the deci-
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sion. She asked cashiers at the local convenience store why the dumpster in 
the parking lot had been locked. They said the reason was because the store 
would be legally liable if anyone were to injure themselves while dumpster 
diving. Next, she asked a neighborhood activist, who explained that it was 
because local residents had complained about the noisy drunks who were 
congregating by the dumpsters; it was an issue of children’s safety. Then she 
discovered that local college students in Minneapolis had been making maps 
of the local bins with timetables for when fresh spoils could be raided. In re-
sponse to this fad, many bagel and pizza shops had stopped putting out trash 
at night. Local shopkeepers, by contrast, explained to her that people were 
dumping household garbage (including old washing machines and furniture); 
therefore locking the dumpsters was a good cost-saving measure. Similarly, 
people involved in charities and health care said locking up the dumpsters was 
a good thing because this was really a public health matter and not an issue of 
limiting individual freedoms.
 Puzzled by this diversity of explanations and still no nearer to an ex-
planation, Cruikshank then asked the company that owns and empties the 
dumpsters who had instituted the lock-up policy or whether there was a law 
they were complying with. Nobody was able to give her an answer. She also 
called their insurance company and the city’s administration, but again failed 
to find anyone able to give an authoritative account. Despite all her efforts, 
Cruikshank was unable to trace the source of this practice, or whether it was 
part of some conscious policy. Finally, she asked some of the down-and-outs 
and homeless people of Minneapolis. They told her that locking up the city’s 
dumpsters was a way for ‘them’ or ‘the system’ to get street-dwellers off the 
streets and under systems supervision.
 (Re)locating the agent in the policy process
There are a number of lessons to be learned from Cruikshank’s story about 
the way social scientists approach policy questions. Perhaps the first is that 
all of the participants observed the same practice and everyone assumed that 
it stemmed from an authoritative decision and that it was intended to lead to 
some preferred outcome; this illustrates the hegemony of ‘authoritative in-
strumentalism’: everyone constructed a story within this account, although no 
one had any actual evidence to support their assumptions, and, when Cruick-
shank began to research the matter, she was unable to find a decision-maker 
or any decision on the matter. This is another illustration of what Elmore 
(1979), in a different context, termed ‘backward mapping’; since there was an 
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observed regularity, there must have been an authoritative choice that must 
have been made in order to achieve some rational outcome.
 Most academic writing on policy is grounded in a similar teleological ac-
count. Yet, as Edward Page observes, some policies become established with-
out ever having been consciously deliberated on; a category of policy that 
arises more from ‘non-decision’ and inaction (Page 2006: 220). While we may 
recognize that systematic regularities in government do not necessarily stem 
from the authoritative will of a decision maker (i.e., not all policies have a sov-
ereign ‘author’), the assumption that they do nonetheless continues to frame 
academic discussion. As Foucault observed, ‘in our political thought and anal-
ysis we have still not cut off the king’s head’ – that is, we attribute observed ac-
tion to some prior decision. By contrast, anthropologists would seldom make 
these assumptions or look upon policy as a problem-solving device, but would 
ask instead how these ways of talking about governing influence what people 
do and say, and the new relations and problems these create.
 We can see, too, that there are many actors in the game, and it is unclear 
whether any of them is actually ‘in charge’. Usually, there is no single authority 
or agent behind policy initiatives. This somewhat Kafkaesque case study il-
lustrates some of the problems that social scientists face in locating and iden-
tifying ‘policy actors’ in an age of advanced neoliberalism where so many of 
the State’s functions have been decentralized and privatized, and where the 
idea of ‘multi-level governance’ has become an accepted idiom for describing 
modern regulatory regimes (Rhodes 1997).
 Th is also has important ramiﬁ cations for notions of accountability and 
democratic control. Minnesota was a democratic state, but the ruling that 
was implemented was not directed by (or even known to) the democratically 
elected city government. What does the lack (or invisibility) of a policy author 
mean for local democracy? If one cannot locate an actual cause, individual or 
institution responsible for a policy reform, what possibility is there for resis-
tance? As Cruikshank puts it, ‘the task for democratic theory, when faced with 
the facelessness of power, could be understood as the eﬀ ort to give power a face 
or a name, to make it visible or accountable’ (Cruikshank 1999: 15).
 Cruickshank draws two further lessons from this story. The first is that 
rather than being pre-occupied with policy authorship and the activities and 
attitudes of policymakers, we need to focus on its wider social effects. It was 
not clear who ordered the locking of the dumpsters or why, but the effect was 
to make it more difficult for marginal people, like the homeless, to survive 
outside of the institutionalized forms of official welfare. Locking the dump-
sters was an important act of exclusion, and the fact that neither a responsible 
policy actor nor policy rationale could be found, only makes this case even 
217Locating the Work of Policy
more interesting. The second insight relates to the wider argument of Cruick-
shank’s book regarding democracy, empowerment and the modern techniques 
of government. Despite the absence of a recognizable policy actor, the dump-
ster lock-ups nevertheless reflect a wider, more diffuse rationality of govern-
ment in relation to the ‘problem’ of homelessness: i.e., one that sees solutions 
to the problems of poverty through the mobilization of ‘community’ assets 
and empowering the poor and homeless to help themselves. Thus everyone in 
the story (except the homeless), for different reasons, was able to agree that 
locking the dumpsters was a ‘good policy.’
 While there is no singular method for doing an ‘anthropology of policy,’ 
just as there is no one way to do policy analysis, anthropology is particu-
larly useful for addressing some of the larger-scale political questions of our 
times such as the transformation of the modern state, the emergence of new 
methods of governing, and the articulation of new relations of power. In our 
Anthropology of Policy: Critical Perspectives on Governance and Power (1997), 
Susan Wright and I argued that policies can be interpreted in terms of their 
effects (i.e., what they produce), the relationships they create, and the wider sys-
tems of thought in which they are embedded. This approach to policy provides 
a useful analytical framework for social science research as it draws attention 
to three critical insights about the mythical, symbolic and political nature of 
policy: namely, that policies work on at least three levels as 1) vehicles for pro-
ducing order, 2) charters for action and 3) a mechanism for distributing and 
concealing power.
 Policies refl ect ‘rationalities of governance’
Policies reflect ways of thinking about the world and acting upon it. They 
contain implicit – and sometimes explicit – models of social organization 
and visions of how individuals should relate to society and to each oth-
er. As such, policies sometimes create new sets of relationships between 
individuals, groups, and nations (think of the US policy of ‘containment’ 
in 1948, which marked the beginning of the Cold War; or the economic 
policies of the UK and New Zealand governments during the 1980s, which 
turned those countries into laboratories for neoliberalism). A key feature 
of policies is the way they work to construct new types of individual (e.g., 
‘citizens,’ ‘ legal adults,’ ‘permanent residents,’ ‘over-stayers,’ ‘immigrants’ etc.) 
and new categories of subjectivity. As the ‘governmentality’ literature dem-
onstrates, a liberal government relies increasingly on ‘techniques of the 
self ’; i.e., on technologies that instill the norms and practices by which in-
dividuals will govern and manage themselves (Rose and Miller 1992). Mod-
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ern government has become, in effect, the art of governing at-a-distance 
by inculcating habits of self-management and self-regulation, turning the 
objects of policy (such as unemployed young people) into subjects, the actors 
in their own regime of control. The policies associated with neoliberaliza-
tion and New Public Management in the USA, Australia and the United 
Kingdom provide vivid examples of how this form of advanced liberal gov-
ernmentality works.
 Policy echoes ‘myth’ in non-literate societies
Drawing on Malinowski’s (1926) observations about the role of myth in Tro-
briand society, we suggested that policies, like myths, provide a ‘charter for 
action,’ accounting for it in a way that ‘makes sense.’ Like myths, policies offer 
rhetorical narratives that serve to either justify or condemn the present and 
to lend legitimacy both to the holders of positions of authority and to the ac-
tions over which they preside. Like myths, policies provide vehicles for unit-
ing past and present in a way that gives coherence, order and certainty to the 
often incoherent, disorderly and uncertain workings of government. Finally, 
like myth, policy also provides a focus for allegiance; a way of uniting people 
around a common goal or purpose, and a device for defining or maintaining 
the symbolic boundaries that separate ‘Us’ from ‘Them.’
 Policy is an expression of power, but this is masked by its being 
described in terms of its putative outcomes
Policy is a way of describing the application of power to manage, regulate 
or change social practice. Being concerned with imposing order and coher-
ence on the world, they therefore express a certain ‘will to power.’ However, 
to describe policies as instrumental does not mean they are somehow devoid 
of symbolism or meaning. The dualism between the ‘instrumental’ and the 
‘expressive,’ central to some schools of thought within Policy Studies, is gener-
ally absent in anthropology. Anthropologists view all policy-making – how-
ever instrumental its intent – as symbolic and meaningful for the involved 
different actors. The key question for social scientists should therefore be 
how meaning is attached to policy accounts, what is accepted as ‘rational,’ and 
whose interests do these accounts serve. To answer those questions we must 
focus on issues of language, discourse and power and the cultural context in 
which policy processes operate.
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 Studying Policy
We have argued that policy work should be viewed as a particular form of 
social and symbolic action. Articulating goals is part of this action, but pol-
icy activity cannot be fully understood as the framing and pursuit of goals. 
Policies themselves – like blueprints or plans – can be usefully conceived as 
a category of condensed symbol (Turner 1967). But the participants will see 
them from different perspectives, and we should recognize that they can have 
multiple meanings, and can be almost consciously ambiguous. This means 
more than ‘policy means different things to different people’; it means that 
policy is concerned with constructing meaning in situations of contestation 
and ambiguity. But is also means that the perspective of the researcher will be 
different to that of the practitioner. If policymakers are ‘professional sense-
makers’ operating in situations of managerial ambiguity (Noordegraaf 2000), 
then anthropologists are professional interrogators of other people’s sense-
making – including the social and symbolic worlds that policy professionals 
inhabit. This raises the question of how much the sense-makers want to have 
their activities interrogated, and in what sense academic research can be ‘use-
ful.’ It may be unrealistic to hope that there can ever be a shared language or 
narrative that unites the diverse perspectives of academics and policymakers.
 Conclusions
If prescription (or advice) to policymakers is not based on such a founda-
tion of understanding, it will either mislead or fall on deaf ears. In turn, 
understanding depends not just on seeing policy making as a strange form 
of theater – with the analyst in the ﬁ rst row of the stalls – but on trying 
to capture the intentions of the authors of the drama, the techniques of 
the actors, and the working of the stage machinery. Empathy in the sense 
of capturing what drives policy actors and entering into their assumptive 
worlds, is crucial (Klein and Marmor 1996: 893).
This quote goes some way towards mapping the contours of what an anthro-
pological approach to policy analysis might look like. Policy is seen as a type 
of ‘performance’ or social drama, the analysis of which requires empathy and 
sensitivity to other people’s worlds of meaning. This emphasis on literary and 
theatrical techniques, recalls the approach of Geertz (1973; 1983). However, 
while a focus on meaning has long been a priority for anthropologists, we 
need to go beyond this if our goal is to explain social phenomena (as the 
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dumpster lock-up example illustrates). To analyze what policies mean, we also 
have to consider the wider socio-economic, political and historical contexts in 
which they are embedded, their preconditions, and the ‘work’ they perform. 
Rather than studying policy as an end in itself, we should remember that 
policy provides a methodological window for exploring wider socio-economic 
patterns and new and emerging rationalities of government. We should step 
back and look at the idea of policy, how it works as an organizing principle 
(and ideology), and the different social and political functions it performs.
 This anthropological perspective relocates policy in multiple ways. Firstly, 
it emphasizes the importance of thinking outside the box of authoritative 
instrumentalism. Policies also have effects that may escape the designs and 
intentions of their authors (if indeed a ‘policy author’ can be identified). Once 
created, policies enter into complex webs of relations with various agents, ac-
tors and institutions, and these entanglements can often result in unanticipat-
ed consequences (for example, think of the problems of ‘insider trading’ and 
corruption that arose following the policies of privatization and de-regulation 
of financial markets during the 1990s). To echo Appadurai (1986) policies, like 
material objects, have ‘social lives’ of their own. When analyzing the work of 
policy, therefore, it is important to reflect on their biographies and the dy-
namics surrounding their translation and interpretation.
 Critical and interpretive social sciences provide a valuable antidote to the 
traditional, normative and rationalist approaches that see policy in terms of 
linear models of decision making and execution. If policies serve as tools for 
extending the reach of government into civil society (Ferguson 2006), they 
can equally be used as instruments for analyzing the workings of government. 
Policies provide a lens for ‘studying up’ and for exploring the worlds of policy-
makers, not simply the peoples to whom policies are addressed. This has im-
portant methodological implications for both Policy Studies and Anthropol-
ogy. One of anthropology’s strengths is its well-honed method of participant 
observation based on long-term fieldwork. This is what enables us to observe 
what people actually do as opposed to what they tell us they do. This empiri-
cal approach is ideal for generating insider knowledge and high quality ‘thick 
description’ that enables us to get ‘under the skin’ of the socio-cultural com-
plexities we wish to understand. However, while such microanalysis is use-
ful for generating local knowledge, anthropologists recognize the limitations 
of these approaches, particularly in the context of our increasingly mobile, 
transnational and globalized world. Many therefore try to follow Marcus’s 
call (1995) for ‘multi-sited ethnography’: conducting research in numerous 
field sites. A policy perspective provides a framework for achieving that goal 
and for exploring the relationship between local and global actors within a 
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particular epistemic community. It can also help us track the connections be-
tween differently situated actors, institutions and sites within a given policy 
community.
 Secondly, an anthropological perspective reminds us that policies contain 
a ‘will to power’: they are an exercise in persuasion and legitimation (Majone 
1989) and they objectify those they target, subjecting them to the anonymous 
gaze of experts. In so doing, policies create new categories of individual and 
new forms of subjectivity.
 There is no single way to analyze policy work. Just as our choice of meth-
ods depends on the questions we seek to answer, so our accounts of policy 
work should also be tailored to suit the particular aspects of policy we wish 
to analyze. For scholars studying policy, the discussion in this chapter has 
important implications in terms of both method and attitude. The research-
er should not try to ‘think like a policymaker,’ abandon disciplinary strengths 
or the analytical and critical distance of the scholar. It is important not to 
reify policy, as policymakers sometimes do, and to remember that policies 
are embedded cultural phenomena that are better viewed as processes than 
as entities. This again highlights an important methodological difference 
between anthropology, policy studies and political science: anthropologists 
focus on the constitutive, whereas political scientists and policy analysts focus 
on the outcome. As one former Norwegian diplomat and political scientist 
has noted:
Anthropologists tend to deﬁ ne politics as a question of who we are, politi-
cal scientists tend to deﬁ ne it as who gets what, where, why and when. In 
the terms of classical political theory, anthropologists focus on the pre-
conditions for political order, and political scientists focus on how that 
order is maintained (Neumann 2009: 256).
This leaves the researcher’s relationship with the world of professional prac-
tice open. As I have argued, researchers should not try to mimic the policy 
practitioners, nor be burdened by the desire to please or prove the ‘relevance’ 
of social science to policy professionals, because what makes research valuable 
to the practitioner is that it comes from a different perspective and can show 
the practitioners things that they could not see. But to communicate this 
requires that researchers develop ways of talking, and practitioners develop 
ways of listening that do not come naturally to either, and this is perhaps the 
greatest challenge for both groups.
222 Cris Shore
 Notes
 I wish to thank the editors for inviting me to write this chapter and, in particular, 
Dvora Yanow and Hal Colebatch for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of 
this chapter.
 This comment was made by a keynote speaker at one of the main panels during the 
 meeting of the American Anthropological Association in Washington, DC.
 See, in particular, the work of Fischer (), Yanow (; ), and Peters and 
Pierre ().
 For example, the ‘bounded rationality’ model used by Jones, Boushey and Workman 
(: ) is based on the ‘scientific analysis of the cognitive architecture of humans.’ 
This assessment is supposedly based on an analysis of ‘how people actually behave 
in experimental and observational situations where comprehensive rationality makes 
precise predictions about outcomes.’
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12  e Lessons for Policy Work
Hal Colebatch, Robert Hoppe and Mirko Noordegraaf
  e focus on policy work
This book has focused on the work that ‘makes policy’ – that is, on policy 
as a field of specialized professional practice rather than on policy as some-
thing created in order to bring about some desirable end. The study of policy 
has tended to focus on the proclaimed goals of policy, on alternative ways 
of achieving these goals, on the characteristics and likely outcomes of these 
alternatives, on the influence of other jurisdictions on policy choices (‘policy 
transfer’), and on the relationship between proclaimed goals, outputs (‘imple-
mentation’) and outcomes (‘effects,’ ‘impacts’). Less attention has been paid to 
the nature of the practice through which policy statements are generated and 
related to the ongoing process of governing, and this dimension of governing 
tended to be referred to in general terms like ‘coordination,’ which seemed 
to describe one of the intermediate outputs rather than the entire process 
through which it was achieved.
 In this way, the concerns of the discipline tended to be shaped by the 
‘official accounts’ of government, which saw governing as the exercise of au-
thority by appropriately empowered leaders to achieve known goals. But it 
became increasingly clear that these were not the only players in the game. 
Policy work was becoming increasingly institutionalized and professional-
ized. There has been an increasing tendency among the governments of many 
liberal democracies to designate staff as policy officers or policy analysts, and 
to create policy branches, sometimes central policy units. This move has not 
been limited to government, as business and professional associations and 
non-government organizations appoint their own policy staff to facilitate 
dealings with government and other bodies. Policy has become a specialized 
form of professional practice, and this has been accompanied by the develop-
ment of forms of specialist training and certification, particularly in North 
America, where graduate schools of public policy began to emerge from the 
1960s. But the significance of this change, and the sort of practice in which 
these players engage, has attracted little attention in the literature on govern-
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ment, with some notable exceptions such as the work of Meltsner (1976) and 
Radin (2000).
The literature has focused on the development and application of ‘policy 
analysis,’ which has been seen as a systematic, expert and unbiased identi-
fication and comparison of alternative courses of action – ‘policy options’ 
– applying a methodology of comparative benefit derived from econom-
ics, which would enable the policy analyst to advise the ‘decision maker’ on 
their optimal choices. This field of knowledge and the institutions which 
sustained it – not only policy positions and organizational units, but also 
textbooks, journals, and conferences – was developed and refined during 
the second half of the 20th century, and, by the end of the century, Radin 
observed that policy analysis had ‘come of age.’ At the same time, she found 
that the work of policy analysts in the US was quite diverse and often bore 
little resemblance to the systematic comparison of alternatives expounded 
in the texts, leaving trained practitioners rather unsettled regarding the ‘dis-
junction’ between the tenets of their training and the demands of the job. 
This was reinforced by other research findings, and by the oral feedback of 
practitioners (e.g., Noordegraaf 2000; 2007; Howard 2005; Adams 2005; 
Page and Jenkins 2004). Noordegraaf ’s policy managers focused not on the 
systematic comparison of options but on the ‘meetings and papers’ through 
which the diverse array of participants sought to reach a mutually accept-
able outcome.
 Here, it became clear that there were two very distinct approaches to 
thinking about policy practice. One is teleological, outcome-focused: the ac-
tivity is about ‘making policy,’ and the focus of attention is on the problem 
being addressed and how the measures proposed would contribute to its 
solution. The alternative approach might be termed relational, or process-
focused: policy activity is a continuing but variable flow of attention among 
a large and diverse array of participants, who have overlapping agendas, dif-
ferent interpretations of the problem, and varying levels of concern about 
its resolution. In this book, we have tried to be open to both approaches, 
but have been particularly concerned about outlining the implications of the 
second, which tends to get less attention in both the academic and the prac-
titioner’s discourse. We have been asking a number of questions such as: 
What is it that policy workers do? What does it mean to ‘make policy’? Why 
do people do it? What are the resulting ‘policies’? Where can these policies be 
found? What are the results?
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  e broadening context of policy work
The image of policy practice in the early discussions of policy analysis was 
relatively uncomplicated because policy was the responsibility of ‘government’ 
– coherent, instrumental, and hierarchical – and the policy analyst was there 
to advise ‘the decision maker,’ who was preferably located in a small unit close 
to the top. It was soon clear, however, that if the person at the top was using 
‘policy analysis’ in his or her decision-making processes, lower-level manag-
ers would want to have their own policy analysts in order to convince the 
boss. Moreover, ‘government’ is composed of a variety of specialized agencies, 
with their own agendas and competing claims on the attention and resources 
of ‘the government,’ and policy analysts have discovered that while they saw 
themselves as ‘advising the Prince,’ they spent much of their time negotiating 
with policy workers from other organizations, attempting to find a mutually 
acceptable and justifiable outcome. Policy analysis was not so much a way of 
determining the optimal course of action, more a set of ‘duelling swords’ to be 
used in structuring negotiations (Radin 2000).
 Policy work was also not limited to state bureaucracies. Political scientists 
noted that stable relationships often developed between state officials and the 
officials of organized interests – e.g., regarding issues of food policy, organi-
zations representing farmers, transporters, wholesalers, retailers, consumers, 
etc.; this constellation of shared concern was called ‘the policy community’ 
(Richardson and Jordan 1979), and the term became popular, reflecting the 
recognition that, to a large extent, policy work was a continuing interaction 
between mutually recognized participants. Governing was less the imposi-
tion of rule by a coherent, external actor (‘the government’) and more of an 
interweaving of different structures and logics into a presentable form. In this 
perspective, the government’s formal acts were often the ‘enactment’ of agree-
ments reached within these broader policy communities, and less concerned 
with the accomplishment of externally determined goals than the constitu-
tion and maintenance of a structure of rules that the stakeholders were com-
mitted to.
 This emerging challenge to the paradigm of government as a coherent and 
hierarchical instrument culminated in the proposition that ‘government’ is re-
placed by ‘governance,’ or rule by negotiation among self-organizing networks 
(Rhodes 1997). Rhodes argued (at least initially) that this was happening in 
the UK – that is, that governance was a descriptive term. Other researchers, 
meanwhile, contested the claim that government had been replaced by self-
organizing networks (Kickert et al. 1997; Johansson and Borell 1999; Bache 
2000; Jordan et al. 2003) and Stoker (1998) argued that governance was actu-
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ally more of a heuristic or analytical term than a description that identified a 
form of governing in which:
– governing is accomplished by actors inside and outside government;
– boundaries and responsibilities are blurred;
– power dependence makes collaboration necessary;
– there are self-organizing networks;
– coordination is achieved without recourse to command.
The implications of this for policy work are that attention shifts from a hi-
erarchical and instrumental, outcome-oriented focus (advising the decision 
makers on appropriate goals) to an interactive, process-oriented one (incor-
porating stakeholders and generating agreed outcomes). The term ‘gover-
nance’ has become a popular term, but it has so many different meanings 
that Offe (2008) wondered whether it had not become just an ‘empty signi-
fier.’ But using it as an analytic category in the way Stoker suggests raises 
many questions about policy work, and in particular about how participants 
are to be recognized, which locations and discourses are acceptable and 
how policy workers should relate to the various agendas and participants 
involved. There are also questions about the extent to which actors from 
outside the official circle – from ‘civil society’ organizations or the unorga-
nized ‘community’ – can engage in these negotiations among officials. The 
‘policy community’ concept reflects a recognition that policy work has taken 
place among people who know each another. However, the widening array of 
participants meant that they might not know each other all that well, that 
modes of mutually acceptable discourse would have to be figured out, and 
that participants would be grappling with the complex, negotiated world in 
which they found themselves.
 Taking an interpretive approach to policy work
The approach taken to policy in this book has been broadly interpretive – 
that is, rather than seeing policy as a statement of the clear choices of ‘the 
government,’ we see it as an exercise in meaning-making, in which par-
ticipants, from inside and outside government address questions in which 
they share an interest, but which they approach from different angles, for 
a range of reasons, and apply varying criteria to define both the problem 
and the appropriate response. Policy texts – statements, plans, and pro-
grams of action – are produced in this process of interaction, but their sig-
nificance can only be understood in relation to the interaction. Participants 
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employ a variety of frameworks of meaning to ‘frame’ the problem in ways 
that make sense to them and validate the courses of action that they prefer, 
so that the meaning of policy texts is, in effect, negotiated between the par-
ticipants, and that the relationship between texts and subsequent action is 
itself part of the practice, not something that follows by definition (‘imple-
mentation’).
 We can see, too, that there is a close relationship between institutions and 
meaning in policy work. A department of agriculture is not simply an instru-
ment to achieve the government’s goals in relation to agriculture; it is a loca-
tion where the dominant framework of meaning privileges agriculture as an 
activity, in contrast to other frameworks such as planning, the environment or 
sustainability. The policy process is likely to involve encounters between these 
different frameworks or, more specifically, between policy workers coming 
from agencies which institutionalize different frameworks. The department 
of agriculture is likely to have established close relationships with agricultural 
interests outside government, which probably have their own policy workers 
and seek to involve themselves in the definition of policy questions. If the 
outcome is a ‘government decision,’ it will be a reflection of the way that these 
different institutionalized participants – i.e. specialized policy workers who 
represent organizations –interact to produce statements on problems, actions 
and resources.
 Policy workers thus tend to discover that they are not making detached 
and context-free comparisons of policy options, but are engaged in ongoing 
interactions with other policy workers about points on which their respective 
institutionalized concerns intersect. Together with other policy workers, they 
have to negotiate the meaning of concern, the terms used to describe them, 
the way that these terms are used to express commitments to action and to 
validate the actions that need to be taken. They are not so much ‘speaking 
truth to power,’ as Wildavsky (1979) had hoped, but ‘making sense together’ 
(Hoppe 1999).
 What can we learn from these accounts?
There are a number of common themes running through these accounts. 
Taken together, they oppose the central assumption of authoritative instru-
mentalism that policy can be understood as political leaders in positions of 
authority involved in a goal selection process. Among the specific themes that 
emerge are the following:
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 a The ambiguity of authority
One of the reasons authority is ambiguous is that it’s not necessarily politi-
cal, as Geuijen and ’t Hart show in their analysis of ‘professional’ authority in 
EU policy making. In chapter 9, we can see policy workers struggling with 
the conflicting ‘authority claims’ of their own agency, their profession, their 
country, and the EU. As a Dutch Brussels-based official put it:
I am here to represent the Netherlands and my colleagues back home 
sometimes have diﬃ  culties appreciating that. Th ey do their individual 
ministries’ bidding. Th eir arena is about pulling and hauling between 
ministries. Here the arena is about pulling and hauling between countries.
This is mirrored in the practitioner’s account in chapter 8, which shows the 
overlapping forms of political authority – the national government, the EU 
and the UN – and even within the EU, the different patterns of authority and 
decision-making procedures that apply to economic activity, foreign policy, 
and police and judicial matters.
 Authority structures can also be ambiguous in national settings. The 
account of policy innovation in the water industry (chapter 6) shows the 
tensions between the authority of parliament, the ministry and the long-
established water boards. The bureau responsible for economic forecasting 
(chapter 5) jealously guarded its autonomy, since its authority depended on 
its being seen as expert and immune to political pressure, but felt that it 
should take note of positions that had been reached in EU policy circles in 
Brussels. So, policy work calls for detailed knowledge about these formal 
authority structures, and judgment about the appropriate way to frame the 
policy activity.
 One of the reasons that authority is unclear is that political leaders are 
sometimes not anxious to assert it. In some cases, as Geuijen and ’t Hart show 
in chapter 9, they are simply not interested in the matter under discussion, 
or they don’t feel that their participation has an impact, and they are content 
to leave it to officials to work out an acceptable resolution, unless they fear 
that the issue may become a political liability. If officials manage to reach a 
consensus, it is described as ‘technical’; if they cannot, it is described as ‘po-
litical’ and passed back to the politicians. Because public support for the EU 
was uncertain, Dutch political leaders were reluctant to be too closely identi-
fied with EU rule making. These Dutch officials often felt that they weren’t 
receiving any ‘steer’ from their leaders. Whenever policy is being developed in 
unfamiliar territory, political leaders are likely to become wary of being too 
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closely identified with it. Loeber’s study (chapter 7) shows that while politi-
cal leaders were happy to embrace the rhetoric of sustainable development, 
the vehicle chosen to pursue it was a temporary, publicly financed foundation 
which could easily be abolished (which was what happened). In uncertain 
areas of governing, political leaders may want to keep their distance.
 At the same time, the authoritative instrumental view has great norma-
tive power and this is how it should be. Both chapters on the EU show of-
ficials looking for a ‘steer’ from their political leaders; without which they 
are inclined to play it safe, and stick with the established positions. But the 
dynamic of negotiations in Brussels means that they have to speak on behalf 
of their respective countries and defend national positions, which have to 
be ‘invented’. This causes great concern among these officials because as one 
official noted, ‘it does not reflect the way the relationship between a minister 
and the civil servants should be.’ Political leaders should lead, and officials 
should follow their lead. When officials realize that this is often not the way 
it happens in can make them very uncomfortable about their policy work. 
‘Eurocrats’, however, learn how to manufacture policy stances – they turn 
into ‘bricoleurs’.
 b Policy work as a continuing process
One obvious characteristic of policy work in these accounts is the impor-
tance of recognizing that it is an ongoing process. In the authoritative choice 
paradigm, policy is seen as a series of discrete episodes with the policymakers 
identifying a problem, considering the alternatives, choosing, and implement-
ing; it is a story with a beginning and an end. This is a convenient way to tell a 
story, but it is not necessarily the way that the participants experience it, and 
the beginning and the end are, in a sense, artifacts of the way we tell a story. 
They single out some elements for attention (e.g., the actions of ‘the poli-
cymakers’ in identifying a problem) and marginalize other aspects (e.g., the 
historical experience, ways of thinking, and interactive context, all of which 
make this issue appropriate). As one of the negotiators in Brussels said (chap-
ter 9), ‘Sometimes we are against a proposal because we have always been 
against it even if no one knows why exactly.’ As Woeltjes points out (chapter 
8), ‘There is no one single problem to be solved. A lot of different issues are 
running at the same time.’ Each episode is part of the continuous flow of ac-
tion, and how matters command attention, and the sort of attention they get, 
reflects past experience – and also, to a certain extent, expectations of future 
dealings (‘the shadow of the future,’ as it has been called) (Axelrod and Dion 
1988). While it may be convenient (and conventional) to begin the story with 
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a choice by the policy actor in question, as Woeltjes points out, policy work 
is reactive as well as proactive, and policy workers will just as likely respond 
to the agendas of other players as they will pursue their own initiatives. ‘With 
or without a coherent political position on the issue, Dutch Eurocrats have 
to anticipate and respond to ongoing moves in EU policy on police coopera-
tion’ (chapter 9). Policy work is part of a pattern of structured interaction and 
these responses take place in a more or less stable framework of expected be-
havior. As de Vries et al. showed (chapter 5), ‘a well-rehearsed (tacit) protocol’ 
has developed over a long period of working together, which governs the way 
that civil servants and experts interact in the production of a policy docu-
ment. And in the water management case study (chapter 7), the question that 
evaluators had to answer was how to find a location in the continuing process 
where their perspective could be presented because, after all, their evaluation 
was part of the policy process, not something external to it. So it is important 
to have good relationships with other participants; even if they are not allies, 
it is important to understand their positions, and to be taken seriously by 
them. Policy workers thus spend a considerable amount of time maintaining 
relationships, keeping relevant others ‘in the loop,’ to facilitate the pursuit of 
consensus when necessary.
 c The leading role of specialists
Even though it might make some of them uncomfortable, policy work is 
mainly considered the domain of specialist officials. As we have seen, this is 
often because the issues are not interesting to political leaders or the general 
public, and it is up to specialist officials from different organizational bases 
to reach a consensus on a workable outcome, which leaders can then endorse. 
This reflects the fact that most governing involves the routine adjustment 
of established patterns, and is accomplished through low-key negotiations 
between interested specialists – the ‘policy community’ that Richardson and 
Jordan (1979) identified. But specialists also take the lead, as in Metze’s study 
of the redevelopment of redundant industrial land (chapter 4), where the ini-
tiative came from the consultants who were then hired to work on the project; 
they assembled the various stakeholders and secured finance from a friendly 
government agency. Similarly, the water management project (chapter 6) orig-
inated with policy specialists hoping that the seeking of policy advice from 
an independent institute would offer an opportunity to advance innovative 
policy directions. The initiative to redevelop industrial land turned out to be 
relatively successful while the water management project was only moderately 
so, which may reflect the absence of an ‘organized counterfactual’ in the land 
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use case – i.e., there were no strong alternative uses for the sites – whereas 
the water management initiative contested the domain of a well-entrenched 
segment of the public bureaucracy.
 d The role of goal statements
In the discourse of authoritative instrumentalism, policy is primarily about 
the ‘big picture’ – the strategic plan or vision that leaders pursue – but it is 
strikingly absent from these accounts. Both accounts of policy work in the EU 
context stress that policy workers were forced to operate despite the absence 
of any clear strategy and a defining strategy did not seem essential in the do-
mestic cases either. In Loeber’s study (chapter 7), one recognized a ‘vision’ of 
sustainable development, but no strategy toward its achievement. Meanwhile, 
the policy work was not concerned with defining a strategy, but with sup-
porting and learning from approaches that were already in place. In the land 
redevelopment case (chapter 4), the policy task was not to develop and imple-
ment an overarching strategy, but to enable the project teams in the different 
sites to develop their own, and to learn from one another in the process. The 
policy workers in the water management case (chapter 6) developed a stra-
tegic perspective, but struggled to find a location where it would be noticed 
and considered significant. They managed to find a fringe audience, but the 
mainstream never saw the need for a new strategy.
 But in contradiction to the previous point, there is a sense that the man-
agement of ongoing professional interactions can actually create a need for 
objectives. The Dutch officials involved in EU negotiations needed a ‘Dutch 
position’ to present and defend at the meetings, so an important part of their 
policy work was constructing a position through negotiation, consensus, the 
inertia of past practices, and sheer improvisation.
 e Policy work as constituting meaning
In all of these accounts, we can see policy workers creating meaning, often 
in ambiguous and contested contexts, where the outcome has to be compat-
ible with the diverse understandings of the participants. In the EU context, 
national representatives had to first construct an understanding that was ac-
ceptable to their constituents at home, and then find the words that all of 
the various national delegations could reach a consensus on. In the redevel-
opment of industrial land case (chapter 4), the need to create meaning was 
openly recognized, and the process was considered an exercise in collective 
learning. However, in the economic forecasting case (chapter 5), it was impor-
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tant that the outcome was seen as the product of disinterested expertise. In 
the sustainability case (chapter 7), the policy workers asked ‘how would this 
broad objective be reflected in our practice?’ and sought to convert existing 
attempts at innovation into learning opportunities. In the water management 
case (chapter 6), the task was to reinterpret existing practice and generate a 
new shared meaning. In this case, meaning interacted with institutionalized 
practice. The EU processes created a need for a ‘national position’ on the issue. 
National officials meet in advance, and these meetings then become exercises 
in ‘problem finding’ (chapter 8) at which ‘some problems become real policy 
items, and some problems just disappear.’ The policy innovators in the water 
management case (chapter 6) had to search for opportunities to find an audi-
ence for their re-framing of meaning in relation to water management. The 
innovators in the industrial sites case were less constrained by established 
procedure, and were able to adopt unusual means (like visual artists) as a way 
of discovering and expressing shared meaning. There is an interplay between 
meaning and structure where meaning informs structured action, and struc-
ture informs appropriate meaning.
 Policy workers are thus engaged in creating and disseminating accounts 
of the process of governing, and there is more than one way of giving ‘a good 
account.’ Talking ‘policy’ is itself a particular account of governing, one that 
highlights the coherence of the process, its authoritative character, and the 
beneficial outcomes that can be expected. It can be contrasted with other 
accounts, which might focus on the divergent and competing agendas of the 
stakeholders, or the force of institutional inertia, or the personal motives 
of some of the individual participants. As we have seen, we can distinguish 
accounts of policy in terms of authoritative choice, which focuses on the in-
tentions of leaders, structured interaction, which focuses on the interplay 
between stakeholders, and social construction, which focuses on the devel-
opment of shared problematization which frames and justifies collective 
 action.
 Policy workers therefore have to know how to use these distinct accounts, 
and to be able to mobilize the appropriate account in each context. An inquiry 
into a policy question may be set up less to find out the nature of the prob-
lem (social construction) than to generate consensus and commitment among 
stakeholders (structured interaction). So policy workers may use a ‘sacred’ or 
‘front office’ account in public, and a ‘profane’ or ‘back office’ account among 
insiders like themselves.
 And policy workers are particularly concerned with the ‘enactment’ of criti-
cal points in the policy process, framing them in the appropriate (usually of-
ficial) account: the ministerial announcement, the National Plan, the budget 
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allocation, etc. They have to constitute the context, which gives meaning to 
the policy action. As we saw in chapter 5, this may be a large public occasion 
with a queen and a golden carriage, or a dry formula about projections and 
variations, both of which are understood ways of creating significance.
 Implications for research
What does this mean for future research in relation to policy work? In what 
follows we do not set a specific and elaborate research agenda. Instead, we 
identify certain research puzzles that can perhaps be investigated in future 
research, which would also include methodological aspects.
 a Institutions and meaning
Perhaps the first thing to note is the importance of institutions, and the re-
lationship between institutions and meaning. By institutions we mean not 
simply organizations, but also structured ways of acting across organizational 
boundaries. Policy work is concerned with creating meaning, and because 
of the close relationship between shared meaning and organization, sharing 
meaning across organizational boundaries can be problematic. But as these 
cases show, it can be done. Woeltjes’ account (chapter 8) suggests that long-
established patterns of working, backed by strong international linkages, and 
aided by the technical complexity of the subject matter (and a lack of public 
interest), can make for shared understanding and fruitful collaboration. This 
can also occur at the national level, as officials prepare for their international 
meetings. Research into policy work, therefore, needs to be attentive to the 
interplay between meaning and institution, and particularly to how this oper-
ates across organizational and national boundaries. This also concerns the 
interplay between continuity and change. Institutions tend to stabilize social 
behavior, whereas (new) circumstances might call for new forms of collective 
behavior. Such behavior has to be enacted, and how exactly this is done in 
complex policy situations is not self-evident.
 The question then is how institutionalized ways of thinking and working 
can be changed, and a number of these cases pointed to the potential for ‘out-
siders’ to facilitate the re-thinking of the nature of the problem and possible 
responses. In the ‘sustainability’ case (chapter 7), responsibility for this policy 
concern was given to a temporary ‘quasi-outsider’ organization, perhaps re-
flecting the ambiguous nature of the political support for the policy goal, but 
while this helped to facilitate innovative ways of thinking, the organization 
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remained marginal and was allowed to expire without having accomplished 
its purpose. In chapter 6, we saw that innovative policy workers turned to an 
independent institute to initiate the re-thinking, but, although the innovators 
acted strategically and sought to present their proposals in the most friendly 
terrain, they were unable to secure support for radical policy change. In the 
industrial land case (chapter 4), the outsiders were more successful, perhaps 
reflecting the absence of a strong agenda among the major stakeholders in 
government, and the fact that, for most of the participants, it was about add-
ing something rather than taking something away.
 b Relations and rationality
This suggests that research should be particularly concerned with relation-
ships, and the shared understandings that are produced by them, and how this 
interplay between relationships and understandings is challenged by conflict-
ing norms of rationality and validation. Writing on policy tends to focus on 
problems, proffered solutions and outcomes, but in these accounts of practice, 
more attention seems to be given to process, and the relationships through 
which it is accomplished. ‘Maintenance work’ on collaborative relationships is 
important, both for the present and the future. Having an institutional frame-
work that facilitates collaboration is important. As we have already noted (p. 
8), the Brussels-based official found that agencies generally experience do-
mestic politics as a conflict, whereas in an EU context, they needed to collabo-
rate to create a national position. The water management reformers (chapter 
6) struggled to find a location for collaboration and tended to be seen as dis-
ruptive, whereas the land developers (chapter 4) had the good fortune to be 
outside the main concerns of the interested parties and were able to develop 
new institutional forms in which collaboration was valued. To achieve this 
collaboration, however, required a ‘tolerance for ambiguity,’ that minimized 
the differences in beliefs and values in the minutes and final document. In 
the EU working party (chapter 9), attention was focused on what elements 
consensus could be reached on, which were then described as ‘technical’. In 
the areas where a consensus could not be reached, the issues were described 
as ‘political,’ and transferred to another forum.
 c Stories and practices
In this respect, it can probably be compared to sociology of science or science, 
technology, society studies (STS) in some ways. There was a gradual shift in 
these fields, from seeing science as rule-governed, ‘algorithmic’ practice to-
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wards a more ‘heuristic’ and ‘socially’ structured view of scientific activities. 
What the epistemologists philosophers of science (like Popper, Lakatos) and 
methodological textbooks claimed was that ‘science’ was seen as an ex post 
rationalization and justification for what science claimed to be. Historical 
(e.g., Kuhn), or empirical (e.g., Latour, Knorr-Cetina) studies of what scien-
tists actually do in their laboratories, show a rather ordinary workaday world 
of discussions and practices, in which the aspiring young scholar is gradu-
ally ‘enculturated’ into a process of learning-by-doing; a process in which he 
gradually hones his assessment skills, which allow him to function in a world 
of the similarly enculturated world of his/her ‘peers.’ Practices and practi-
cal assessments, not algorithms and step-by-step methods, dominate his life. 
Nevertheless, the epistemological and research-methods-and-techniques 
textbooks are essential for ‘front-office’ conversations about the ‘sacred story’ 
of what science is as well as getting research funding. Reality, however, is the 
‘back-office’ talk about the ‘profane story’ of the practices and routines of his 
or her colleagues.
 The comparison to policy analysis is clear; policy analysis, as originally 
conceived and largely still taught in American universities, is a set of ‘al-
gorithmic’ professional practices, dominated by post-positivist convictions 
about reality and how important statistics and economics are for political 
and administrative decision making. The shift from policy analysis to policy 
work advocated in this book is comparable to the shift from epistemology 
and the philosophy of science to the sociology of science and STS: this 
book has argued that the leading concern of the scientific study of what pol-
icy professionals do should not be methodological rules of self-justification, 
but the observation of and immersion in what policy workers are really do-
ing most of the time and achieve by their activities. Just like science is what 
scientists do, policy work is what those professionally engaged in policy 
actually do, in other words, how policy is done and how policy practices 
evolve.
 d Distant, but close
This also suggests that an important task for researchers of policy work is 
not to devise more intellectually satisfying ways of solving problems, but to 
understand the process of discovering the problems. In these accounts, the 
policy process ‘uncovered’ the problems. The problems were not the pre-ex-
isting reason for the institution of a policy process. The problems emerge 
from the frames that are applied to experience. These accounts do not suggest 
a need for more finely crafted analytical techniques, or more elaborate ran-
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domly controlled trials of policy options. The economic forecasters in chapter 
5 did not need more accurate forecasting tools; they needed an institutional-
ized and trusted way of relating their calculations to the other expert players. 
In chapter 9 we saw that policy workers could draw on different institutional 
identities – agency, profession, national and European – in the process of 
framing a situation. Much of the policy work related to overcoming differ-
ences between these framings. Where the practice of cross-organizational 
collaboration was well-established (e.g., chapter 8), concern emerged in a 
process of ‘problem finding,’ in which some issues become identified as prob-
lems to be attended to and others disappear.’ The study of policy processes 
can, of course, involve the use of many research methods, but ‘getting close,’ 
as others (Rhodes et al. 2007) have already argued, is particularly relevant. 
Employing policy practices and in-depth interviews of policy participants 
are especially recommended because of their added value in tracing the evo-
lution of policy work over time but also because of their demanding and 
time-consuming nature. Entering the policy world via ethnographic means 
has rarely been attempted.
 Implications for teaching
Finally, what lies at the basis of all of this is a problematic relationship that 
exists between research and practice, and between the researcher and the 
practitioner. As Loeber discovered (chapter 7), it was impossible to research 
policy practice without becoming part of the practice. And becoming involved 
means coming to terms with the differences between practitioners and aca-
demic ways of describing and evaluating practice. Of our two EU case studies, 
the academic account (chapter 9) revealed the issue of political leaders being 
unavailable to actually lead and no one actually knowing what ‘the Dutch po-
sition’ was. While in the practitioner account (chapter 8), there was an agree-
ment about characterization of practice: officials simply manage the demands 
put upon them when no clear ‘steer’ is offered. The first account is framed in 
terms of implicit constitutional formulations, while the second is framed only 
in terms of the requirements of competent practice. This divergence between 
academic and practitioner accounts is addressed in our final section, where 
Williams (chapter 10) tries to mediate between the two by outlining how a 
‘culture of engaged communication’ could be constructed between practitio-
ners and researchers. Shore (chapter 11), on the other hand, sees the cogni-
tive gap between the two as inevitable, and actually fruitful, as the academic’s 
utility to the practitioner is not that the academic thinks like a policymaker, 
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but that (s)he does not, and can act as a candid critic, making sense of the 
policy workers’ practice with empathy, but in terms which are not limited by 
the constraints of an official position. But, as Loeber discovered, talking to 
practitioners in academic analytical terms risks alienating them rather than 
enlightening them.
 Since we have been discussing what can be learned from these cases, we 
should address the question of how students can learn from them – in other 
words, how teachers of policy might incorporate these lessons into their cur-
ricula. However, we should note not only of what there is to be learned, but 
also of how compatible these lessons are in the format of conventional univer-
sity teaching – segmented into 2-3 month courses, taken part-time, defined by 
content, and tested via essays, projects or examinations.
 There is an established format for teaching policy work, which is the North 
American Policy Analysis style, which teaches a method derived from eco-
nomics and statistics for the systematic comparison of ‘policy options.’ These 
courses are popular, tend to be required courses in Master’s programs and are 
supported by textbooks. But the policy work accounts presented in this book 
do not suggest that policy workers need more training in formal policy analy-
sis.
 What they need, first of all, is to recognize that policy work is as much con-
cerned with process as with outcome. It is a game with many players, diver-
gent agendas, varying levels of skill and attention, with ambiguous and pro-
visional outcomes and where the game never stops. Perhaps the first thing to 
teach would be how to make sense of the multiplayer games to properly iden-
tify the participants, their agendas and practices, and the locations in which 
they interact. This calls for anthropological approaches to policy work (see, 
e.g., Shore and Wright 1997; Yanow 1996), which reflect the aforementioned 
emphasis on ‘getting close.’ In this multiplayer game, policy workers are con-
cerned with the translation between the life-worlds and meaning-frames of the 
different participants, which means that students need to be well-grounded in 
the interpretive approach to policy or the framing, narrative, discourse analy-
sis, etc. skills (see, e.g., Majone 1989; Fischer and Forester 1993; Roe 1994; 
Dryzek 1997; Yanow 2000; Hajer and Wagenaar 2003).
Most importantly, they need to learn that the policy process is context- 
dependent, which is easy to say but hard to teach, particularly in a university 
environment traditionally oriented toward the mastery of content. It calls 
for confronting the student with the complexity of a specific policy situation, 
which is difficult to do in a classroom; case studies and simulations are at-
tempts to meet this need, but tend to be formal and detached both from the 
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life-world of the student and the policy world from which they are drawn. 
Another way of trying to link the student to a specific policy context is to 
draw practitioners into the classroom. However, it is a rare practitioner who 
can step out of his or her role and enter the classroom and present oneself in 
a rigorously introspective and self-critical manner. An alternative is to seek 
some form of practical involvement in a policy workplace. One way of doing 
this is through class projects in a workplace; these are usually defined and 
managed by the teaching staff, but it is possible (though usually difficult) to 
negotiate with a policy workplace to define a project that would be within the 
competence of the students and still be useful to a particular workplace. The 
internship is even more involved in that it usually lasts at least a couple of 
months, and the student actually becomes part of the workforce. All of these 
require the development of a shared understanding between the academy and 
the workplace about the role of each in structuring the activities, drawing the 
lessons and assessing the learning, which is one of the reasons why intern-
ships play relatively insignificant role in university teaching programs. But 
the effort that has to go into organizing such activities is the price to be paid 
for teaching an understanding of the significance of real-life contexts. Since 
learning is an important part of policy work, as we have already seen, it is 
also important that we challenge the assumption that learning only occurs on 
campus and policy work only happens in the workplace. This is a challenge for 
both practitioners and academics.
 Concluding remarks
We began this book by emphasizing the importance of developing knowl-
edge to ‘illuminate the work of policy, both for the outsider who wants to 
understand it and the insider who has to make it happen.’ By stressing the 
importance of account giving, by summarizing available accounts of policy 
work, and by presenting new accounts, by both outsiders and insiders, we 
would probably draw the same lessons that we drew above. We hope this will 
give rise to new and (even) better accounts of processes that are central to 
modern processes of governing societies and thus social welfare and human 
well being.
We must make one final remark on the major theme of this book. There 
is one consistent observation that we found amidst the variety of terms, 
insights and messages, including the varied lessons for research and teach-
ing, and that is that understanding policy work calls for an acknowledge-
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ment of multiplicity. There will never be one, definitive account of policy 
work because policy is too ambiguous and contested to be defined in neu-
tral ways, and because policy is an ongoing process, that evolves over time 
and eschews fixed and static demarcations. Of course, some accounts may 
emerge as more authoritative and in/outsiders may speak convincing truths 
about how truth is spoken to power; but all of these accounts have only rela-
tive value. This implies that both outsiders and insiders can never be told 
precisely how things ultimately work; they will need to invest considerable 
amounts of time and hard effort in developing the competencies to make 
sense of ongoing policies in confusing (policy) worlds. Working for policy 
not only means working in or close to policy and thus contributing to (bet-
ter) policies – it also literally means working for policy, in other words, we 
must do work before policies can be captured and understood. We hope this 
book also works in that way.
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